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The first essay in my dissertation (co-authored with Karen Conway) examines the 
effect of the taxation of social security benefits on elderly labor supply. In 1983, the 
federal government and thirteen states passed legislation that taxed the social security 
benefits of the high income elderly for the first time. The 1983 policy, which required 
individuals with 'combined incomes' over $25,000 ($32,000 for married filers) to include 
up to half of their social security benefits as federal taxable income, has been largely 
ignored by economists. Because the income thresholds have never been indexed for 
inflation, this policy reaches more individuals each year and has become of even greater 
importance with the elimination of the earnings test in 2000. In addition, it has 
implications for other social security policies, such as the earnings test and Delayed 
Retirement Credit (DRC), as well as 'forward-looking' measures used in dynamic 
models. Results from our econometric analysis indicate that the high income elderly 
(especially women) were the most affected and that their labor force participation 
increased as a result, as predicted by our conceptual framework. Using data from 2005, 
we show that the failure to index the income thresholds for inflation, the removal of the 
earnings test, and the addition of a second set of thresholds in 1993 all magnify the scope 
of the 1983 policy, making it more relevant today. 
The second essay considers the effect of public health insurance benefits on 
individual labor supply. Between 1993 and 1995 Medicare increased the coverage of 
iv 
immunosuppression medication for kidney transplant recipients from one year post 
transplant to three years post transplant. Because these medications cost an average of 
$10,000 per year, this policy change provides a large, exogenous source of variation in 
public insurance benefits depending on the year in which an individual receives a 
transplant. While other government insurance programs are either means tested or 
targeted at very specific groups, such as low income women, children, the elderly, or the 
disabled, Medicare's coverage of individuals with end stage renal disease (ESRD) is 
universal. This universal eligibility provides a unique opportunity to explore labor 
supply responses to the provision of public insurance among a large number of men and 
women of prime working age and of all income levels. I find that Medicare's increased 
medication coverage led to a significant decrease in labor force participation, particularly 
with respect to the number of part time workers. The responses of men and women are of 
similar magnitude. These results suggest that labor supply reducing income effects 
should be taken into account when considering the possibility of expanded public health 
insurance coverage, particularly for individuals with chronic conditions, such as diabetes, 
or high expected medical expenditures, such as the elderly. 
Along with labor supply effects, policy makers must be concerned with the 
determinants of enrollment in public programs. Reducing the number of uninsured 
individuals requires that those eligible actually enroll in the program. Despite increases 
in Medicaid eligibility levels throughout the late 1990s, many children remain uninsured. 
Language barriers or a lack of information about the program may prevent individuals 
from enrolling in programs for which they are eligible. This paper tests the hypothesis 
that individuals with stronger social networks are more likely to enroll in public programs 
v 
due to the presence of "network effects." The intuition behind this hypothesis is that 
individuals with greater numbers of contacts belonging to their racial or ethnic group 
should be more likely to be able to obtain information about eligibility levels and 
enrollment procedures. Using Medicaid enrollment data from the Current Population 
Survey (CPS) and housing pattern measures from the U.S. Census Bureau, I test for the 
existence and importance of network effects in explaining geographic differences in 
enrollment among racial and ethnic population subgroups. The results suggest that social 
networks appear to explain some of the variation in enrollment rates for individuals who 
speak only Spanish. These results are sensitive to the choice of model specification, and 
no significant network effects are found when networks are defined by race or ethnicity 
rather than language. 
These three essays add to our understanding of how individuals behave in 
response to changes in public insurance programs. Essay #1 studies the taxation of 
Social Security benefits- a widely overlooked, yet increasingly important federal policy 
that has also been adopted by several states. Essay #2 uses an unexplored policy that 
affects a more demographically heterogeneous sample than the existing literature to 
attempt to improve our understanding of the effects of government provided health 
insurance on individual labor supply decisions. Essay #3 investigates the role of 
information sharing in promoting enrollment in Medicaid. As the fraction of the elderly 
population increases, and as some politicians propose national health insurance plans, 
understanding the effects that these programs have on the economic decisions made by 
households is important for making policy decisions in the future. 
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ABSTRACT 
BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES TO PUBLIC INSURANCE PROGRAMS: THREE 
ESSAYS 
by 
Timothy F. Page 
University of New Hampshire, September, 2008 
Evaluating the effectiveness of public programs requires an understanding of how 
these programs affect the choices of individuals and households. For example, the 
program design of Social Security and Medicare may affect how much people work. 
While these effects are not intended goals of the programs, proper evaluation of these 
programs requires analyzing costs and benefits from all sources, even those that may be 
unintended. Given the growing number of uninsured individuals, currently 47 million, 
policy makers are considering an expanded role for government in the provision of health 
insurance. With any expansion may come secondary effects, such as those on labor 
supply, which must be accounted for and considered when deciding on the proper 
structure and parameters of the policy. Although the goal of expanding current public 
health insurance programs would be to cover more individuals, this goal might not be 
achieved if the public were not well informed about eligibility and enrollment 
procedures. The three essays in my dissertation consider how the Social Security, 
Medicare, and Medicaid programs affect the decisions made by households with regard 
to retirement, labor supply, and program enrollment. The results of these studies provide 
xiii 
useful information for evaluating current programs that will be useful for guiding future 
public policy decisions. 
PART 1: THE LABOR SUPPLY EFFECTS OF TAXING SOCIAL SECURITY 
BENEFITS: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER 
SOCIAL SECURITY POLICIES (WITH KAREN CONWAY) 
THIS PAPER HAS BEEN SUBMITTED TO JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
With a rapidly aging population and a social security program with questionable 
fixture solvency, understanding the link between social security and the labor supply 
behavior of the elderly becomes increasingly important. However, the labor supply 
effects of the social security program are difficult to study empirically because it is 
federally administered and the program rules have not changed much over time, both of 
which limit the possible sources of exogenous variation with which to study its 
behavioral effects.1 In this paper, we investigate an overlooked, additional source of 
variation ~ the 1983 legislation that began taxing social security benefits. 
The 1983 legislation required social security recipients with incomes over 
$25,000 ($32,000 for married filers) to include up to half of their benefits as federal 
taxable income; thirteen states followed the federal government. These thresholds have 
never been indexed for inflation.2 This policy therefore has two potential sources of 
variation, across time and across states, and it also has implications for the incentive 
1
 As discussed shortly, these sources have been limited to the 1977 amendment that changed the calculation 
of benefits (Krueger and Pischke 1992), changes to the Delayed Retirement Credit (DRC, Pingle 2006) and 
changes to the earnings test (e.g., Friedberg 2000 and Haider and Loughran 2007). Some studies, 
especially early studies and the more recent 'forward-looking' models of retirement such as Coile and 
Gruber (2006), use variation across individuals. Because this variation is primarily due to differences in 
earnings histories and marital status, it is potentially endogenous. 
2
 In 1993 a second set of higher thresholds ($34,000/44,000) were added beyond which up to 85% of 
benefits could be subject to tax. To simplify the analysis and also keep to the spirit of a 'before' and 
'after' natural experiment, we focus on the 1983 legislation and the effects it had on the labor supply of 
elderly individuals during that period. We explore the potential effects of the 1993 policy change, as well 
as the elimination of the earnings test in 2000 and the effects of inflation, on current individuals in chapter 
6. 
2 
effects of other aspects of social security policy. Furthermore, the recent removal of the 
social security earnings test and erosion of the income thresholds due to inflation has led 
the policy to becoming increasingly important over time. Surprisingly, however, this 
policy has received little attention from economists and, to our knowledge, we are the 
first to study its behavioral effects.3 
We first provide a conceptual framework that shows the labor supply effects of 
taxing social security benefits and how such a tax interacts with other aspects of social 
security policy such as the earnings test and the Delayed Retirement Credit (DRC). Our 
framework identifies four groups of elderly individuals that are affected in different ways 
by the 1983 policy. One is a 'control' group whose potential income is not sufficient to 
reach the threshold levels without having all of their social security benefits already 
'taxed away' by the earnings test imposed during that time. It is therefore not possible 
for these individuals to be affected by the policy. At the other end of the income 
distribution are the elderly whose nonlabor income alone requires them to pay taxes on 
3
 Butrica et al. (2006) calculates the impact of the federal tax policy on the elderly's implicit tax on work 
but does not investigate the possible labor supply (or other) effects of the policy or the fact that some states 
also began taxing social security benefits. The authors simulate the effects of repealing this policy and 
find large reductions in the implicit tax on work. As discussed shortly, Sevak and Schmidt (2006) examine 
the labor supply effects on the elderly of state income taxation more generally but do not focus specifically 
on the tax treatment of social security benefits. In an earlier study, Chernick and Reschovsky (1985) 
describe the effects of the policy on individuals of different income levels. Although they do not test for 
labor supply effects explicitly, they argue that the taxation of benefits may lead to an overall increase in 
labor supply due to income effects on high income households and the relatively small impact on aggregate 
wages for lower income households. That is, since so few households are in the "phase in" range of the 
policy where the marginal wage is reduced, the overall impact of the implicit tax on earnings will be small 
relative to the total elderly population and any decrease in labor supply resulting from this wage reduction 
could be outweighed by the predicted labor supply increases from those experiencing only a strict benefit 
reduction. These predictions are consistent with our findings- labor supply increases among the high 
income elderly, and we find no evidence of labor supply reductions among the lower income elderly. Our 
study goes beyond the analyses in Butrica et al. (2006) and Chernick and Reschovsky (1985) by describing 
the effects of the policy on labor market incentives and testing explicitly for its labor supply effects. 
3 
the maximum one-half of their benefits regardless of whether they work or not. The 
theoretical prediction for this 'treatment' group is clear - the policy induces an income 
effect that should increase labor supply. There is no effect on wages for individuals in 
this group, so these individuals do not face a substitution effect. The two intermediate 
('treatment') groups are defined in a similar manner, but with competing effects on labor 
supply as the policy also has the potential to reduce their marginal wage. 
To study the policy empirically, we use data from the March supplements to the 
Current Population Survey (CPS) for the years 1981 to 1986. The CPS is a large, 
nationally representative dataset containing information on income, labor market activity, 
and demographics. We focus on the time period surrounding the point when the policy 
was first introduced to obtain the most reliable estimates of the policy's labor supply 
effects.4 The NBER's TAXSEV1 calculator, described in Feenberg and Courts (1993), is 
used to describe the actual and potential impacts of the social security benefit taxation on 
the incomes of affected individuals and to verify the changes in their budget lines 
predicted by our conceptual model. We also include women in our analysis. While most 
economic studies of the social security program focus solely on men, the 1983 policy 
4
 The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) introduced many changes to the tax code, so measuring the effects 
of the 1983 policy change would be more difficult with a longer time frame. For this reason, we restrict 
our analysis to the 1981 to 1986 period. In addition, Bertrand et al (2004) caution against using long 
panels of data surrounding policies that change very little over time. Studying the policy effects for more 
recent years and including the 1993 policy would substantially complicate the analysis, but is a worthwhile 
extension of this research. 
4 
affected a disproportionately high number of women.5 Thus, our study provides more 
comprehensive insights into elderly labor supply behavior. 
Our descriptive analyses, including labor force participation trends for the 
different groups and 'bunching analyses' of incomes similar to those in earnings test 
studies (e.g., Friedberg 2000 and Haider and Loughran 2007), all suggest that individuals 
appear to respond to the policy. This finding is further supported by our difference-in-
differences econometric analysis that estimates the effects of both the federal and state 
policies on labor force participation and hours worked. Consistent with our conceptual 
framework, our estimates suggest that the federal policy led to a substantial increase in 
the labor supply of the high income elderly, particularly women, whereas the other 
groups show little response. The estimated effects of the state policy, however, are 
counterintuitive and persistent to specification checks. We suspect these findings are due 
to the small number of observations receiving this dual treatment and their apparent 
differences with comparable individuals in nontreated states even before the policy is 
implemented. 
The policy's current impact is likely even stronger. Data from the 2005 CPS 
reveal income clustering around the thresholds introduced in 1983 and the second set of 
higher thresholds added in 1993. This analysis of more recent data also demonstrates that 
a much larger proportion of individuals are likely affected by this policy as inflation and 
the elimination of the earnings test has all but removed the 'control' group and has 
pushed more and more individuals into the higher income 'treatment' groups. As the 
5
 This is a consequence of treating spousal earnings as exogenous. While a common assumption in the 
labor supply and social security literatures (e.g., Mroz 1987, Eissa 1995, Friedberg 2000), it is nonetheless 
questionable and we explore its validity later in our analysis. 
5 
labor supply incentives of social security continue to be debated, our research suggests 
that the taxation of benefits is an important policy to consider. 
CHAPTER 1 
1. BACKGROUND AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
The policy of taxing social security benefits can be viewed as both a tax on 
income and a reduction in net social security benefits. Studying the effects it has on labor 
supply therefore draws from and has implications for both strands of research. 
Researchers have studied labor supply responses to social security benefits in several 
different ways. Early studies consider the effects of social security benefits or social 
security wealth6 on retirement (e.g., Fields and Mitchell 1984, Gordon and Blinder 1980) 
with mixed findings. More recent studies emphasize the need to incorporate 'forward-
looking' measures such as the 'accrual effect' - i.e., the potential accrual of future 
benefits if one delays retirement, as discussed, for example, in Coile and Gruber (2006) 
and Gustman and Steinmeier (2007) - and frequently find stronger labor supply 
responses.7 
Social security is a federal program with a benefit structure that has changed little 
over time. As a result, most of these studies must rely primarily on individual-level 
variation that results from differences in earnings histories, marital status and other 
factors that may have independent effects on labor supply and may be endogenous. One 
important exception is Krueger and Pischke (1992), who use the only notable change in 
6
 "Social security wealth" refers to the present discounted value of all future social security benefits. 
7
 Most of these studies are limited to men. For studies that consider the retirement decisions of women, see 
McCarty (1990) and Vistnes (1994), and for joint retirement decisions by couples, Coile (2004). 
7 
program rules, the 1977 amendment that significantly reduced the social security wealth 
of the 'notch' cohort. Friedberg (1999) went back in time to the 1950's to the 
predecessor to social security, the Old Age Assistance (OAA) program that varied across 
states, to find another source of variation in benefits. 
The taxation of social security benefits, especially with the lack of indexed 
thresholds, plays a potentially important role in such models and also could provide new 
sources of exogenous variation (both over time and across states). It reduces net social 
security wealth for high income households and may disproportionately diminish accrual 
benefits, such as delaying retirement and increasing post-retirement income and benefits 
makes it more probable that such benefits will be subject to tax. As we demonstrate 
shortly, the additional annual tax burden is in some cases quite substantial. Incorporating 
the effects of taxing benefits could therefore be a worthwhile extension to these 'forward-
looking' retirement studies and an additional source of variation. 
The lack of independent variation in benefits has led researchers to focus on other 
aspects of social security policy that have changed, notably the earnings test (e.g., 
Friedberg 2000 and Haider and Loughran 2007) and more recently the Delayed 
Retirement Credit (DRC, Pingle 2006).. The DRC creates an incentive to delay receipt of 
social security benefits and is therefore linked with the accrual effect in forward-looking 
studies. The DRC was instituted in 1972 and gave a 1 percent bonus to social security 
benefits for every year that receipt is delayed past age 65 until age 70. It was increased to 
3 percent in 1982, and the 1983 amendments that resulted in benefits being subject to tax 
8 
also raised the DRC for individuals turning age 65 in 1990 or later. Pingle (2006) takes 
a reduced form, difference-in-difference approach similar to ours in studying the labor 
supply effects of this policy change and finds that the increased incentives raised 
employment. 
Taxing social security benefits has the same (apparently unexplored) 
ramifications for the effects of DRC as it does for the accrual effect; the incentives 
provided by increases in the DRC are likely dampened by the increased probability that 
such benefits will be subject to tax, especially over time. Conversely, the DRC has little 
impact for our empirical analysis because of the timing of the policies' changes. While 
enacted in 1983, the legislated increases in the DRC do not affect the birth cohort we 
study (ages 65-69 in 1981-1986). The increase to 3% in 1982 could potentially affect our 
analysis, however, and we therefore investigate the impact that dropping 1981 has on our 
results. 
The policy that has changed the most and received the most attention in the labor 
supply literature is the earnings test (e.g., Honig and Reimers 1989, Friedberg 2000, and 
Haider and Loughran 2007.) The earnings test removes social security benefits at a rate 
of $1 for every $2 (or more recently, $3) of earnings above a specified threshold 
amounts. Therefore, once an individual earns enough to reach the earnings test threshold, 
8
 The amendment raised the DRC in 0.5% increments based on birth cohort with a maximum of 8% for 
those born in or after 1943. See Pingle (2006) for more details of the policy. The 1983 legislation 
introduced other modifications to the social security program as well. As explained in Gustman and 
Steinmeier (1985), the 1983 legislation also included a provision to gradually increase the full retirement 
age to 67 beginning in the year 2000. Duggan et al (2007) investigate both this change and the increased 
penalty for claiming benefits early and note that neither policy change affected individuals born in or 
before 1937; therefore, individuals in our sample are unaffected. The legislation also removed the earnings 
test for individuals over age 70 and reduced the earnings test penalty to 33 cents for every dollar of 
earnings for individuals ages 65 to 69 beginning in 1990. Again, none of these changes affects our sample. 
9 
the implicit marginal tax on earnings increases dramatically. For individuals ages 65 and 
over, the earnings thresholds were $5,500 in 1981 and $7,800 in 1986 (Haider and 
Loughran 2007). The earnings test was completely eliminated for all individuals reaching 
full retirement age in 2000 and now only applies to those who draw their benefits early. 
Our study is closely linked with the earnings test and its literature in several ways. 
The 1983 legislation also eliminated the earnings test for those workers age 70 or over; 
this informs our decision to focus only on those aged 65-69. The other change it made — 
reducing the penalty rate to 1/3 - affects workers turning age 65 in 1990 (and therefore 
not included in our analysis). The fact that earnings test rules did not change between 
1981 and 1986 for individuals in our sample is important. 
However, the earnings test itself, even though essentially unchanged, interacts 
with the taxation of benefits in two interesting ways, as we demonstrate in Chapter 2. 
First, the earnings test enables us to identify workers who could not possibly have been 
subject to the tax - our 'control' group. Due to their low levels of nonwage income, in 
order to reach the taxable thresholds, these workers would have had to earn so much 
earned income that their social security benefits would have already been 'earnings-
tested' away. We also explain how taxing benefits acts to reduce the effect of the 
earnings test for high income earners (because their benefits would have been subject to 
income taxes anyway), yet to our knowledge no earnings test research has recognized this 
link. 
The earnings test is the most similar social security policy to the one we consider 
here because it not only represents a reduction in potential social security benefits for 
elderly workers, but it is also a tax on earned income. The two policies therefore lend 
10 
themselves to similar empirical approaches, including the 'bunching analyses' of both 
Friedberg (2000) and Haider and Loughran (2007) that we perform, and borrow heavily 
. insights from the labor supply and taxation literature. While Friedberg (2000) takes more 
of a structural approach, using piecewise linear, maximum likelihood to estimate her 
labor supply equations, our econometric approach is more similar to the reduced form 
approach of Haider and Loughran (2007) and follows the natural experiment, difference-
in-differences approach in the recent taxation and labor supply literature, such as Eissa 
(1995) and Eissa and Liebman (1996). 
Finally, a recent study of labor supply and income taxation of the elderly is 
relevant. Sevak and Schmidt (2006) use 1998, 2000 and 2002 data from the Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS) for men and women aged 65-84 to estimate labor force 
participation and hours equations that include the potential wage, after-tax nonlabor 
income and the state plus federal marginal tax rate as key regressors. While the tax 
treatment of social security benefits is reflected in this marginal tax rate, the effects of the 
policy are not explicitly considered. Furthermore, the timing of their analysis precludes a 
'before and after' look at the policy. However, the large estimated labor supply 
responses strongly suggest that the elderly are responsive to economic incentives and 
therefore are consistent with the sizable effects we find.9 
In sum, the taxation of social security benefits provides us with an unexplored 
source of variation with which to study a policy that otherwise does not vary much. This 
policy has strong implications for other aspects of social security policy, likely 
9
 They estimate that a 10% increase in the return to work results in a 7.9% (4.9%) increase in the labor 
force participation of men (women) and a 5.3% (6%) increase in hours worked. 
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diminishing the accrual effect and the effects of the DRC and earnings test for high 
income individuals. Fortunately, no other policy changed substantially during the period 
immediately before and after the taxation began, and the existence of the earnings test 
provides us with a 'control' group. We can also draw on the rich set of empirical tools 
from both the tax and earnings test literatures to take a multi-pronged approach to 
investigating the policy's effects. One difference, however, is that our conceptual 
framework, which we present next, provides precise, predetermined conditions for 
classifying individuals into differently affected groups. 
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CHAPTER 2 
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND POLICY DETAILS 
In this section, we lay out the details of the 1983 benefit taxation policy and 
describe how the labor supply incentives faced by individuals of different income levels 
and different income compositions are affected by the policy. We begin with an intuitive 
discussion and simple theoretical framework, followed by a separate subsection that 
rigorously derives the conditions for classifying individuals into different groups, and 
then end by using TAXSIM to verify these conditions and the predicted effects of the 
1983 policy. The details and implications of the 1993 policy that added a second layer of 
taxation of social security benefits are discussed in chapter 6, when we consider the likely 
current effects of this policy. 
Our theoretical framework is static and does not explicitly consider the 'forward 
looking' effects discussed above; we leave such considerations to future work. We also 
follow the common approach of considering the individual's labor supply decision as 
separate from and exogenous to the spouse's. We then use our framework to identify 
four groups of individuals on an (arguably) exogenous basis - by differences in their 
respective amounts of non labor income. Based on these differences in non labor income, 
we determine the incentives facing each group. One group is completely unaffected by 
the policy - our 'control' group - which facilitates our differences-in-differences 
empirical approach. 
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While the assumption of exogenous nonlabor income is common in much of the 
static labor supply (e.g., Mroz 1987, Eissa 1995) and social security earnings test 
literatures (e.g., Friedberg 2000), we recognize that it is a strong assumption and attempt 
to explore its validity in the empirical analysis. Likewise, one can question the 
comparability of treatment and control groups classified on the basis of nonlabor income. 
Eissa (1995), who also uses nonlabor income to classify her groups, discusses in detail 
the conditions necessary for this approach to be valid and reviews existing evidence that 
supports such conditions. As in Eissa (1995), we explore the robustness of our results to 
using an alternative 'control' group.10 Another exercise limits our analysis to single 
individuals to address the possible endogeneity of spousal earnings. Finally, similar to 
past social security studies which use slightly younger (or older) workers as a 'control' 
group (e.g., Friedberg 1999, Haider and Loughran 2007), we investigate the behavioral 
differences across such age groups as well, resulting in a DDD(D) model similar to 
Gruber and Poterba (1994) who also use income as one source of differences in their 
DDD estimator.11 Our results are reasonably robust to all of these investigations. 
Nonetheless, the exogeneity of nonlabor income and the comparability of households 
classified on that basis remain important assumptions - and by extension, possible 
caveats - for this research, and we therefore return to this issue as we present our 
strategy, interpret our findings, and conduct sensitivity analyses. 
Eissa (1995) defines her primary treatment group to be married women whose spousal earnings and other 
nonlabor income place them in the 99th income percentile. Her main control group is married women at the 
75th percentile, but she explores using those at the 90th percentile as an alternative. 
11
 The authors estimate the effects of TRA86 on health insurance purchases of the self-employed by 
comparing the high and low income employed versus self-employed before and after TRA86. 
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2.1. Policy Description and Its Budget Effects 
The Social Security Amendments of 1983 required higher income individuals to 
include social security income as federal taxable income. Filers with "combined 
incomes" above a certain threshold are required to include up to one half of their benefits 
as taxable income. "Combined income" is the sum of adjusted gross income, non-taxable 
interest, and one half of social security benefits. Thus, elderly individuals pay taxes on 
up to one half of their social security benefits if their combined income exceeds the 
threshold, which is equal to $25,000 for single individuals or $32,000 for married 
couples. 
When an individual's combined income reaches the threshold level, benefits are 
added to taxable income at a rate of $1 for every $2 of income above the threshold level. 
Benefits cease to be added to taxable income when the amount of taxed benefits reaches 
50 percent of the total benefit amount. Therefore, when combined income reaches the 
income threshold plus the amount of the individual's social security benefit, half of the 
benefits would be included as taxable income, and no additional benefits can be taxed. If 
combined income is above the threshold but does not exceed the threshold by more than 
the social security benefit amount, then benefits are taxable at an amount equal to one 
half of the amount by which combined income exceeds the threshold. 
Figure 1 depicts the effect of this policy on an individual's budget constraint over 
consumption and leisure before and after the policy change. For ease of exposition, we 
assume a proportional tax on income. We also ignore, for now, the effects of the 
earnings test; this allows us to see the full range of possible impacts for a worker with 
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relatively low nonlabor income and to ignore the implicit tax rate caused by the earnings 
test. (As demonstrated shortly, workers with high nonlabor income will only face the 
leftward portions of the budget constraint and those with low nonlabor incomes will not 
face the policy at all due to the earnings test.) The first kinkpoint occurs when the 
combined income threshold is exceeded, at which point the marginal tax rate increases by 
50 percent as each $1 of earnings causes $.50 of social security benefits to be added to 
taxable income. That is, the marginal wage is now (l-t-0.5t)Wover this range where W 
is the gross wage and t is the assumed proportional income tax rate. This continues until 
the individual has worked/earned enough such that the maximum one half of benefits is 
added as taxable income. This is the second kinkpont; benefits are no longer added to 
taxable income as income and hours increase and the after tax wage returns to its pre 
benefit taxation level, (l-t)W. This policy therefore results in a three-segment, kinked 
budget line. On the first segment, the policy has no effect because the combined income 
threshold has not yet been exceeded. Over the second segment, the after tax wage is 
reduced because benefits are being added to taxable income. Once the maximum amount 
of benefits has been added, the slope of the budget line returns to its original value. 
The segment(s) of this budget line actually faced by a given individual depends 
on the value of non labor income, their social security benefits and the earnings test. 
First, there are individuals whose non labor income plus one half of their benefits12 
exceed the threshold by more than the full amount of their benefits. This treatment group 
Benefits play two roles in this policy. First, one half of benefits is included in the "combined income" 
calculation. Second, if the combined income exceeds the threshold, then benefits are added to taxable 
income at 50 cents for every dollar that combined income exceeds the threshold. Thus, "combined 
income" and "taxable income" have very distinct meanings. 
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pays taxes on the maximum one half of their benefits regardless of their labor supply 
decisions. For this group, the relevant portion of the budget line in Figure 1 is labeled 
Treatment Group #1. The policy creates a pure income effect, with no effect on wages, 
and results in a parallel downward shift of the budget line. For example, consider a single 
individual with asset income of $30,000 and social security benefits of $8,000. In this 
case, combined income at zero earnings exceeds the $25,000 threshold amount by $9000 
($30,000 plus one half of $8,000), which means that $4,500 of benefits could be subject 
to taxation. However, this amount exceeds the maximum one half of benefits subject to 
the tax, or $4,000, and so only $4,000 is subject to tax regardless of how much he or she 
works. For individuals in this group, there is a pure income effect resulting from the 
reduction in social security benefits that should act to increase labor supply. 
The next group of individuals affected by the policy falls in the range of the 
budget line labeled Treatment Group #2. For this group, non labor income at zero 
earnings exceeds the taxation threshold but by less than the amount necessary for the 
maximum benefit amount to be taxed. Thus, at zero hours of work they must include 
some of their benefits as taxable income and that amount grows as they work more hours. 
This leads to a reduction in their after tax wage until the maximum one half of benefits 
have been added as taxable income. For example, consider an individual with asset 
income of $23,000 and benefits of $8,000. Combined income at zero earnings exceeds 
the threshold by $2,000 (23,000 + 0.5*8,000 - 25,000), so this individual will pay taxes 
on $1,000 of benefits even if earnings are zero. If she chooses to work, then there is an 
extra marginal tax on earnings that expires once her combined income reaches $33,000 
(this occurs with an additional $6,000 of earnings). Once combined income reaches 
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$33,000, it exceeds the threshold by $8,000 (the benefit amount) and the maximum one 
half of benefits is taxable. As with treatment group 1, there are income effects present, 
but there is also a wage effect resulting from the fact that additional earnings increase the 
amount of benefits included in taxable income. Therefore, this group also experiences a 
labor supply reducing substitution effect, leading to an ambiguous impact on labor 
supply. 
The final group affected by this policy falls in the range labeled Treatment Group 
3. These are individuals whose combined income at zero hours of work is below the 
threshold. Benefits are not taxed when hours of work are equal to zero. Rather, benefits 
become taxable when earnings push combined income over the threshold. Consider an 
individual with asset income of $18,000 and social security benefits of $8,000. Once his 
earnings push combined income over the $25,000 threshold, benefits are added as taxable 
income, which is equivalent to a tax on wages. The tax on benefits therefore reduces the 
wage for these workers also, again resulting in the usual competing income and 
substitution effects. 
For this group, the number of hours after which benefits become taxable depends 
on both the amount of non labor income and the individual's wage. Holding the amount 
of non labor income constant, higher wage workers will hit the threshold at a lower 
number of hours and should therefore be more likely to face the benefit taxes. Lower 
wage workers will reach the income threshold at a much higher number of hours (or may 
not be able to reach it at all). Holding wages constant, individuals with a higher non 
labor income hit the threshold before individuals with lower amounts of non labor 
income. The effects that wages and nonlabor income have on the relative positions of 
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individuals in treatment group #2 can be determined analogously. In fact, both treatment 
groups #2 and 3 can be viewed as 'intermediate' groups between treatment group 1 and 
the control group that is created by the earnings test. 
The preceding analysis ignores the earnings test, which was still in effect during 
the 1981 to 1986 time period considered in our empirical study. The earnings test does 
three things. First, it makes actual or observed social security benefits depend on 
earnings. The above discussion classifying individuals into groups must therefore be 
refined to refer to maximum possible social security benefits because each group is 
classified based on its position at zero hours of work. Second, it provides an exogenously 
defined control group for our analysis. This control group consists of individuals whose 
benefits would be "earnings tested" away before they reach the combined income 
threshold for social security benefit taxation. Consider a single individual with zero non 
labor income and benefits of $5,000. According to earnings test rules, once earnings pass 
the earnings test threshold13, benefits are reduced by $1 for every additional $2 earned. 
Thus, if the earnings test threshold is $6,000, this individual would have had all benefits 
removed by the earnings test by the time his combined income reached $25,000 ($22,500 
in earnings plus one-half of $5000 in benefits). The earnings test therefore provides an 
exogenously determined 'control' group that will allow us to use a natural experiment 
methodology to determine the labor supply effects of the 1983 policy.14 
13
 Actual thresholds during these years ranged from $5,500 in 1981 to $7,800 in 1986. The average amount 
of social security benefits received by individuals in our sample is $4030. 
14
 As noted above, a fair criticism is that these 'control' individuals are substantially different from the 
other groups due to their low income, although the short period of time makes it seem likely that inherent 
differences are captured by including the treatment dummy variables. To further address this issue, we 
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Third, we need to consider how the earnings test will affect our remaining 
'treated' individuals. The earnings test effectively reduces the marginal wage once the 
earnings test threshold is exceeded and expires once benefits have been reduced to zero 
(which occurs when earnings equal the threshold plus twice the maximum possible 
benefits). It therefore behaves in a similar manner as a tax on benefits, and the two 
policies combine in such a way as to mitigate each other's effects. To see this more 
clearly, consider the case of an individual in treatment group #1 who now faces the 
earnings test (with implicit tax rate, tE =0.5) and a proportional income tax t as before, 
shown in Figure 2. Prior to the 1983 policy, his budget line has two kinkpoints. The first, 
A, occurs when the earnings test threshold is first exceeded and his marginal wage is 
reduced by the implicit tax due to the earnings test (i.e., his marginal wage changes from 
(l-t)W to (1-t- (E)W). The second, B, occurs when all benefits have been 'earnings-
tested' away and the marginal wage returns to its original level. 
The taxation of benefits alters this budget line in two ways. At zero hours of 
work, his net income is reduced by the amount of tax he is paying on the maximum one 
half of benefits, while his marginal wage is unchanged. He will continue along this 
lower, but parallel, budget line until his earnings exceed the test threshold, at which point 
his marginal wage is again decreased. However, with every dollar in benefits lost to the 
earnings test, his tax liability is reduced by one-half his marginal tax rate. Instead of his 
wage being reduced to (1-t- tg)W as before, it is now only reduced to (1-t- tE(l-0.5t))W. 
The new, after-tax policy budget line must rejoin the original one at point B because at 
perform sensitivity analyses that incorporate different types of control groups. These exercises are 
discussed in detail in chapters 3.2 and 5. 
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this level of earnings there are no more benefits to tax or be earnings-tested away. This 
further highlights how taxing social security benefits actually reduces the implicit tax rate 
of the earnings test - the marginal wage must be higher in order for the budget lines to 
rejoin at the level of hours and earnings where all benefits are gone. 
This analysis shows that even within treatment group #1 there is the potential for 
this policy to have wage effects, operating indirectly through its interaction with the 
earnings test. Treatment groups #2 and 3 are affected analogously. For treatment group 
#2, the after-tax/after-eamings test budget line is very similar to Figure 2 except at low 
hours of work, where the after-tax budget line is not parallel because, as before, each 
dollar of earnings adds another $.50 of benefits to taxable income. For an individual in 
treatment group #3, it is possible that the earnings test threshold could be crossed before 
the tax threshold is crossed. Crossing the earnings test threshold first implies a new 
kinkpoint that occurs before the tax threshold and reduces the marginal wage to (1-t-
tgJW. Once the tax threshold has also been crossed, the marginal wage increases to (1-t-
tE(l-0.5t))W. 
More generally, this analysis reveals that individuals, depending on their levels of 
nonlabor income and social security benefits, will cross the earnings test threshold, 
income tax threshold or both, as they work more hours. Individuals in the control group 
cross the earnings test threshold first and at a low level of 'combined income', such that 
by the time they reach the income tax threshold, no social security benefits remain to be 
taxed. At the other end of the nonlabor income distribution, treatment #1 crosses the 
income tax threshold even without working and pays tax on the maximum one half of 
benefits. If they work enough to also cross the earnings test threshold, then the implicit 
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tax it imposes is mitigated by the reduction in their tax liability. The effects of both 
policies disappear once all benefits have been earnings-tested away. Again, treatment 
groups #2 and 3 represent intermediate cases of these two extremes; crossing either 
threshold reduces the marginal wage while crossing the second threshold mitigates that 
decrease. 
Adding the earnings test to our analysis therefore provides us with a control group 
but further complicates the predicted labor supply effects of the treatment groups. 
However, these complications exist only for those who have the potential to cross both 
thresholds. For treatment group #1, the sum of the two effects of taxing benefits (pure 
income effect at zero or low hours of work and an increased marginal wage once the 
earnings test threshold is exceeded) seems likely to increase labor supply. For the other 
two treatment groups, the effect on labor supply remains ambiguous. Fortunately, the 
conditions for classifying individuals into the treatment groups rely only on nonlabor 
income and benefits received at zero hours of work and therefore are unaffected by the 
existence of the earnings test. The next subsection derives these conditions formally. 
2.2. Deriving Expressions for Assignment into Treatment and Control Groups 
As outlined in the previous section, the structure of this policy allows us to assign 
individuals into the treatment and control groups based only on differences in their 
respective amounts of non labor income and maximum social security benefits. While 
many studies in the taxation and labor supply literature, such as Eissa (1995) and Eissa 
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and Liebman (1996), assign individuals into treatment and control groups somewhat 
arbitrarily, our definition of treatment and control groups falls directly out of the 
conceptual framework. As in 2.1, we begin by first ignoring the earnings test and then 
alter the conditions in light of it. 
Combined income is given by: 
Y = V + E + -B. 
2 ' 
(1) 
where Y is combined income, V is non labor income (spousal earnings and assets), E is 
earnings and B is social security benefits. Thus, the individual's taxable income is 
Y, taxable V + E + 
0 






In equation (2), 0 is the minimum amount of benefits that can be taxed, 1/2B is the 
maximum benefit amount that can be taxed, and the middle term is the intermediate case 
where benefits are taxed 50 cents on the dollar for every dollar above Y*, the combined 
income threshold, but where Y is not sufficient for the maximum of one half of the 
benefits to be added. 
Recall that treatment group 1 consists of individuals whose combined income at 
zero hours of work (non labor income plus one half of social security benefits) exceeds 
the combined income taxation threshold by more than the full amount of their benefits, 
which means they pay taxes on the maximum one half of benefits. We identify this 
group with the following condition: 
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V + -B>Y*+B (3) Treatment Group 1 
Thus, the condition on V for this group becomes: 
V>Y* + -B (3 a) Treatment Group 1 
Treatment group 2 has combined incomes at zero hours of work that exceed the 
combined income threshold, but they do not exceed the threshold by an amount sufficient 
to make the maximum one half of benefits taxable. This group is identified by the 
following condition: 
Y*<V + -B<Y*+B (4) Treatment Group 2, 
Or, as a condition on V, 
Y* — B<V <Y* + -B (4a) Treatment Group 2 
The last group of elderly individuals affected by the 1983 policy is the most 
complex, treatment group 3. These are individuals whose combined income at zero hours 
of work is below the threshold, yet if they choose to work, their earnings could push their 
combined income over the threshold. This group is identified by the following condition: 
V + ~B<Y*<V + -B + E (5) Treatment Group 3, 
where E represents maximum possible earnings. This condition is difficult to apply 
because we do not always observe the hourly wage (i.e., nonworkers) and because the 
choice of maximum possible hours is arbitrary, especially for older workers. Fortunately, 
the earnings test provides an additional condition; E may be so high that the individual 
would no longer have any benefits left to tax at that level. However, it also requires the 
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other three conditions to be altered so that they are written as a function of maximum 
social security benefits (what is received at zero earnings). 
To incorporate the earnings test into our analysis, we rewrite observed or actual 
social security benefits as 
B = B--(E-T)ifE>T (6) 
Equation (6) states that the observed benefit amount, B, is the exogenous (in the current 
period) component of benefits, B, less the part removed by the earnings test. If E is less 
than T, the earnings test threshold, then observed benefits consist only of the exogenous 
component. Substituting (6) into (1), we see that an individual must pay taxes on benefits 
if: 
E + V + -(B--(E-T))>Y* (7) 
= E + V + -B--E + -T>Y* (8) 
2 4 4 
= -E + V + -B+-T>Y* (9) 
4 2 4 
We can now define our treatment and control groups more precisely. In 
particular, equations 3, 3 a, 4 and 4a can simply be rewritten such that B appears rather 
than B, because these conditions are derived at zero hours of work (in order to be 
exogenous). Treatment group #3 can now be subdivided into those who could potentially 
reach the income threshold (without specifying a wage or maximum hours) and still have 
benefits remaining, and those who could not (our control group). Re-arranging equation 
(9), an individual is not subject to the tax if: 
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V<Y*--E--B--T (10) 
4 2 4 
Equation (10) implies that the individual's potential income is not sufficient to reach the 
threshold. However, this expression relies on earnings, which are endogenous. So, in 
order to define our control group exogenously, we use the following additional condition: 
Y * -V > 2 B+ T (11) Control Group (isolatedfrom Treatment #3) 
The right hand side of Equation (11) is the amount of earnings where benefits have been 
reduced to zero by the earnings test. The left hand side is the difference between the 
threshold income and non labor income, or the amount of earnings plus half of actual 
benefits required to reach Y*. The inequality specifies that this difference be large 
enough that it would require earnings so large that social security benefits would be zero 
(i.e., E exceeds 2B+ T) per earnings test rules. 
In an effort to assign individuals into the treatment and control groups based on 
exogenous variables15, we use equation (11) to define our control group. Treatment 
groups 1 and 2 are identified by equations (3 a) and (4a), where B is actually maximum 
benefits, B . Individuals fall into treatment group 3 if equation (11) does not hold and 
V<Y*--B. (12) 
2 
If equation (11) does not hold, we cannot exogenously rule out that the individual could 
potentially be affected, while equation (12) requires that the individual does not have 
Again, we follow the literature and treat non labor income, V, as exogenous. We also assume that 
maximum possible social security benefits (those received at zero earnings) are exogenous. 
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enough non labor income to fall into treatment group 2. Thus, the policy creates three 
groups 'treated' differently and one group that should be totally unaffected. 
2.3. Predicted Effects of the Federal Policy Using TAXSIM 
To verify that the budget lines and labor supply effects are as we describe in the 
previous sections, we use the NBER's TAXSIM calculator to plot out budget lines for 
representative individuals in each treatment group. We use the values of social security 
benefits and non labor income given in section 3.1, and we assume a wage of $10 per 
hour. To simplify the analysis, we begin by calculating the effects of the federal income 
tax (only) for a representative individual from each group for hours of work ranging from 
0 to 2080 (40 hours of work for 52 weeks), where the only difference between groups is 
the amount of non labor income assumed. Each after-tax budget line is plotted using the 
federal tax calculator for 1983 (Before) and 1984 (After)16. This allows us to see whether 
the budget line behaves as expected and also whether there were other obvious changes to 
the federal tax system that could confound our results. 
Figure 3 a shows the budget lines plotted for the hypothetical individual in 
treatment group 1 and confirms our predictions. The pure income effect is shown by a 
parallel shift of the budget line after 1983 compared to before. Results from this group 
will have the most relevance for the social security literature because this group 
16
 We also construct budget lines for each year from 1981 to 1986. The only noticeable difference across 
years is that the after-tax V intercept increases slightly each year, likely a consequence of the yearly 
increases in the standard deduction. 
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experiences a strict reduction in net benefits and little or no effect on wages. Results 
from treatment groups 2 and 3 will be more relevant for the taxation and labor supply 
literature because in addition to the policy creating a reduction in benefits, it also creates 
a reduction in the after tax wage. 
Figure 3b shows the budget line plotted for the hypothetical individual in 
treatment group 2. While there is an income reduction even if hours of work are zero, 
there is also a wage effect over some range. This wage effect expires once taxable 
benefits reach the maximum of $4,000. The higher V is for individuals in this group, the 
more they begin to look like individuals in treatment group 1. As V becomes lower, they 
begin to look like individuals treatment group 3. 
The budget lines for treatment group 3 are shown in Figure 3c. Notice that 
benefits are not taxed when hours of work are equal to zero. Rather, benefits become 
taxable when earnings push the individuals combined income over the threshold. In this 
example, the individual has asset income of $18,000 and social security benefits of 
$8,000. Once earnings push combined income over the $25,000 threshold, benefits are 
added as taxable income, which is equivalent to a tax on wages. This exercise therefore 
confirms both that the budget lines of the treatment groups are affected in the way 
predicted by our conceptual framework and also demonstrates that very little else was 
changing in the federal tax treatment for these individuals that might obscure these 
predicted effects. 
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2.4. State Taxation of Social Security Benefits 
Prior to 1983, states did not tax social security benefits. Some states followed the 
federal government when it began taxing social security benefits with the 1983 
legislation.17 During the period of our study, ten states had no income tax or one that is 
very limited (i.e., Tennessee and New Hampshire; Connecticut enacted its income tax in 
1991). Three states (Rhode Island, Nebraska and Vermont) based their tax liability on 
the federal tax liability and so automatically followed the federal government. The other 
states that began taxing social security benefits are Colorado, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma and Utah. These differences in 
state tax treatment of social security benefits provide an additional layer of variation in 
benefits. In addition, state tax liabilities can be indirectly affected by the federal policy if 
the state allows federal income taxes to be deductible. However, we do not classify such 
states as 'treatment' states per se. 
To give an idea of how this policy affected the tax burden of affected individuals, 
we use TAXSBVI to calculate changes in tax burdens for individuals in treatment groups 1 
and 2 calculated using average income values for each group. We take these average 
income values for each group and drop them into each state to calculate the change in the 
This discussion and our conclusions regarding which states followed the federal government are based on 
Zahn and Gold (1985), Table III.l, pp.40-43 for 1985, the results of TAXSIM, and information generously 
provided by Jon Bakija from his income tax calculator (Bakija 2006). In the few instances where we found 
disagreement or ambiguity among the sources (specifically for Georgia, Minnesota, New Mexico, and 
Wisconsin), we consulted with Jon Bakija, Jon Rork, as well as Dan Feenberg and Inna Shapiro at 
TAXSIM/NBER and the relevant legal documents we could locate for the state. We thank all of them for 
their help with this exercise. Our investigation using these sources reveals a few changes during the 'after' 
period of our study, 1984-86. Specifically, it appears as though Minnesota and Oklahoma may have begun 
taxing in 1985 (rather than 1984) and Wisconsin in 1986. In the empirical analyses, we therefore 
investigate the sensitivity of our results to the exact list of states and find our results are robust. For a 
discussion of current state policy, see Conway and Rork (2008). 
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overall tax burden resulting from benefit taxation. We do not report values for treatment 
group 3 because the "average" individual in this group falls below the benefit taxation 
threshold. This exercise is summarized in Table 1. At the federal level, increased tax 
liabilities in 1985 range from $659 for married people in treatment group 1 to $846 for 
single individuals in treatment group 2. Note that these burdens depend on the average 
incomes and benefit levels of each group. At the state level, increased average state tax 
burdens range from $105 for married people in treatment group 1 to $165 for single 
individuals in treatment group 2. Due to the linkages between federal and state tax codes, 
the increased tax burden at the federal level can result in a decreased burden at the state 
level among states that did not tax benefits.18 When we repeat this exercise for 2005, we 
find that the addition of the second set of thresholds in 1993 and increases in benefit 
levels result in increased nominal burdens due to benefit taxation, despite the reductions 
in marginal tax rates due to TRA86. 
This point is discussed in more detail in the next section. 
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CHAPTER3 
3. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
Given that we have one well defined group of people unaffected by the policy, 
studying the policy's labor supply effects lends itself to the difference-in-differences 
approach used in Eissa (1995) and Eissa and Liebman (1996)19. Our main econometric 
model contains the "difference-in-differences" estimates designed to capture the impact 
of the policy at the federal level and "difference-in-difference-in-differences" (DDD) 
estimates designed to capture any additional responses to the policy at the state level. 
Our primary dependent variable is labor force participation, but we also estimate 
equations for hours conditioned on participation and adjusted for selection bias. In 
addition to our econometric analyses, we also provide two different descriptive analyses, 
discussed and reported in Chapters 4.2 and 4.3. 
3.1. Model Specification 
Our main model specification has the form: 
3 3 
P{LFPi=\) = a + Xi,p+ylg ^{Treatmen^ * Federal) + y2g Z(Treatmentg *Statest) + si, (13) 
Note that this reduced form approach does not allow for measures of the welfare effects of taxes on 
social security benefits. Thus, welfare measures such as excess burden and deadweight loss are not 
discussed in this paper. Our approach is also subject to the usual criticisms and caveats regarding 'natural 
experiments' (e.g., Besley and Case 2000). One particularly relevant criticism could be the dissimilarity 
between our control group and treatment #1. We address this criticism in Chapter 5 by investigating the 
robustness of our conclusions to instead using treatment #3 - the treatment group expected to face the 
smallest treatment who is likely more similar - as a control. We find even stronger results in that scenario. 
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where g indexes treatment group, i indexes the individual, s indexes states, and t indexes 
time. X is a vector of control variables, and Treatment is a dummy variable indicating 
that the individual belongs to treatment group g. The vector X contains the full set of 
year dummies, treatment group dummies, state fixed effects, age dummies, and controls 
for gender, race, marital status, and education level.20 The year dummies should capture 
the effects of year to year changes in macroeconomic conditions that may affect labor 
supply. The before and after difference-in-differences estimates for each group are given 
by the coefficients in the row vector yx . Federal equals 0 for the years 1981 to 1983 
and equals 1 for the years 1984 to 1986. State is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the 
years 1984 to 1986 in states that taxed benefits. Therefore, y2g gives the DDD estimate. 
That is, it tests for an additional response at the state level for states that taxed benefits 
over and above the response at the federal level. Standard errors in all models are 
adjusted for clustering at the state level. 
In addition to state and year fixed effects, we attempt to control for changes to tax 
policy at the state level by including a summary state marginal tax rate measure, 
calculated in TAXSIM using average income values for each group, excluding social 
security and pension income. We also include a variable designed to capture explicitly 
any changes in the tax treatment of pension income across states over time. To do this, 
we calculate marginal tax rates in TAXSIM again using only average pension income for 
2
 Because the federal policy only varies over time, the 'federal' dummy by itself (or an additional year 
dummy for the 'after' period) must be omitted to prevent perfect collinearity. Rather, the effects of the 
policy on the 'control' group, usually captured in the policy dummy coefficient, is subsumed in the 'after' 
year dummies, none of which are statistically significant. Replacing the year dummies with a time trend 
plus the 'federal' dummy has no qualitative impact on the results. 
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each group. For those states that fully exempted pension income from taxation during 
this period from taxation, this variable will equal zero. As discussed more by Conway 
and Rork (2008) and Zahn and Gold (1985), there were some changes to state tax policy 
regarding pensions, which this variable should capture. We calculate these measures for 
each year using the same average income values for each group. Therefore, the variables 
are picking up differences across years in state tax policy and differences in these 
changes across groups. Finally, Coile and Levine (2007) find that older workers' 
retirement decisions may be influenced by labor supply shocks, especially 
unemployment. We therefore also include state unemployment rates to account for state 
level differences in labor market conditions. 
We estimate equation (13) with a linear probability model21 to determine whether 
the probability of participation in the labor force changed for treatment group / relative to 
the control group. We estimate equations for men and women pooled together and then 
stratified by gender. The regressions are identified by the assumption that there are no 
other (unobserved) factors correlated with income group and labor supply that coincided 
with the timing of the benefit taxation.22 
In addition to looking at labor force participation, we also estimate equations 
using hours conditioned on participation as the dependent variable. To do this, we 
estimate equations similar to (13) with Heckman two step selection correction models. 
21
 We use a LPM here because interpreting multiple interaction terms in non-linear models is difficult. See 
Ai and Norton (2003). 
22
 This is why we focus our labor supply analysis on this time period. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 
introduced all sorts of changes to the tax code, and the stock market crash of 1987 could have differentially 
affected the higher income individuals in our sample. The 1981-1986 period allows for the estimation of 
the policy's labor supply effects that will not be confounded by these issues. 
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Unfortunately, there is nothing in our data that we suspect would affect participation but 
not hours of work, and so we rely on the non linearity of the estimated inverse mills ratio 
. to identify the participation decision. We also estimate these hours equations with OLS, 
ignoring self-selection, and find similar results. 
3.2. Alternative Models 
We estimate several alternative models in order to check the robustness and 
sensitivity of our results. First, we estimate a model containing only the 
"Treatment*Federal" interactions. This gives a sense of what the overall effect of the 
policy was at a national level and allows us to verify that our results are robust when we 
ask less of the data (e.g., the treatment group sample sizes become quite small when 
limited to certain sets of states). We also stratify the sample by age. It could be the case 
that the young elderly (ages 65 and 66) may respond differently than the older elderly in 
our sample (ages 67 to 69). While differences in the levels of participation will be 
absorbed by the age dummies, there may be differences in the responsiveness to the 
policy by age group. To determine the consequences of treating spousal earnings as an 
exogenous component of non labor income, we estimate separate models for single 
individuals. We also estimate models omitting the years 1981 and 1986 to mitigate the 
potential effects of TRA86 and the increase in the DRC from 1 to 3 percent in 1982. The 
potential for changing macroeconomic conditions to affect labor supply behavior 
provides an additional justification for narrowing the time period further. 
In another specification, we make use of the fact that states, by virtue of different 
marginal tax rates, differ in the intensity of their tax treatment of social security benefits. 
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To obtain an exogenous and continuous measure of the differences in the intensity of 
taxation at the state level, we use TAXSEVI to calculate the change in the marginal tax 
rate around the threshold income levels for each state. After the policy change, the policy 
variable reflects the change in marginal tax rates caused by the benefit taxation. Before 
the policy change, this variable equals zero for all states. Table Al contains a breakdown 
of the changes in marginal tax rates around the income thresholds by state. States riot 
listed experienced no change in state marginal tax rates resulting from the taxation of 
social security benefits. For some states the marginal tax rate decreases slightly. This is 
a product of the linkage between federal and state tax policy. Therefore, the variation in 
the state policy variable is driven by three factors: the decision to tax benefits, differences 
in state marginal tax rates, and cross state differences in the linkage between federal and 
state tax policy. 
Finally, to further investigate the validity of our empirical approach in general and 
our classification by nonlabor income in particular, we look to the social security 
literature for an additional control group or 'straw man.' Many previous studies (e.g., 
Haider and Loughran 2007, Pingle 2006) classify individuals on the basis of age, using 
age groups who are unaffected by the policy change as a control group. One 'straw man' 
exercise we could perform, then, would be to re-estimate our main model using slightly 
younger individuals, classified in the same way into 'treatment' and control groups on the 
basis of nonlabor income.23 Since these individuals are too young to receive social 
23
 Recall that social security benefits are important in assigning individuals into the different groups. For 
that reason, we assign each younger individual the average amount of benefits from the older sample, 
$4030. This practice preserves the basic ranking of individuals according to nonlabor income and provides 
us with a benefit value with which to artificially classify them into groups. 
35 
security benefits and thus are not actually 'treated' in the static model we consider, any 
treatment effect we find would be evidence of a bias caused by our empirical approach. 
Moreover, if this bias is similar across age groups, we can isolate the true treatment effect 
from the bias by estimating the difference between the two age groups. Essentially, we 
can perform a DDD(D) analysis similar to that of Gruber and Poterba (1994) by adding 
another level of variation - the difference between slightly younger individuals and the 
older individuals currently treated by the policy. The effect of state policy is now a four-
way difference, where the policy effect is given by the difference-in-difference-in-
differences between treatment and control states (hence, the fourth 'D'). 
However, as we note in chapter 1, all other age groups are potentially affected by 
the rule changes in 1983, which makes it impossible to find a true 'straw man.' The 
dramatic increase in the DRC that was enacted in 1983 but took effect beginning in 1990 
may have influenced the labor force decisions of younger workers. The youngest 
workers, in particular, could be especially affected because the DRC they face more than 
doubled. Still, one would not expect this policy change to cause strong differences across 
the treatment and control groups because all individuals are potentially affected by the 
DRC. 
There is no question, however, that these younger individuals are not a true 
'control' group. This is not only due to the DRC but also because if individuals are 
'forward-looking' (a necessary condition for the DRC to matter), then they might be 
affected by the expected taxation of their future social security benefits as well. And, this 
effect could very well differ along the lines of our treatment and control group 
classification. For this reason we present this model only as an illustrative robustness 
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check. We also use the age group and time period with the least number of potentially 
confounding effects possible for the exercise. We use the oldest of the slightly younger 
individuals who are not yet nearing regular or early retirement - ages 57-59 - to 
minimize the increase in the DRC they experience. We limit the time period to 1982-85 
(for both age groups) to avoid the initial increase in the DRC for all workers (1981) and 
the anticipated effects of TRA86, which one might expect to affect younger individuals 
differentially according to their nonlabor income.24 Coefficients on all variables are 
allowed to differ between the two age groups to permit maximum flexibility. This 
exercise is therefore equivalent to estimating a separate model on our 'straw man' sample 
(slightly younger individuals) and then calculating and testing the difference in the 
treatment effects across the two samples. Our premise is that the estimated 'treatment' 
effects for the young captures any bias due to our classification approach or other issues, 
such as macroeconomic shocks. Finding similar results after this 'differencing' thus 
provides reassurance that our empirical strategy is valid. 
24
 We also estimate regressions for each possible combination of age definition (the more typically used age 
55-59 versus 57-59) and time period (1981-86 versus 1982-85). As discussed in chapter 5, the results are 
robust to these choices. 
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CHAPTER 4 
4. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE 
We use data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the years 1981 to 
1986. (For some descriptive analyses we also use 2005 data.) The CPS is a large, 
nationally representative cross section of the non-institutionalized civilian population. 
While the research question in this study could perhaps be best answered using panel 
data, there is no suitable panel dataset that covers the time period surrounding the 1983 
policy. The use of a large dataset such as the CPS is also necessary in order to have an 
adequate number of observations for each of our identified groups. Even with this large 
dataset, the sample sizes of some groups, treatment groups 1 and 2 in particular, become 
small as we further subdivide the data into gender and age groups or try to isolate state 
policy effects. 
4.1. Data Description 
Our main sample contains individuals between the ages of 65 and 69. 
the age at which individuals become eligible for full social security benefits. 
25
 Potential candidates are the Retirement and History Survey (RHS), the Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS), The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the Survey of Income and Program Participation 
(SIPP), and the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) of older men. The RHS ended in 1971 and the HRS 
did not begin until 1992. The NLS survey of older men does not cover this time period and also does not 
include women. The PSID is a survey of 5,000 households of all ages, and therefore is likely too small. 
The SIPP did not begin until 1984. Administrative data is not useful for our purposes because we need 
information on income, not just earnings. In fact, we make almost no use of earnings data in this study. 
Finally, using the matched March CPS data, which amounts to a two period panel for each respondent, is 
not feasible for us because matches between the 1984 and 1985 surveys cannot be conducted (Coile and 
Levine 2007). 
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Age 65 is 
We place 
the cutoff at age 69 to avoid complications resulting from changes to earnings test rules 
in 1983 that affected individuals over age 70. The resulting sample contains 36,786 
observations. Individuals are coded as participating in the labor force if they have both 
positive hours worked and have positive earnings26. The various treatment and control 
groups used in this study are defined based on non labor income and benefits as derived 
in chapter 2. The education variable is a categorical variable where individuals are coded 
as less than high school graduate, high school graduate, or some college. 
We compute B, the maximum social security benefit, as the observed benefit plus 
one half actual earnings minus the threshold amount. This essentially "gives back" the 
benefits that were earnings tested away. Again, because actual benefits depend on 
individual labor supply decisions in the current year, they are determined endogenously. 
While this method may not be the ideal way to obtain a measure of maximum benefits, 
the measure is only being used to classify the groups. Furthermore, if individuals are 
mis-assigned into either of the treatment or control groups, due to measurement error for 
instance, our difference-in-difference estimates will be biased towards zero (Lewbel 
2006). Using our measures of non labor income, maximum social security benefits, 
earnings test threshold levels, and policy income threshold levels, we define our four 
study cohorts. 
26
 Conditioning on positive earnings eliminates possible contamination for individuals who report working 
52 weeks the previous year yet have zero earnings. Upon further investigation, these individuals usually 
report their major activity in the survey week as "keeping house." As a robustness check, we also included 
individuals who report looking for work as participating. Results were virtually identical using either 
definition of participation. 
27For the majority of our sample, B and B are equal. Individuals with earnings above the earnings test 
threshold tend to be higher income individuals whose group assignment is not sensitive to the adjustment to 
their benefit levels. 
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Our measure of non labor income, V, contains all non wage income, such as 
interest income, pension income, dividend income, and spousal earnings. As discussed 
earlier, we follow the typical assumption that spousal labor supply and earnings are 
exogenous. Such earnings help determine an individual's marginal tax rate and also 
whether an individual is above or below the benefit taxation threshold, and therefore we 
include them in our measure of non labor income28. To address the possible 
consequences of treating spousal income as an exogenous variable, we calculate the 
correlation between our measure that includes spousal income and one that does not. For 
men, this correlation is 0.64 and for women the correlation is 0.52. This finding suggests 
that the same individuals would likely continue to be classified as the highest income 
(and most likely to be in treatment #1) if we excluded spousal earnings. In addition, 
recall that two of the alternatives models we estimate are designed to test the validity of 
this assumption. 
Table 2 contains descriptive statistics for each of the four cohorts by gender. As 
expected, most individuals during this time period, roughly 66 percent of the sample, fall 
into the control group. Treatment group 2 only contains 1,177 individuals, which could 
pose a problem for finding anything significant in estimation. Treatment groups 1 and 3 
contain 3,763 observations and 7,328 observations, respectively29. In general, the 
Coile (2004) finds that elderly women tend to behave independently of their spouses' labor supply 
decisions. Since spousal earnings are most relevant for women in our sample, this result suggests that 
treating spousal income as exogenous may be a valid assumption. 
29
 Treatment group 3 is defined residually. We first define the control group and treatment groups 1 and 2 
based on exogenous factors. The individuals left over comprise treatment group 3. It is possible that many 
of these individuals, although we cannot exclude them from taxation exogenously, might not have potential 
earnings sufficient to reach the taxation thresholds. The composition and size of our younger sample (aged 
57-59) used in the DDD(D) model is reported in Appendix A2. 
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differences in characteristics are as one would expect, with treatment #1 having a much 
higher non labor income and being a bit younger and better educated than the other 
groups. Interestingly, treatment group #1 has lower maximum social security benefits 
than the other two treatment groups, perhaps suggesting a heavier reliance on non labor 
income throughout their lives and/or shorter earnings histories. 
4.2. Descriptive Labor Supply Evidence 
Figure 4a contains plots of labor force participation rates by cohort. The control 
group shows a slight but steady decline in labor force participation rates from 1981 to 
1986, with a slight uptick in 1985. Treatment group 1 experienced declines from 1981 to 
1983, but from then on labor force participation rates increased, perfectly coinciding with 
the taxing of benefits. Treatment group 3 likewise saw its labor force participation rate 
decline from 1981-83, continuing downward through 1984, at which point it leveled off. 
The series for treatment group 2 is erratic, which is not too surprising given its small 
sample size. Two striking patterns emerge overall. The labor force participation rates for 
all groups are declining during the 'before' period, with treatment groups #1 and 3 
appearing especially similar with strong downward trends. The decline for these two 
groups is reversed after 1983, especially for the group (Tr #1) for which we predict the 
most positive labor supply effects, whereas the trend for the control group remains 
essentially the same. Thus, it appears as though the 1983 policy may have been 
responsible for slowing or stopping the decline in labor force participation rates among 
the highest income elderly, as our conceptual model predicts. 
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Figure 4b contains plots of hours conditioned on participation in the labor force 
by cohort. This figure tells much the same story. For treatment group #1, and to a lesser 
degree #3, we again see a reverse in the decline after 1983. For the control group, 
however, the slight uptick we saw in labor force participation in 1985 appears to continue 
through 1986. Together these two figures suggest that the policy may have halted the 
steady declines in both the labor force participation and hours worked of treatment #1, 
and perhaps #3, while leaving the control group mostly unaffected. 
4.3. Clustering Around Income Thresholds 
In addition to the hypothesized effects on labor supply, the laws of optimizing 
behavior suggest that we should observe individuals clustering on or just beneath the 
benefit taxation thresholds. Allowing for some degree of optimization error, we expect to 
see a higher percentage of elderly individuals with 'combined income' measures around 
i n 
(rather than strictly beneath) the income thresholds after 1983 compared to before. 
Friedberg (2000) and Haider and Loughran (2007) find clustering beneath the earnings 
test thresholds, which suggests that elderly individuals are aware, at least to some degree, 
of the consequences of non-linear budget constraints. 
To look for such clustering, we adopt the 'bunching analysis' method used in 
Haider and Loughran (2007). The histogram in Figure 5 shows the percentage of 
When considering kinked budget constraints caused by non-linear tax systems, researchers typically 
allow for two sources of error: 1) the usual error based on heterogeneity and 2) optimization error, where an 
individual might be attempting to 'land' on or just underneath a kink but may instead wind up just over it. 
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individuals that fall into each combined income "bin". Specifically, we divide each 
histogram "bin" into ten percentage point deviations from the thresholds. For example, 
the bin labeled "-100" contains married individuals with combined incomes between $0 
and $3,200 and single individuals with incomes between $0 and $2,500. The bin labeled 
"0" represents the actual threshold values of $32,000 for married individuals and $25,000 
for single individuals. Therefore, individuals in bins -10, 0, or 10 are within $3200 of the 
threshold if they are married and $2500 if they are single. Studies using 'bunching 
analyses' must often contend with 'round number bias,' which occurs because 
respondents tend to report round numbers such as $25000. However, because the 
combined income measure used to determine whether benefits are taxable is not directly 
reported by individuals in the survey data (we construct it ourselves as the sum of several 
types of nonlabor and labor income plus one half of social security benefits), it seems less 
likely to be an issue here. 
The histogram reveals a slight uptick32 in the percentage of individuals around the 
threshold levels after 1983 compared to before. Figure 5 reports.the histogram for our 
entire sample using nominal values. We construct several alternative histograms to 
explore whether limiting the sample to married people, to younger elderly (aged 65 and 
31
 Histograms are usually represented as bar graphs, but we follow Haider and Loughran (2007) and present 
them as line plots. The line plots make any sudden breaks or jumps more evident than in the bar graph 
representations. 
3
 The clustering observed in this study is substantially less evident than the clustering found around 
earnings test threshold levels. This occurs for a few reasons. First, individuals may not be as aware of a 
measure such as 'combined income' compared to an obvious measure such as earnings. Second, earnings 
test thresholds during this period were between $5,000 and $8,000, which made them more accessible than 
the $25,000/$32,000 taxation thresholds. Third, the marginal impact of the earnings test is larger than the 
marginal impact of the social security benefit taxes-the earnings test removes benefits 50 cents for every 
dollar earned in excess of the threshold, while the benefit taxation merely adds 50 cents to taxable income 
for every dollar in excess of the threshold. 
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66) or both has an impact on the results. We also repeat all of the exercises adjusting for 
inflation by inflating combined income values in the 'before' period (1981-1983) using 
the average value of the GDP deflator from 1984-1986. All are available upon request. 
Overall, these histograms are quite similar to the one in Figure 5, although a couple of 
patterns are evident. Adjusting for inflation moves the before and after lines much closer 
together, as expected, and makes the bulge below the threshold smaller but perhaps more 
obvious. Limiting it to married people and/or the younger elderly leads to a larger uptick, 
using either nominal or inflation-adjusted values. Presumably, the younger elderly are 
more likely to still be working, so to the extent that earnings are the mechanism by which 
individuals are able to control where they fall relative to the threshold, this result should 
also be expected. It may be easier for married households to reach the threshold since it 
is not double that of singles ($32,000 versus $25,000), although it could also lead to more 
optimizing error. 
We formalize this analysis by estimating equations similar to Pingle (2006), 
where we estimate the probability that an individual falls into bin -10, 0, or 10 as a 
function of a time trend (designed to capture the effects of inflation) and a "Post 1983" 
variable. For the entire sample, the "Post 1983" variable is significant at the 10 percent 
level. For married individuals and married individuals ages 65 or 66, the "Post 1983" 
variable is significant at the 5 percent level. Therefore, although the upticks just beneath 
the thresholds are fairly subtle, they behave in a consistent manner, are larger for those 
groups expected to react most and appear to be statistically distinct from an overall time 
trend. Both types of descriptive analyses ~ the 'bunching analyses' and the time trends 
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in labor supply behavior across the groups - therefore suggest that the elderly reacted to 
the taxation of their social security benefits. 
45 
CHAPTER 5 
5. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
This section summarizes the results of our difference-in-differences estimation. 
Our baseline model, given by equation (13), includes the set of Treatment*Federal 
interactions and Treatment*State interactions. The Treatment*Federal coefficients give 
the before and after difference-in-differences estimates for each group resulting from the 
introduction of the policy at the federal level, while the Treatment* State interactions give 
the DDD estimates for states that taxed benefits compared to states that did not tax 
benefits. We estimate both participation equations and self-selection-corrected hours 
equations conditioned on participation. 
Results from our baseline participation equation are reported in Table 3. As noted 
in chapter 3.2, we also implement several sensitivity and robustness checks. These 
exercises are summarized in Table 4 for the key policy coefficients. Some of these 
exercises have a large impact on sample size and therefore the power of the resulting 
estimates, and so we report sample sizes for each, along with treatment group 1 cohort 
sizes, in Appendix A2. All models are estimated with state fixed effects, year dummies, 
age dummies and the other variables described above33. Control variables have their 
The measure of disability available in the CPS does not line up well because it refers to the (current) 
survey year, whereas the rest of the labor market information refers to the previous year. Nonetheless, we 
re-estimate the models including a dummy variable equal to 1 for individuals who report being unable to 
work in the survey year. The policy coefficients are unaffected by the inclusion of this variable. 
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expected signs and are consistent across all exercises. The probability of labor force 
participation increases with education and decreases with age. The effect of being 
married on the probability of participation is positive and significant for males and 
negative and significant for females. High income individuals, especially women, have 
lower labor force participation rates overall, as indicated by the Treatment #1 
coefficients, although the middle to high income groups (treatment groups 2 and 3), have 
higher participation, if anything. 
5.1. Benefit Taxation at the Federal Level 
Turning to the first of our estimated policy effects, the coefficient on the 
"Treatmentl*Federal" variable is positive and significant at the 5 percent level in the 
pooled model and approaches significance at the 10 percent level (t = 1.6) for women. 
Splitting the sample by gender increases the standard errors, which is expected given the 
smaller numbers of observations, but the point estimates are similar to the pooled model 
(0.39 for men and 0.37 for women). In contrast, the federal treatment effect is never 
close to significant for the other two treatment groups. Treatment #2's small sample size 
make this expected, but the lack of significant results for treatment #3 is an important 
finding that further bolsters our results for treatment #1. Our conceptual framework 
makes clear that this is the potentially treated group for which we expect the smallest 
effects. A fair criticism of our approach is that our control group - individuals without 
much non labor income - may not be similar enough to our primary treatment group #1. 
It is reassuring to note that if we instead compare treatment group #1 to treatment group 
#3, a much more similar group as revealed by the descriptive analyses, we arrive at the 
47 
same conclusion. The labor force participation of treatment group #1 is positively 
affected relative to of any of the other groups, just as predicted by our conceptual 
framework. 
These results are also quite consistent and behave as expected across our different 
exercises, reported in the left panel of Table 4. The other two treatment groups continue 
to show no evidence of a significant federal policy effect, except for a couple instances 
that are actually negative, while the effect for treatment #1 remains consistently positive 
and often statistically significant. As we discuss more shortly, the state treatment 
estimates are puzzling, and so we first check to see that our results are robust to their 
omission. The estimated federal policy effect is slightly smaller and no longer 
significant, which is expected given that the federal coefficient now includes the 
weighted average of treated and non-treated state estimated policy impacts. It is 
nonetheless consistent with the rest of the estimates, however. Younger individuals (ages 
65 or 66) appear more responsive than older individuals aged 67 to 69 (0.50 compared to 
0.38). Despite the reduction in sample size, these effects remain significant in the pooled 
model at the 10 percent level. The effects of age appear to differ between men and 
women, as older women appear more responsive than women ages 65 or 66, although the 
coefficients are never significant likely due to the very small number of treatment #1 
observations when subdivided by age and gender. 
To determine whether our significant results for treatment group 1 are a product 
of treating spousal earnings as exogenous, we estimate the models for single individuals 
34
 Specifically, we can reject the equality of the federal*treatment coefficients for treatment groups #1 and 
3 at the 10% level or better in all three cases. The results for treatment #1 are therefore even stronger if we 
compare them to treatment #3 instead of the less similar control group. 
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only. This reduces the sample size by roughly two thirds and the size of treatment #1 by 
even more, so we expect a large impact on precision. The point estimates are of a very 
similar magnitude to our baseline model, so that the lack of significance at conventional 
levels appears to be entirely driven by the (expected) inflated standard errors. In 
addition, we estimate models using a continuous measure of the change in marginal tax 
rates around the benefit taxation thresholds, a specification which recognizes that the 
magnitude of the state policy differs across state tax systems as well as marital status. 
Changes in tax rates at the federal level were 13 percent for single individuals and 12.5 
percent for married couples. Again, the "Treatment l*Federal" coefficient is positive and 
significant in the pooled model and implies a similarly sized effect as the discrete model, 
while treatment effects for groups 2 and 3 are not significant. Re-estimating the models 
omitting the years 1981 and 1986, to remove the possible influences of TRA86 and the 
1981 increase in the DRC, yields very similar results. Finally, our federal results are 
quite robust to our DDD(D) specification in which we attempt to 'difference away' any 
remaining bias by subtracting the estimated 'treatment effect' for the young.35 
Overall, results for treatment group 1 are consistently positive, with a typical 
range of 0.02 to 0.05. This result is robust to splitting the sample by gender, age, and 
marital status, although the effects predictably become weaker in significance as sample 
size diminishes. Results for Treatment groups 2 and 3 are rarely significant and, if so, 
35
 It is interesting to note that the 'treatment' effects for the young tend to be positive, but uniform, across 
all groups, which is consistent with the predicted effect of an increased DRC and the expected wealth effect 
of benefit taxation. Re-estimating the models with a more expanded age group (ages 55-59) and/or time 
period (1981-86) leads to even more positive estimated effects for the young. Nonetheless, the 
relationships between the estimated policy effects for each treatment group are preserved. The estimated, 
age-differenced (DDD(D)) treatment effect for individuals age 65-69 in #1 are consistently larger than 
those for the other groups and is always statistically different from that estimated for treatment #3. 
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negative. These estimates therefore suggest that the approximate 20 percent reduction in 
benefits experienced by treatment group 1 led to an approximate 2-5 percentage point 
increase in the probability of working after the policy's introduction, which is a fairly 
large response relative to the overall rate of only 37% and 15% for men and women, 
respectively, in this group. These results therefore provide supportive evidence that the 
dominant income effects predicted by the conceptual model had a substantial impact on 
the labor supply of high income elderly individuals. 
5.2. Benefit Taxation at the State Level 
A priori, since marginal tax rates and tax burdens at the state level are smaller 
than at the federal level, we expect to see coefficient estimates on the "Treatment* State" 
interactions that are of similar sign to the federal interactions but smaller in magnitude. 
Although the state treatment effects for groups 2 and 3 are again consistently 
unimportant, the "Treatment 1* State" coefficients are negative, highly significant, and 
quite large in the pooled and gender stratified regressions. They are fairly robust to all of 
the exercises we perform in Table 4, and the significance remains even when the sample 
is stratified by age and marital status, which is remarkable given the very small number 
of treatment #1 observations in 'treated' states. They are also robust to the inclusion of 
state specific, group specific, and age specific time trends (not reported, but available 
upon request as are all exercises discussed here). Only the DDD(D) exercise appreciably 
diminishes this result and, even so, the large negative magnitude of the estimated policy 
effect persists. 
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The state results for treatment group 1 are obviously puzzling and lead us to 
explore several alternative explanations. First, the results may be due to small numbers of 
treatment #1 observations in treatment states. In fact, there are only 488 observations in 
treatment group 1 in treatment states, with 218 in the "before" period and 270 in the 
"after" period. However, this explanation is not satisfactory because having a small 
number of observations usually translates into insignificant coefficients. We test whether 
the results could be due to a small number of influential outliers that are driving the 
results, identified as those observations with large Dfbetas for the "Treatment*Federal" 
•ye 
and/or "Treatment*State." However, the influential observations are fairly evenly 
distributed across treatment states, and no troubling pattern stands out; their wholesale 
exclusion from the sample has no real impact. We re-estimate the models dropping one 
treatment state at a time to test whether one influential state is driving the results. We also 
modify our list of treatment states to reflect the apparent disagreement in the literature 
over which states taxed benefits and which states did not. We stratify our sample into 
'treated' and 'control' state observations and then estimate the (total) policy effects for 
each group. (One would then expect a negative/zero effect for 'treated' states and a 
positive effect for 'control' states; this exercise also allows the other coefficients to vary 
by type of state.) In all cases, the basic results remain. 
3
 Dfbetas are calculated as the change in the estimated coefficient when the observation is excluded from 
the sample divided by its estimated standard error. See Judge et al (1988), pp. 895-6 for more discussion. 
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We adapt the 'aggregate' approach suggested by Bertrand et al (2004) to see 
whether our results could be due to unadjusted serial correlation. 37 This exercise 
weakens the estimated state treatment effect somewhat - it is now only -0.067 and 
significant at the 10% level - but does not eliminate it. The estimated federal policy 
effect is generally stronger in this exercise. Finally, we estimate a less restrictive version 
of equation (13) by stratifying the sample into the four groups and estimating a separate 
equation for each. This allows all of the coefficients to differ between groups. The 
statistically significant, negative difference between the state policy's effects on 
treatment #1 versus the control group remains. 
We next examine the actual data - the time trends for the different groups in 
treatment versus control states. As shown in Figure 6 for treatment #1, the series 
behave quite differently between treatment and control states. The downward trend 
among treatment group 1 in treatment states is much stronger than in control states, even 
before the 1983 policy. Both series flatten out in 1983-4, but then diverge in 1985. Note 
that observations in the 'control' states behave exactly as theory would predict and they 
also look much more similar to the overall control group prior to the policy (nationally, 
shown in Figure 4a). The other groups (discounting treatment #2 with its very small size) 
Bertrand et al (2004) provide evidence that many strong difference-in-difference results reported in the 
literature for treatment/control state policies may in fact be due to serial correlation, especially when the 
time series is long and the policy changes are small. The authors suggest an aggregate 'before and after' 
approach which we adapt for our DDD model by constructing state aggregates 'before' and 'after' the 
policy for each of our groups and then re-estimating the model. The results of all of these analyses are 
available upon request. 
52 
have much more similar time trends across treatment versus control states, so the 
difference appears unique to treatment #1. 3 8 
We draw several conclusions from this analysis. First, our econometric results are 
not due to some statistical artifact or influential outlier; the apparent differences in 
behavior over time between treatment and control states appears real. Second, these 
differences existed even before the policy is enacted, which violates a basic requirement 
for the difference-in-differences approach to work, that the treatment and control groups 
are facing similar time trends. It appears as though some other unobservable factor 
specific to treatment #1 may have coincided with the timing of the state benefit taxation. 
Recall that our models already control for group-specific state marginal tax rates 
calculated with respect to pension income and to overall other income. (Omitting these 
policy variables, as well as the state unemployment rate, has no impact on the results.) 
One other possible candidate is the widespread elimination and reduction of state estate, 
inheritance and gift (EIG) taxes during this period, as documented in Conway and Rork 
(2004). These taxes have the potential to impact only the high income elderly; however, 
we detect no strong patterns in either the level or changes in EIG policies across 
treatment and control states.39 Elderly migration in response to tax policy also does not 
seem a plausible explanation. One would expect retired workers to be most likely to 
migrate and so this should reinforce the labor supply effects as retired workers move to 
38
 In all four cases, the labor force participation rates appear to be higher in 'treatment' states rather than 
'control' states, but this overall difference should be captured by the state fixed effects. 
39
 Five of the 13 treatment states eliminated EIG taxes during 1979-86, while 9 of the 37 control states did. 
Overall, 7 of 13 treatment states had no EIG taxes at the end of the period compared to 14 out of 37 control 
states. Treatment states therefore seem somewhat more likely to have abandoned their EIG taxes, but the 
pattern is not strong. 
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low tax states. In addition, the overall rate of state-to-state elderly migration is so small 
(approximately 5% migrate over a 5 year period; see Conway and Houtenville 2001) that 
migrants seem unlikely to exert a large effect in the sample. 
The source of this unexplained difference remains unanswered in our view. We 
are reassured, however, that its significance does not stand up to the DDD(D) model, 
whereas the federal effect does and is strengthened if anything. Given that this policy 
affected only the higher income elderly during the time period of our analysis, we do not 
have a great deal to work with in the data when trying to isolate any effects at the state 
level. However, as more and more individuals are affected by this policy each year, 
future research may be able to adequately address the effects of benefit taxation at the 
state level. Despite the inability of our models to address the effects of this policy at the 
state level, our models estimating the effects of the policy at the federal level generate 
robust results for treatment group 1. 
5.3. Estimates from Hours Equations 
To estimate the effect of the 1983 policy on hours of work conditioned on 
participation, we estimate Heckman two step models. Results from our main 
specification are reported in Table 5. While none of the coefficients is significant at 
conventional levels, the "Treatment l*Federal" coefficient approaches significance at the 
10 percent level (t = 1.54) in the pooled regression. Moreover, if we instead use 
treatment #3 as our comparison group, the effect on treatment #1 is statistically 
significant at the 10% level (i.e., we reject the coefficients' equality at 10% level.) More 
importantly, the odd results at the state level are not present in the hours equations. Once 
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again, neither treatment #2 or 3 is significantly affected by the policy. The control 
variables - education, age, marital status, group assignment - behave in much the same 
way here as they did in the labor force participation regressions. In general, the hours 
equation results are quite similar to the labor force participation equations, except that 
they tend to be weaker, probably due to the smaller sample size, and that the anomalous 
state policy effects are not present. 
We estimate models similar to those in Table 4 for hours equations, but because 
only about one third of our sample works, results from these models are generally 
inconsistent and not significant. As noted by Eissa and Liebman (1996), hours estimates 
are sensitive to model specification issues, so we alternatively estimate OLS hours 
regressions and find similar, mostly insignificant results. There are, however, other 
possible reasons for the lack of significant responses. We will not observe any change 
along the intensive margin if individuals are not able to freely adjust their work hours. 
That is, there may be discontinuities in individuals' choice sets (Haider and Loughran 
2007). Alternatively, the lack of responsiveness could be a product of the conflicting 
labor supply effects predicted by economic theory and our conceptual framework. 
Overall, our results suggest that individuals in the highest income groups (women 
in particular) may have increased their labor force participation and may be working 
more hours relative to individuals in the group not affected by the 1983 policy. However, 
given the limits of our data, it is unclear whether these individuals are delaying retirement 
from their main jobs or whether they are "unretiring" and going back to work as 
described in Maestas (2004) and Reimers and Honig (1993). Because we find stronger 
responses among the women in our sample, existing studies that ignore women in their 
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analyses may be missing an important part of the link between social security benefits 
and elderly labor supply. In addition, Coile (2004) finds that women make their 
retirement decisions more independently from their spouses than men do; this lends 
additional credibility to our results and also provides one possible reason why the men's 
results are weaker (we ignore spousal incentives). The effects of this policy on the joint 
retirement decisions of couples could therefore be even more important. 
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CHAPTER 6 
6. PRESENT DAY SCOPE OF THE POLICY 
As discussed earlier, the policy and its potential effects on labor supply have 
changed in three important ways since its 1983 inception: 1) the erosion of income 
thresholds due to inflation, 2) the removal of the earnings test, and 3) the 1993 policy. In 
this section, we explain within our conceptual framework the expected effects of the 
evolved policy and then repeat our bunching analyses using 2005 data to search for signs 
of a current behavioral response. We also investigate the composition of the 2005 data 
to see how many individuals would fall into each group. 
The erosion of the income thresholds will clearly push more individuals further up 
the income distribution into Treatment #1. The removal of the earnings test in 2000 
eliminates our control group and means that everyone could potentially be affected by 
this tax if they work enough hours. It also means we can ignore the earnings test and its 
interactions and return to the analysis in Figure 1. 
The 1993 policy added a second set of income thresholds in 1993. Specifically, 
beginning in 1993 single and married households with combined incomes above $34,000 
and $44,000, respectively, must begin adding in a maximum of 85% of the social security 
benefits as taxable income.40 In Figure 1, this change causes two more kinks in the left 
The actual rules deviate from what one might expect. As outlined in IRS Publication 915, 2003, 
available online at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p915.pdf, accessed 7/10/07, once combined income 
exceeds the second threshold, households must include .85 of the amount by which combined income 
exceeds the threshold plus the lesser of .5 x benefits or .5 x difference in income thresholds (i.e., .5 x 
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side budget segment and causes treatment group #1 to be further subdivided. Figure 7 
shows the effect of the second set of thresholds (and ignores the earnings test, since it is 
no longer relevant). Individuals whose combined income is large enough to have to pay 
the maximum one half in benefits at zero hours of work again see a parallel downward 
shift in their budget line - until they earn enough to cross the second threshold. At that 
point, they face an increase in their marginal tax rate as they begin paying taxes on more 
of their social security benefits as they work more until they have finally earned enough 
to pay taxes on the maximum 85% of benefits. The budget line and resulting labor 
supply effects are therefore even more complex and the only group that truly faces only 
an income effect (like our original treatment group #1) is the portion of group #1 whose 
combined income at zero hours of work is large enough such that they pay taxes on the 
maximum 85% of benefits. The higher rate (85% versus 50%) suggests even stronger 
potential income and wage effects than before, especially with no earnings test to help 
mitigate its effects. 
Estimating the labor supply effects of the current policy would require an entirely 
different empirical methodology and is well beyond the scope of this study. Rather, we 
investigate the extent to which individuals are potentially affected by using 2005 data 
from the CPS and using similar conditions as those derived in Chapter 2 to assign 
individuals to the various groups. We further subdivide control group #1 into those who 
($34,000-25,000) = $4500 for single; $6000 for married). The amount of taxable benefits cannot exceed 
85% of total benefits, however. This leads to a complicated expression for the level of combined income 
(and by extension, V) at and beyond which the household is paying taxes on the maximum 85% of benefits. 
As a result, households face an additional tax rate of .85t over this range until their combined income is 
high enough such that the maximum 85% of benefits is subject to tax. Further documentation, some 
illustrative examples and the derivation of this second level of income are available upon request. We have 
also verified these findings with additional simulations in TAXSIM. 
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face pure income effects (the highest income individuals) and those facing a more 
complex budget line. These breakdowns are reported in Table 6 for both 1981-86 and 
2005. In 2005 there is no longer a control group, due to the elimination of the earnings 
test, whereas two thirds of our sample was unaffected in 1981-86. Treatment #1 has 
tripled in size, entirely due to the erosion of the thresholds by inflation. Furthermore, 
28% of the sample faces pure income effects (i.e., they are in the far left range of the 
budget line) and therefore should experience an increase in labor supply according to our 
results. Another 12% of the sample faces a combination of income and wage effects, 
such that 40% of the 2005 sample is affected by this income tax policy at zero hours of 
work. The remaining 60% also have the potential to be affected, but likely only those 
with relatively high wages or nonlabor incomes are influenced. In any event, this 
exercise confirms our suspicion that many more people are currently affected by this 
policy. 
To search for evidence of a corresponding behavioral response, we repeat the 
bunching analyses from chapter 4.2 using the 2005 data (Figure 8). There is some 
observable clustering around the (first) social security benefit taxation threshold. Again, 
the clustering is more evident among the younger married elderly. The bin at +30 
roughly corresponds to the $34,000/ $44,000 benefit taxation thresholds that were added 
in 1993. We examine this more closely by repeating the analysis using $44,000 as the 
value in "bin 0" for married people and $34,000 for single people (Figure 9). There is 
also a slight jump in the distribution around this threshold. These exercises confirm two 
things. First, there are substantially more elderly around the thresholds in the 2005 data 
compared to the 1981-1986 data. Second, we observe some clustering in 2005 around 
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both taxation thresholds, which suggests that this policy remains an important factor in 
the labor supply decisions of the elderly. 
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CHAPTER 7 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Almost 25 years ago the federal government and several states began taxing social 
security benefits, and yet this policy has been almost completely overlooked by 
economists. Our purpose here is to close that gap. We set out a conceptual framework 
that helps us to understand the policy's possible labor supply effects and the implications 
that it has for other social security policies, such as the earnings test, Delayed Retirement 
Credit and individual-level measures constructed in 'forward-looking' studies of 
retirement. To investigate the policy's effects empirically, we take a multi-faceted 
approach including 'bunching analyses' of incomes and both descriptive analyses and 
difference-in-difference (and DDD) estimates of labor force participation and hours 
worked using data from the CPS. We focus on the time period immediately before and 
after the policy was enacted (1981-86) in order to avoid the confounding effects of other 
policies (e.g., TRA 86) and to provide the cleanest possible 'natural experiment.' Our 
findings mostly confirm the labor supply effects predicted by our model - that the highest 
income elderly individuals would increase their labor supply (participation and hours 
worked) relative to all other groups as a result of the federal policy. The estimated 
response is also of a meaningful magnitude, where the approximate 20 percent reduction 
in benefits due to taxation causes a 2-5 percentage point increase in the probability of 
labor force participation. 
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The earnings test that was in existence at that time turns out to be quite important. 
It provides us with a control group of individuals who could not have been affected by 
the policy, and it mitigates the wage effects of the policy for those who could be. 
Furthermore, the elimination of the earnings test in 2000 means that everybody over age 
65 is now potentially affected and that the possible effects on labor supply are magnified 
(even for those previously affected). Two other changes also cause the policy to have 
grown in importance - the fact that the thresholds are not indexed for inflation and the 
addition of a second set of higher income tax thresholds in 1993. Using 2005 data from 
the CPS we show that approximately 28% of individuals over age 65 now fit the 
definition of the 'highest income' individuals who should react with increased labor 
supply, compared to only 10% during 1981-86. Another 12% are (ambiguously) affected 
by the policy even at zero hours of work (compared to only 3% earlier). The policy 
therefore continues to grow in importance over time. 
Despite our thorough and careful investigation into this policy's labor supply 
effects, unanswered questions remain. The strong, negative estimated effect of the state 
policy is an unresolved puzzle. We suspect that it is due to the small number of 'treated' 
observations in states that enacted the policy and evidence that these individuals were 
different from their counterparts in states that didn't enact in the policy - even before it 
was enacted. The time period we study, while providing the 'before' and 'after' scenario 
least likely to be confounded by other factors, is limited in that the income thresholds 
were so high in real terms that only a small number of high income elderly were 
predictably 'treated,' especially at the state level. In addition, our empirical methodology 
does not allow for the estimation of the forward looking effects found in more recent 
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studies of the Social Security program. Future research could extend the analysis 
forward and include the effects of the 1993 policy change and the 2000 elimination of the 
earnings test, as well as any changes in state policy. Additional evidence could be 
provided by building the effects of this policy into studies that examine the effects of 
other social security policies and seeing if it has an impact on their conclusions. Given 
our relatively strong results for women and the 'marriage tax' implicit in the income 
thresholds for married and single households, the effects on the joint retirement decisions 
by couples may be especially affected. This policy could also have an effect on other 
behaviors such as savings or state-to-state elderly migration. The policy is affecting a 
growing number of individuals and the research presented here strongly suggests that 
elderly labor supply is reacting to this policy, so further exploring its possible behavioral 
effects appears warranted. 
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Notes: Calculations were performed in TAXSIM for hypothetical individuals constructed 
using average income values by group and marital status. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics by Group and Gender 
Men 
Variable 
Proportion in Labor 
Force 




High School Diploma 







Non Labor Income ($) 
Social Security Benefits 
at zero hours of work ($) 


































































Proportion in Labor 
Force 




High School Diploma 







Non Labor Income ($) 
Social Security 
































































Numbers given are proportions unless otherwise noted 
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Table 3: Labor Force Participation Estimates from Main Specification 
Variable 






























































































































































Notes: Estimates are from linear probability models. Absolute values of t-statistics are in 
parentheses. *,**, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent 
level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by state. 
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Table 4: Estimated Policy Effects from Alternative Labor Force Participation 
Specifications 




















































































































































































































































Cont. Table 4 
Federal Only 
























































































Notes: Estimates are from linear probability models estimated with same specification as 
Table 3. Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. *,**, and *** denote 
significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. Standard 
errors are clustered by state. 
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Table 5: Hours Estimates from Main Specification 
Variable 






Treatment3 * Federal 
Treatmentl* State 
Treatment2* State 





























































































































































Notes: Estimates are from Heckman two step models. Absolute values of t-statistics are 
in parentheses. *,**, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 
percent level, respectively. Standard errors in Heckman models are not clustered by 
state. 
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Notes: Authors' calculations from CPS data. In 2005, treatment 1 is subdivided into 
those who cross the thresholds added in 1993 and those who do not. The removal of the 
earnings test in 2000 eliminates the control group completely. 
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Figure 1: Effect of Social Security Benefit Taxation on Consumption-Leisure Budget 
Line 
Maximum Benefits 
Taxed: Combined Income 
V + E + C1/2B = Y*+B Threshold: V + E + (1/2)B = Y* 
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V+B 








Figure 2: Individual in Treatment #1 with Earnings Test —Before and After 
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Notes: The solid line represents the period before the policy change while the 
dotted line represents the period after the policy change 
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Condition For Assignment into Treatment #1: V>Y* + (1/2)B 
V = $30,000 
Y* + (1/2)B - $25,000 + $4000 = $29,000 
$30,000 > $29,000 
41
 Budget lines were plotted with calculations in TAXSIM for the years 1983 (Before) and 1984 (After) by 
calculating after tax income at each hour of work from 0 to 2000 
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Figure 3b: Treatment Group #2 Before and After 1983 Plotted in TAXSIM 
Effect on wages 
until combined 
income > $33k 
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Condition For Assignment into Treatment #2: Y*<V+(1/2)B<Y*+B 
Y* = $25,000 
V+(1/2)B = $23,000 + $4,000 = $27,000 
Y* + B = $25,000 + $8,000 = $33,000 
$25,000 < $27,000 < $33,000 
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Figure 3c: Treatment Group #3 Before and After 1983 Plotted in TAXSIM 
Y* + B = 33k 
Effect on wages 
until combined 
income > $33k Y* = $25k 
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When hours of work equal zero, V + (1/2)B < Y* 
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Figure 4a: Labor Force Participation Rates by Cohort 
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Figure 4b: Hours Conditioned on Participation by Cohort 
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Figure 5: Bunching Analysis for Entire Sample: Distribution of Combined Incomes 
I -20% j , 
j , , , , Qy^ , _ , , , S 1 
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100 
Combined Income Bin 
— - 1981-1983 1984-1986 
Notes: Each bin represents a 10 percent deviation from the threshold values. Bin 0 
contains married individuals with combined incomes between $32,000 and $35,200 and 
single individuals with combined incomes between $25,000 and $27,500 
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Notes: Slopes are given along the x-axis 
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Combined Income Bin 
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•2005 •1981-1983 
Notes: Each bin represents a 10 percent deviation from the threshold values. Bin 0 
contains married individuals with combined incomes between $32,000 and $35,200 and 
single individuals with combined incomes between $25,000 and $27,500. The second set 
of social security taxation thresholds ($32,000 single, $44,000 married) occurs 
approximately at bin +30. 
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Notes: Each bin represents a 10 percent deviation from the threshold values. Bin 0 
contains married individuals with combined incomes between $44,000 and $48,400 and 
single individuals with combined incomes between $34,000 and $37^400 
87 
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Although Montana was one of the states that taxed benefits, Montana uses a measure different than the 
'combined income' measure used at the federal level. 
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TABLE A2. COHORT SIZES FOR ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS 
REPORTED IN TABLE 4 
Sample Sizes 
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PART 2: LABOR SUPPLY RESPONSES TO GOVERNMENT PROVIDED 




Between 1993 and 1995 Medicare increased the coverage of immunosuppression 
medication for kidney transplant recipients from one year following transplantation to 
three years following transplantation. These medications, which are necessary for the 
long term survival of a transplanted kidney, cost an average of $10,000 per year43. 
Therefore, this policy change provides a sharp, exogenous increase in public insurance 
benefits depending on the year in which an individual receives a kidney transplant. 
Those transplanted before July 1, 1993 received only a one-year benefit, while those 
transplanted after July 1, 1995 received a three-year benefit. These medications are 
covered by Medicare Part B, which reduces the out-of-pocket cost to the individual by 80 
percent, or approximately $8,000 per year44. I use this exogenous source of variation in 
public insurance benefits to study the labor supply effects associated with the provision 
of public insurance. 
This particular component of the Medicare program has certain characteristics 
that allow for a more comprehensive analysis of labor supply effects than other insurance 
programs administered by the government. Other government sponsored insurance 
programs, such as Medicaid, federal Disability Insurance, and Medicare for the 
43
 Danovitch (2005) reports the average cost of medications in 2003 was $10,000 per year. The least 
expensive regimen costs $6,000 while the most expensive costs$17,500. In this paper, I estimate average 
treatment effects (ATEs) using his average estimate of $10,000 per year. Future work could examine local 
average treatment effects (LATEs) to determine whether labor supply responses were larger for those with 
more expensive regimens. During the period studied, the typical cost range was $7,000-$ 12,000. 
Patients are also required to pay the $89 monthly Part B premium. 
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elderly, are either means tested or targeted at very specific groups, including low income 
women, children, the elderly, or the disabled. Medicare's coverage of individuals with 
end stage renal disease (ESRD, or kidney failure) is universal. This universal eligibility 
provides a unique opportunity to explore labor supply responses to the provision of 
public insurance among a more demographically heterogeneous group of individuals. 
Although individuals with private insurance may opt not to enroll in the ESRD 
component of the Medicare program, the fact that eligibility is not means tested allows 
for analysis of individuals at all income levels. Also absent is the incentive to stop 
working in order to qualify for the benefit. The program's universal eligibility also 
affords the rare opportunity to study labor supply responses to government insurance 
among a large number of prime working age men and women. 
Admittedly, kidney transplant recipients may not be entirely representative of the 
general population. However, despite being recipients of kidney transplants, these 
individuals are relatively healthy. While the end stage renal disease population as a 
whole is less healthy than the general population, I focus only on transplanted 
individuals. Patients fortunate enough to receive transplants are those individuals whose 
quality of life would improve the most by receiving a transplant and thus are highly 
selected on health status. In the year 2000 there were approximately 220,000 patients 
undergoing dialysis treatment for ESRD, of which only 9,000 (about 4 percent) received 
a transplant from a deceased donor (United States Renal Data System 2000 Annual Data 
Report). The current kidney shortage results in only the healthiest patients receiving 
transplants. Further, I limit the study sample to individuals whose kidneys are 
functioning at the time of data collection. Among the entire sample used in this study, 91 
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percent of the patients with functioning transplanted kidneys report "no activity 
limitations". Ogutmen et al. (2006) find that transplant recipients report significantly 
better quality of life after transplantation than individuals on dialysis, while Ichikawa et 
al. (2000) find that patients with functioning transplants report quality of life measures 
"nearly similar" to the general population. Despite the improved quality of life resulting 
from transplantation, co-morbidities, such as diabetes, may reduce the probability that a 
transplanted patient is able to work. Therefore, employment rates among this population 
are lower than employment rates in the general population. 
Medicare's increased medication coverage for kidney transplant recipients 
resembles other public health insurance expansions, such as the Medicaid expansions of 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, but does not create certain empirical difficulties typically 
encountered in studies of Medicaid expansions. Immunosuppresion medications are 
necessary for the long term success of kidney transplant patient outcomes, so examining 
kidney transplant patients circumvents the problems of low take up rates among those 
without other forms of insurance and the endogenous nature of selection into other 
publicly provided health insurance programs. However, this policy change does create a 
few conflicting labor supply incentives. The income effect associated with the large 
transfer payment theoretically discourages labor supply, while the potential health 
benefits of the increased duration of medication coverage may promote labor supply. It 
is also possible that individuals will opt out of employer provided insurance, resulting in 
higher wages. This should not affect part time workers, who may not be eligible for 
employer provided insurance. 
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To study the labor supply effects of this policy, I divide the sample into high and 
low income groups defined by median income of the residential zip code. Individuals 
residing in lower income zip codes are less likely to be privately insured, and the value of 
the increased benefit comprises a larger share of household income. For these reasons, 
one could expect the labor supply responses, if any, to be greater for lower income 
individuals. Using the median income of the zip code to identify treatment effects avoids 
the endogeneity associated with using individual incomes or insurance status, which are 
both closely tied to labor supply decisions. Kidney transplant recipients are not likely to 
be directly comparable to the general population, so comparing labor supply responses 
within the kidney transplant population is the most appropriate method of identifying the 
labor supply effects of the coverage increase. 
Duration analysis, analysis of labor force transitions, and difference-in-differences 
estimation of employment rates reveal that overall labor force participation rates were 
lower after the policy change and that individuals delayed re-entry into the labor force 
following transplantation. These effects are larger for individuals in the low income 
group, as predicted. Most of the decrease in labor force participation resulted from a 
large reduction in the number of individuals working part time after transplantation. The 
participation decrease suggests the presence of dominant income effects associated with 
the coverage increase. Although this evidence comes from a segment of the population 
that is not entirely representative of the general population, these estimates may be 
representative of individuals with chronic conditions, such as diabetes, or individuals 
with high expected medical expenses, such as the elderly. 
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CHAPTER 1 
1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Because this study relates to a group of individuals with which most readers are 
probably unfamiliar, in addition to reviewing the literature on the labor supply effects of 
publicly provided insurance, I also include background information about kidney 
transplant patients in general and a history of Medicare's coverage of 
immunosuppression medications. 
1.1. Background on ESRD and Kidney Transplantation and Medicare Policy 
End Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) is the clinical term for chronic kidney disease, 
or kidney failure45. The kidneys are organs that filter minerals from the bloodstream. 
Chronic kidney disease is caused by a number of factors, such as diabetes and 
hypertension. Diabetes is the leading cause of kidney failure and is present in 40 percent 
of the ESRD population. According to Danovitch's (2005) Handbook of Kidney 
Transplantation, in 2000 there were 275,000 individuals receiving dialysis for ESRD46. 
Due to the increase in obesity and diabetes this number is expected to reach 520,000 by 
2010. Approximately half of the patients on dialysis are over age 65, and the average age 
of patients receiving kidney transplants has increased over time. Fifty three percent of 
45
 All of the clinical information presented in this section is taken from Danovitch (2005). 
46
 This estimate is different from the 220,000 figure reported by the United States Renal Data System. 
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patients with ESRD are male and 37 percent are black. In 2004, there were 60,000 
patients on the kidney transplant waiting list. 
Upon failure of the kidneys, individuals must undergo dialysis treatment, where 
the patient's blood is filtered through a machine and then pumped back into the patient. 
Patients receive dialysis treatment an average of 3 times per week, and each treatment 
lasts roughly 2.5 to 5 hours. This frequent treatment presents a significant obstacle to 
being able to work. Despite the critical shortage of donor kidneys, some patients with 
ESRD are fortunate enough to receive kidney transplants. The number of deceased donor 
kidneys has remained constant around 9,000 per year47. In this study I focus on 
recipients of deceased donor kidneys due to the positive selection on health caused by the 
current kidney shortage. While recipients of kidneys from living donors have better long 
term graft survival rates, these patients are not as closely selected on health status. 
Transplantation rates are lower for older individuals due to the risks associated 
with transplanting older patients, and transplantation rates are lower among blacks due to 
the lower availability of donor organs. Patients that are not considered to be good 
transplant candidates and therefore are not among those on the transplant waiting list 
include elderly patients, morbidly obese patients, smokers and drug users who refuse to 
quit, and patients with multiple chronic co-morbidities such as diabetes, cardiovascular 
disease, and the HIV virus. In general, patients that are not considered for transplantation 
are patients with "limited or irreversible rehabilitative potential" (Danovitch 2005)48. 
In this study I focus on recipients of deceased donor kidneys due to the positive selection on health 
caused by the current kidney shortage. While recipients of kidneys from living donors have better long 
term graft survival rates, these patients are not as closely selected on health status. 
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Transplanted patients who do not experience any surgical complications leave the 
hospital within one week. Almost all living donor recipients experience "excellent graft 
function" in the first week compared to 30 to 50 percent for deceased donor recipients. 
Among all recipients, first year post transplant mortality is about 5 percent, with most 
mortality occurring in the first three months.49 Stable patients are discharged from the 
hospital 4 to 10 days following transplantation and many return to work after 4 to 6 
weeks. However, it is not uncommon for individuals to remain out of work for up to 
three months. After receiving a transplant, ESRD patients no longer require dialysis 
treatment. Rather, patients return for annual follow up visits. Thus, after the initial 
period spent recovering from the surgery, transplantation removes a large obstacle to 
being able to work. 
The first year following a kidney transplant is the most costly. Costs during the 
first post transplant year are $100,00050, but after the first year the cost falls to $10,000 
per year (this is the cost of the immunosuppression medication). In the year 2000, 65 
percent of transplanted individuals ages 25 to 55 with functioning kidneys at 3 years 
following transplantation were employed. According to data from the Current Population 
Survey (CPS), the corresponding employment percentage for the overall population in the 
year 2000 was 78 percent. Thus, while overall less healthy than the general population, 
The criteria for the allocation of kidneys from deceased donors are determined by the Organ Procurement 
and Transplantation Network (OPTN). The OPTN was established by the U.S. Congress in 1984 as a 
private, not-for-profit organization under contract with the federal government. 
49
 This implies that the most sick newly transplanted patients who may be unable to work will not confound 
the results of mis study. 
50
 This includes the cost of the operation and post transplant hospital stay. 
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the majority of patients with functioning transplanted kidneys appear to be healthy 
enough to work. 
Employment among transplant recipients is lower than that of the general 
population in part due to co-morbidities associated with transplantation that may affect 
their ability to work. For example, the incidence of post transplant new onset diabetes 
among transplant recipients is 9 percent at 3 months following transplantation, 16 percent 
at one year, and 24 percent at three years following transplantation. This particular 
condition is related to a patient's age, family history of diabetes, hepatitis C infection, 
and it is more prevalent in Black recipients. Although such co-morbidities may affect a 
transplant recipient's ability to work, the natural experiment approach I adopt in this 
study should account for this difference in participation levels compared to the general 
population because labor supply responses are identified by changes over time within the 
transplant population. 
Following the transplant, immunosuppression medications are necessary for the 
survival of the transplanted kidney. Schweizer et al. (1990) discuss the factors that lead 
to transplant failure and conclude that the leading cause of organ failure is non-
compliance regarding post transplant medication. Results indicate that 91 percent of the 
non-compliant transplant recipients experience graft failure. During the 1970's, graft 
survival rates at one year post transplant were only 50 percent. By the 1990's, graft 
survival rates at one year increased to 90 percent. Danovitch (2005) attributes this 
increase to the development of better immunosupression medications. 
Between 1993 and 1995, Medicare increased the duration of immunosuppression 
medication coverage from 1 year post transplant to 3 years post transplant for all 
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transplant recipients. Woodward et al. (2001) find evidence that the increase in the 
duration of Medicare's coverage of immunosuppression medication had a positive impact 
on the graft survival of low income kidney transplant patients who receive kidneys from 
deceased donors. The authors use the same 1993 to 1995 extension of Medicare's 
immunosuppression coverage that this paper uses as a natural experiment to identify the 
effects of extending the coverage of immunosuppression medication on graft survival 
rates. The authors assign low income individuals to the treatment group (these 
individuals are the most likely to have been affected by the policy change) and high 
income individuals to the control group (high income individuals are more likely to have 
had sufficient income to pay for the immunosuppression medications or other insurance 
coverage). 
Woodward et al. use United States Renal Data System (USRDS) data for the 
years 1992 to 1993 and 1995 to 1997 for their before-and-after approach. Results for the 
1992 to 1993 cohort indicate that although there were no significant differences in graft 
survival rates of high income and low income patients at the end of year 1, the low 
income group had a 4 percentage point higher graft failure rate in the second and third 
years post transplant after Medicare's immunosuppression coverage ended. However, 
Medicare covered 3 years of medications for individuals transplanted between 1995 and 
1997. In this cohort, no significant differences in graft survival rates occurred in the 
second and third years post transplant. The methodology used in this labor supply 
analysis closely resembles that used in the Woodward et al. (2001) paper. 
The difference-in-differences models estimated in my study are identified by the 
assumption that non-insurance factors that could affect employment status are similar 
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across treatment and control groups. It is possible that changes in transplant outcomes, 
medical technology, or immunosuppression medications could affect high and low 
income patients differently. Based on the findings in Woodward et al. (2001), these do 
not appear to be a problem. Graft survival rates at one year following transplantation 
improved 3.6 percentage points for high income patients and 3.9 percentage points for 
low income patients between the "before" and "after" periods. Changes in the types of 
immunosuppression medications used also appear similar among high and low income 
patients. The use of cyclosporine declined 12.6 percentage points for high income 
patients and 13.1 percentage points for low income patients. The use of tacrolimus 
increased by 6.9 percentage points for high income patients and 7.4 percentage points for 
low income patients. The use of azathioprine declined by 42.2 percentage points and 
41.8 percentage points for high and low income patients, respectively. Mycofenolate 
mofetil, not available in the "before period", was used by 42 percent of high income 
patients and 38.2 percent of low income patients in the "after" period. These findings 
suggest that changes in transplant outcomes, medical technology, and 
immunosuppression regimens were similar among high and low income groups and 
therefore should not confound the estimation. 
1.2. Labor Supply Effects of Publicly Provided Insurance 
Existing studies of the effects of public health insurance coverage on labor supply 
use variation in existing public insurance programs, primarily Medicaid, as the source of 
variation in benefits. Unfortunately, using variation in state Medicaid programs to 
estimate the effect of public health insurance provision on labor supply presents a few 
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challenges. First, it is difficult to put a precise dollar value on Medicaid benefits. It is 
unclear whether the dollar value of Medicaid benefits to families is the cost of the 
covered treatments or the cost of an equivalent insurance plan purchased in the private 
insurance market. In addition, because Medicaid is a means tested program, individuals 
have an incentive to reduce their labor supply in order to qualify for benefits. Lastly, the 
Medicaid program is targeted at low income single women with children, the disabled, 
and the poor elderly. These studies do not allow for analysis of prime working age men, 
or women with different family structures, so the generalizability of the results to the 
general population is questionable. Similarly, because the Medicare program is targeted 
primarily at elderly individuals, it also is not ideal for drawing inferences about the 
potential responses among the general population. In addition the Medicare program has 
not changed a great deal over time and does not vary by state. These factors make 
studying the labor supply effects of public insurance programs difficult. 
Winkler (1991) uses data from 1986 to examine the effect of state level 
differences in the value of Medicaid coverage on both labor force participation and hours 
of work. The author experiments with three methods for valuing Medicaid benefits at the 
state level. One measure defines the value of the benefit for each state as annual 
Medicaid expenditures divided by the number of annual recipients. Similarly, the second 
measure calculates the value of benefits as annual Medicaid expenditures divided by the 
annual number of welfare recipients.51 The third measure computes the value of the 
benefit as annual Medicaid expenditures per dollar of state personal income. The author 
51
 Recall that during this time period the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program was 
linked to the Medicaid program. 
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acknowledges that these measures are only proxies for the actual value of benefits to 
individuals, which are likely to vary across households within each state. 
The author uses individual level data from the Current Population Survey. The 
final sample includes female heads of household between the ages of 18 and 64 with 
children under the age of 18. The author does not condition sample selection on income 
eligibility. Results of participation and hours equations suggest that a 10 percent increase 
in the value of Medicaid benefits reduces a household head's probability of working by 
0.9 to 1.3 percentage points. The author finds no effect of Medicaid benefits on hours of 
work. This study faces the methodological challenges discussed above, in particular the 
use of a state level Medicaid variable to proxy for individual valuation of Medicaid 
benefits and the lack of generalizability to other public insurance programs due to the 
focus on female heads of household. 
In a similar study, Moffitt and Wolfe (1992) examine the effect of Medicaid 
benefits on employment decisions and welfare participation. Rather than using a state 
level proxy for the value of Medicaid benefits, the authors construct a family specific 
valuation variable. The authors identify three potential methods for valuing Medicaid 
benefits. First is the "government cost", define as government expenditures per enrollee. 
Second is the cash equivalent approach, which the authors claim is the preferred method. 
The last method is the "funds released" approach, where the value of benefits is 
calculated as the amount of money households have available to spend on other goods in 
the presence of the government benefit. The authors modify the government cost method 
using individual and family characteristics in order to obtain a better measure than the 
state level proxy used in Winkler (1991). 
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Specifically, the authors use data from the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP) to obtain information on health status and expected medical 
expenditures. The study accounts for regional differences in the cost of care in 
calculating their Medicaid variable. The study sample is restricted to include female 
heads of household between the ages of 18 and 64 with children under the age of 18. 
Results show a significant negative effect of Medicaid benefits on labor supply. The 
magnitudes suggest that a 10 percent increase in the value of Medicaid leads to a 1.7 
percentage point decline in labor force participation. This magnitude is larger than the 
estimate found in Winkler (1991), and when the authors test Winkler's measure in their 
data the results are insignificant. The authors conclude that individual level 
heterogeneity in benefit valuation is important for estimating the effect of Medicaid 
benefits on labor supply. 
While the value of public insurance benefits is difficult to measure when studying 
the Medicaid program, the valuation of Medicare's increased coverage of 
immunosuppression medication is more straightforward. Individuals who use Medicare's 
coverage of immunosuppression medication include individuals who lack a private 
insurance plan that will cover the cost of the drugs and may also include individuals who 
opt out of private insurance plans. Among patients without another form of insurance, 
the government cost, the cash value of the medications, and the additional funds made 
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available by the public provision of the benefit are identically equal to the annual cost of 
the drugs52. 
In addition to the issue of valuing the benefit, another complication of the 
Medicaid program involves the incentive to reduce labor supply in order to maintain 
eligibility for the program. Once earnings exceed the state defined eligibility thresholds, 
individuals lose their Medicaid coverage. This abrupt loss of coverage creates a "notch" 
in the individual's consumption-leisure budget line. For this reason, the Medicaid 
program is not ideal for exploring the possible labor supply effects of a non means tested, 
broad based public insurance expansion. Yelowitz (1995) finds that increasing the 
Medicaid income eligibility thresholds, therefore moving this notch, resulted in 
significant increases in labor force participation among lower income women. The 
ESRD component of the Medicare program is not means tested and therefore allows for a 
more straightforward analysis of the potential labor supply discouraging income effects 
associated with government transfer payments. 
Another possible avenue for studying the effect of publicly provided insurance on 
labor supply is to look at the introduction of National Health Insurance (NHI) programs 
in other countries. Gruber and Hanratty (1995) consider the introduction of NHI in 
Canada from the years 1965 to 1971. The authors find that there were no disemployment 
effects resulting from the introduction of the plan. However, it is not clear that the 
experiences of other countries would be comparable to the experiences of the United 
States. Although this result is contrary to the prior belief that government provided 
52
 The value of the medication for patients who drop their private coverage depends on the out of pocket 
costs they would have paid had they kept their private coverage. Unfortunately the USRDS data do not 
contain this information. 
104 
health insurance (or any in-kind transfer) causes decreases in labor supply, the structure 
of the plan created labor supply promoting substitution effects that offset the income 
effects resulting from the government transfer and the effects of the tax increases 
necessary to finance the program. That is, the wage increases that resulted from the 
removal of employer sponsored health insurance were large enough to offset the income 
effect of government provided health insurance and the effects of the tax increase. 
Although shifting the financing from the employer to the government does not 
necessarily provide the individual with an increase in the total amount of compensation 
(wages and benefits), the authors argue that if individuals value an additional dollar in 
wages more than a dollar of health insurance, then a dollar for dollar replacement of 
wages for insurance could generate a labor supply promoting substitution effects. This is 
also potentially true for Medicare's coverage of immunosuppression medications. If 
individuals are able to opt out of employer provided plans and opt into Medicare's 
coverage, wages might increase53. In addition to the income effects caused by 
Medicare's increased coverage of medications for kidney transplant recipients that should 
reduce labor supply, there also may be positive health benefits and wage increases that 
might increase labor supply. These conflicting effects leave the theoretical prediction 
ambiguous. 
This wage increase would be most likely to occur among individuals who obtain new jobs following 
transplantation. They may seek out employers who offer higher wages instead of insurance benefits. It is 
also possible that individuals who drop coverage at their existing jobs may see their weekly take home pay 




2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
Given that immunosuppression medications are necessary for the survival of a 
transplanted kidney and that transplant recipients have close contact with their 
physicians, it is highly likely that individuals without private insurance will take 
advantage of the benefit54. Therefore it is possible to view the increase in Medicare 
coverage as an increase in an individual's non-labor income55. To the extent that these 
medications may be valued less than their cash value, any labor supply responses will be 
understated. Immunosuppression medications cost an average of $10,000 per year, so the 
extra two years of coverage provide each individual with a substantial amount of 
additional income during the second and third post-transplant years. Therefore, the policy 
change generates an income effect that should act to discourage labor supply (Figure 1). 
Panel (a) of Figure 1 shows an individual who reduces her hours of work, while panel (b) 
shows an individual who drops out of the labor force56. 
54
 One of the difficulties associated with studying the Medicaid program is that not all individuals are aware 
of their eligibility for the program, and therefore many who are eligible do not enroll. Because transplant 
recipients are being treated by physicians who understand the importance of the immunosuppression 
medications, the chance of a transplant patient being unaware of the Medicare benefit is highly unlikely. 
551 model the value of the benefit as an increase in non labor income equal to the cost of the medications 
because with for individuals without alternative forms of health insurance, the "government cost", "cash 
equivalent", and "funds released" approaches described in Moffitt and Wolfe (1992) yield identical 
valuations equal to the amount of the subsidy. 
56
 Analyzing these effects in a static labor supply model implicitly assumes that other factors, such as life 
expectancy or work life expectancy are being held constant. 
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The coverage increase may also affect the average health of the kidney transplant 
population. If healthier individuals have lower reservation wages, then patients 
experiencing this health benefit may be more likely to work even in the absence of a 
wage increase due to a change in the marginal rate of substitution between consumption 
and leisure. Further, if individuals are healthier during this period as a result of avoiding 
the health complications and medical treatment leading up to graft failure, then it could 
be easier for individuals after the policy change to work. That is, health improvements 
may increase the marginal productivity of a worker, resulting in a higher market wage. 
Figure 2 illustrates these two possible scenarios. Panel (a) depicts how improved 
health may affect an individual's reservation wage. As health improves, preferences for 
consumption (and therefore work) increase and labor supply increases. These health 
effects may only be experienced by those individuals who avoid a graft failure that would 
have occurred in the absence of coverage57. Panel (b) shows an individual's 
consumption-leisure budget line in the presence of a wage increase resulting from 
improved health status. The wage increase should result in higher labor force 
participation, while the effect on hours worked is unclear due to the conflicting income 
and substitution effects of the wage increase. Thus, the income effect is present among 
The analysis in Figure 2 assumes that the value of the benefit extension is equal to the cash value of the 
subsidy provided by Medicare. Among patients who would have complied with the medication regimens 
even in the absence of the two year coverage extension, it is suitable to value the benefit at the cash value 
of the subsidy. However, individuals who would not have been compliant may not value the benefit at the 
full amount of the subsidy, and therefore the response to the income effect should be weaker for these non 
compliant patients than for those who would have complied. The subset of patients who experience a 
health effect (and experience a wage increase as a result of the improved health status) and do not value the 
medications at their cash equivalent may therefore be even less likely to decrease their labor supply than 
patients who experience a health improvement but do value the benefit at its cash equivalent. To the extent 
that the medication coverage is valued at less than the cash value of the medications, the magnitudes of the 
estimated labor supply effects will be understated. 
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the entire sample, while the health effect is present only in the individuals who 
experienced a survival benefit according to the estimates found in Woodward et al. 
(2001). 
If individuals who are eligible for insurance through their employers decline to 
enroll because the medications are covered by Medicare, net wages could increase. This 
will occur at the individual level if individuals seek out jobs that offer higher wages 
instead of health insurance benefits. For individuals who remain in the same job, this 
could occur if the Medicare Part B premium is less than previous contributions to 
insurance purchased through the employer. 
In this situation, participation should unambiguously increase, while the effect on 
hours is unclear. If labor supply curves are upward sloping (i.e., if substitution effects 
dominate), then this wage increase should increase labor supply, as shown in Panel (a) of 
Figure 2. This situation resembles the wage increases resulting from the replacement of 
employer benefits with government benefits discussed by Gruber and Hanratty (1995). If 
individuals no longer have money deducted from their paychecks in order to pay for 
health insurance through their employers, wages increase, resulting in higher 
participation. The effect of the wage increase on hours of work is ambiguous. It is also 
possible that individuals return to work specifically to obtain insurance through their 
employer. Insurance purchased through an employer is cheaper than private insurance 
purchased individually due to the larger risk pools and the tax exempt status of insurance 
purchased through an employer. Before the Medicare coverage extension, individuals 
with only one year of coverage may have returned to work earlier following 
transplantation than individuals who received the three year benefit. This may also lead 
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to a reduction in labor force participation among individuals eligible for the three year 
benefit if these individuals delay their re-entry into the labor force due to the additional 
two years of Medicare coverage. Therefore, the overall impact of these insurance effects 
on labor supply is ambiguous. These conflicting income, health, and insurance effects do 
not allow for a clear theoretical prediction of the policy change's effect on labor supply. 
If we observe an increase in labor supply after the coverage increase, we can conclude 
that the health effect and the wage increases due to the insurance effect dominate. 
However, a decrease in labor supply would suggest that the income effect and the 
incentive to delay re-entry due to the insurance effect dominate. 
The next issue is to determine which individuals are "treated" by the policy and 
which individuals are not. A logical approach would be to consider those who use 
Medicare's coverage the treatment group, while those who have private insurance and do 
"not use Medicare's coverage the control group. Unfortunately, the USRDS began 
collecting information on insurance payers in 1994, so information during the "before" 
period of this study is unavailable. Therefore, I am forced to use an alternative definition 
of the treatment and control groups. Given that about half of those eligible for the 
Medicare's coverage have other insurance, it seems reasonable to assume that individuals 
with other coverage are more likely to be higher income individuals. In fact, roughly 65 
percent of individuals residing in low income zip codes transplanted between 1995 and 
2001 report Medicare as the primary payer for their care compared to only 30 percent of 
those living in high income zip codes58. Also, because the medications comprise a 
58
 This insurance information was collected at the time of transplantation and therefore does not vary with 
post-transplant labor supply decisions. 
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smaller percentage of an individual's budget as income increases, the value of the 
medication as a percentage of total income will be greater for low income patients, and 
therefore the response, if any, should be greater, for this group59. Further, the effect of 
health improvements is likely to be greater for this group since graft survival rates 
improved by 5.16 percentage points for low income patients and by 1.7 percentage points 
for high income patients (Woodward et al. 2001). 
Due to this imperfect definition on treatment and control groups, this approach is 
better termed a quasi-difference-in-differences method. As Lewbel (2007) describes, 
given that I have information on insurance status for a different time period, it is possible 
to use this information from the 1995 to 2001 data to weight the estimated policy effects 
found when using the imperfect treatment-control definitions. This method, also used in 
Kutinova (2008) will be described in greater detail in the results section. 
The two year increase in the duration of coverage lends itself to the "before and 
after" approach used in this study. Figure 3 illustrates the nature of the policy change. 
Until July 1, 1993, the duration of Medicare's coverage was one year post transplant. 
After July 1, 1995, the duration of coverage was three years. Therefore, the policy 
change allows for the use of the natural experiment "difference-in-differences" 
methodology used in Eissa (1995). Ideally, I would like to have a treatment group that 
was affected by the policy change and an equivalent control group that was not, but due 
to the lack of information on insurance payer in the "before" period of the study, I am 
59
 Eissa (1996), Eissa and Liebman (1996), and Gruber and Poterba (1994) also define treatment and 
control groups on the basis of income. These studies examine responses to changes in income tax rates and 
use the fact that higher income individuals experience a greater treatment effect than lower income 
individuals to justify their treatment-control group definitions. Although USRDS data do not contain 
individuals' incomes, I use income of the zip code as a proxy. 
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forced to use a less than perfect treatment/control definition. Any mis-assignment of 
individuals into either the treatment or control group will bias the differences-in-
differences coefficient towards zero, so if there is bias, my results will underestimate the 
true policy effect (Lewbel 2007). In this setting, the difference-in-differences model is 
identified by the assumption that non-health insurance factors causing labor supply 
changes by income group are not correlated with the timing of the Medicare coverage 
extension. 
If increased Medicare coverage affected the labor force participation of kidney 
transplant recipients, then we should observe a delayed re-entry into the labor force in the 
1995 to 1997 period relative to the 1991 to 1993 period. If high income individuals are a 
valid control group, then we should observe a bigger effect among low income patients. 
To look for labor supply effects, I conduct a descriptive analysis of employment patterns 
following transplantation which includes time plots of participation rates as well as an 
analysis of labor force transitions made possible by the panel nature of the data. If the 
data contained an exact date of re-entry into the labor force, I would be able to conduct a 
more rigorous duration analysis60. I estimate a Cox Proportional Hazards model using 
the USRDS follow up codes of 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 4 years, and 5 years 
post transplant to measure the time of failure, in this case defined as entering the labor 
force. 
To test for a differential impact of Medicare's extended coverage on the low 
income treatment group, I estimate difference-in-differences equations at follow up 
60
 There is no variable in the dataset that indicates the exact date of re-entry. Rather, re-entry is identified 
by the transition from not working to working between follow up visits. 
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periods 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, and 3 years after transplantation. There is a reason to 
expect a response at 6 months following transplantation, even though medications were 
still covered at this time during the before period. Individuals who know their coverage 
will expire after one year may seek employment before that one year coverage period is 
over '. This urgency is not present after the coverage increase. The equation for the 
difference-in-differences estimator has the form: 
P(LFP = 1) = F(J3X + y.LowY + y2Post + y3 (LowY * Post)) (1) 
In equation (1), LowY indicates that the individual is in the low income treatment group. 
Post denotes the post 1995 period and X is a vector of demographic controls, including 
age, race, gender, and county unemployment rates. The y3 coefficient gives the 
difference-in-differences estimate designed to isolate the policy effect, assuming that the 
treatment and control groups are valid and that time varying factors specific to the low 
income group that affect labor supply are controlled for. 
Conceptually, the change in the treatment group's labor force participation rate 
between the pre and post period contains the effect of the policy change (73), the effect of 
anything else that might have changed between the pre and post periods that could affect 
labor force participation (jz), and any time invariant characteristics specific to low 
income individuals (yi). Therefore, in order to ascertain the effect of the policy, we 
subtract the change in labor force participation experienced by a control group that was 
not subjected to the policy change but was subjected to the same "anything else" that may 
Studies in the literature on Unemployment Insurance (UI) and labor supply typically find that individuals 
begin their job search prior to benefits expiring. See, for example, Meyer (1990), Katz and Meyer (1990), 
and Rogers (1998). 
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have affected the treatment group's labor force participation rate. Subtracting the control 
group's difference from the treatment group's difference isolates the reduced form effect 
of the policy change, 7362. 
There are several identification issues that should be discussed. Medicare is not 
the only public insurance program for which transplant recipients are eligible in order to 
pay for their immunosuppression medications. Patients may also qualify for either 
federal or state disability benefits. Slakey and Rosner (2007) point out the lack of 
uniformity with regard to state Medicaid disability rules but find that disability status is 
not correlated with either education or ethnicity. In order to control for possible changes 
to federal disability rules over time as well as for state differences in Medicaid generosity 
regarding disability, I include the full set of "state*year" interactions to capture 
differences in both federal and state level policies across the years of the study. Because 
the treatment and control groups are defined at the zip code level within each state, these 
interactions do not subsume the policy effect. 
The existence of employer sponsored insurance (ESI) is another potential 
confounding issue. I do not have information on patients' marital statuses and therefore 
do not have information about possible ESI received through a spouse. Section 701 of 
the Health Insurance Portability Act (HIP A) of 1996 limited the exclusion of pre-existing 
conditions to no more than one year after an individual enrolls in an employer provided 
health insurance plan63. This limitation could make work more attractive in the "after" 
In the final model the "post" variable is subsumed by the set of year dummies. Results are not sensitive 
to either specification. 
113 
period of the study. However, this also might make it more likely that individuals with 
employer plans drop out of the labor force with the knowledge that coverage with a new 
employer will resume no more than one year after returning to work. The net effect of 
this policy on the labor supply of kidney transplant patients is unclear, although this 
policy change may not be relevant for part time workers who are usually not eligible for 
ESI. 
A possible concern in defining groups based on median income of the zip code is 
that labor market opportunities might be different for high and low income zip codes 
before and after the policy change. CPS data for the years 1991 to 2000 for individuals 
between the ages of 25 and 55 reveal that participation rates among non college educated 
individuals (defined as a high school diploma or less) increased by more than 
participation rates for college educated individuals. Participation rates for non college 
educated workers range from 65.11 percent in 1991 to 72.76 percent in 2000, while 
participation rates for college educated individuals range from 78.56 percent in 1991 to 
80.82 percent in 2000. To account for potential differences in labor market opportunities 
between high and low income zip codes over time, I include county unemployment rates 
in the models using data from the Area Resource File (ARF). This should control for 
differences in job opportunities over time between the high and low income zip codes. 
63
 The provision of HIPAA (1996) regarding the exclusion of pre-existing conditions took effect in 1997. 
Estimating models at 6 months and 1 year post transplant including only data from the years 1991 through 
1996 produces qualitatively similar results. Sample sizes in the "after" period are smaller, and statistical 
significance is predictably weaker, but the estimated policy effects are only slightly smaller and still 
significant in pooled models (which include men and women) at the 1 percent level at 6 months and at the 5 
percent level at 1 year following transplantation. Therefore, it does not appear as though HIPAA (1996) is 
driving the results in any substantial way. This is expected since most of the declines in labor force 





I use data from the United States Renal Data System (USRDS) for the years 1991 
to 1997. The "before" period covers transplants occurring from January 1, 1991 to July 
1, 1993. The "after" period covers transplants occurring between July 1, 1995 and 
December 31, 1997. The transplants performed between July 1, 1993 and July 1, 1995 
were omitted because this was the time period in which the policy was phased in. The 
unit of observation in this study is the patient follow-up visit64. To focus on individuals 
of prime working age, patients less than 25 years old or greater than 55 years old are 
excluded from the sample. The USRDS data do not contain certain variables that are 
usually of interest in these types of studies, such as the individual's education level and 
information on spouses, so the study will not account for changes in these variables that 
are not captured by the use of a control group that may affect labor supply behavior. The 
data also do not contain a variable for hours worked. Instead, the data contain a variable 
that classifies individuals as working either part time or full time. 
64
 These observations are not independent. I estimate models separately for each follow up period (6 
months, 1 year, 2 years, and 3 years), so individuals do not appear in the same model more than once. 
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3.1. Data Description 
Table 1 contains variable descriptions. Individuals are coded as participating in 
the labor force if they are listed as working full time, working part time, or seeking 
employment. Individuals listed as "retired" or "student" are dropped from the sample. 
Individuals are assigned to either the low income treatment group or the high income 
control group based on the median income of their residential zip code taken from the 
2000 US Census. 
The USRDS dataset does not contain a variable for the individuals' incomes. 
However, using the zip code level income information as a proxy for insurance status is 
actually preferable in this case. If I had used individual level income information to 
assign individuals into the treatment or control group, the individuals' employment 
statuses could determine into which group they were assigned65. Therefore, the zip code 
level median incomes provide a more desirable, exogenous measure of individual 
incomes. 
The low income group consists of individuals in the first, second, and third 
income deciles. The high income group consists of individuals in the ninth and tenth 
income deciles. Income defined at the zip code level is likely to be a better proxy for 
insurance status in the tails of the zip code income distribution. That is, individuals 
residing in the lowest income zip codes should be more likely to rely on publicly 
65
 A basic requirement of the difference-in-differences strategy is that the treatment and control groups are 
stable and exogenously determined. Using zip code level incomes insures that individuals are not "group 
jumping" through changes in employment status, thus providing stable groups that are not endogenously 
determined by the individuals' employment statuses. 
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provided insurance than individuals in higher income zip codes, who are probably more 
likely to be privately insured. This is supported by the data from 1995 to 2001 that show 
65 percent of patients in these low income zip codes report Medicare as the primary 
payer for their care compared to only 30 percent of patients in the high income zip codes. 
The included deciles were chosen to provide somewhat equal numbers of observations in 
the low and high income groups while remaining in the tails of the zip code median 
income distribution66. 
Table 2 gives descriptive statistics for the treatment and control groups for patient 
follow-up visits recorded at six months, one year, two years, three years, and four years 
post transplant. Although the relevant post transplant period for Medicare's coverage of 
immunosuppression medications is years one to three following transplantation, I include 
six month and four year visits because of possible labor market rigidities that could force 
individuals to begin seeking employment before the end of the first post transplant year 
or to have difficulty finding employment immediately after the three year period ended. 
It is reasonable to assume that individuals, knowing that their coverage is going to expire, 
may seek employment before Medicare's coverage officially ends. 
3.2. Descriptive Labor Supply Evidence 
Figures 4 and 5 depict graphically the labor force participation rates of the low 
income treatment group and high income control group, respectively. Although both 
66
 Cohort sizes at 6 month follow up visits are 2,647 for deciles one and two, 3,443 for deciles one, two, 
and three, 4,318 for deciles nine and ten, and 6,496 for deciles eight, nine, and ten. Results are not 
sensitive to different cohort definitions. Comparing deciles one and two to nine and ten, comparing deciles 
one and two to ten, or comparing deciles one, two, and three to deciles eight, nine, and ten return similar 
results. 
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groups experienced a decline in labor force participation rates between 1993 and 1995, 
the drop was more drastic for the low income treatment group. The biggest differences 
occur at 6 months and 1 year after transplantation. Interestingly, participation rates for 
the treatment group in the "before" period decline sharply between years 1 and 3. This 
precipitous drop is not experienced by the high income control group, so if these low 
income patients are deliberately not working in order to collect disability benefits, or if 
the decline is related to declining health status associated with coverage expiration, then 
the estimate of the effect of the increased medication coverage on labor force 
participation will be biased downward in the periods following 1 year after 
transplantation. 
If this drop off is related in some way to the cancellation of coverage, then we 
should see a similar decline in employment after the expiration of coverage in the third 
year among patients in the "after" period. This is not the case. While participation rates 
declined 14 percentage points in the two years following coverage expiration in the 
"before" period, participation rates declined only two percentage points in the two years 
following coverage cancellation in the "after" period. Burkhauser and Daly (2002) report 
that enrollment in federal Disability Insurance increased throughout the 1990s, so if 
disability enrollment among the transplant population mirrored this trend then we might 
expect to see a larger decrease in employment after the cancellation of coverage if this is 
the explanation for the decline. Again, the lack of a drop off following coverage 
cancellation in the "after" period does not support this conclusion. Beginning in 1994 the 
USRDS employment variable became more detailed and included a "not working due to 
disease" category, which could act as a rough proxy for disability status. This variable is 
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not available for patients in the "before" period, so I am unable to determine disability 
enrollment among these patients.67 
Another possible explanation for the substantial decline is that individuals may be 
exiting the labor force in order to qualify for Medicaid benefits under the "medically 
needy" category or to qualify for federal Disability Insurance. Unfortunately I am unable 
to explore this in the data. The USRDS did not begin collecting information on insurance 
status until 1994, so, as with disability status, the information is not available for most of 
the patients in the "before" period of the study. Once again, the lack of decline in 
participation following coverage cancellation in the "after" period also does not support 
this conclusion, assuming that enrollment and eligibility among the transplant population 
did not decline between 1991 and 1997. 
The possibility exists that the decline may be due to health complications. The 
decline in participation is coming entirely from part time workers, who may be closer to a 
health status associated with not being able to work. The percentages of part time 
workers before and after the policy change converge to roughly the same level as that of 
patients in the period after the coverage extension (Figures 6 and 7). This level may 
represent the percentage of patients that actually are healthy enough to work a limited 
number of hours. The interesting question, and one that cannot be answered definitively, 
is whether patients in the "after" period would have been compelled to seek part time 
As a robustness check I estimate models omitting patients who claim to be "not working due to disease." 
The results are qualitatively similar, although magnitudes are smaller and statistical significance for men 
diminishes beyond the 10% level. Because I cannot omit these patients from the "before" period of the 
analysis, omitting them only from the "after" period will make any decline in participation appear smaller. 
119 
employment in a similar fashion had they been eligible for only one year of coverage. I 
investigate this possibility more thoroughly in the results section. 
In addition to the fact that participation rates for the low income group at 6 
months and 1 year declined more than the participation rates for the high income group, 
another piece of evidence that suggests individuals are responding to the labor supply 
incentives created by the policy is that participation rates for the low income treatment 
group increase between years 1 and 2 after transplantation. This increase does not occur 
in the "before" period among low income patients and is not obvious among the high 
income patients. These patients, knowing that their coverage will expire in year 3, may 
be re-entering the labor force in anticipation of coverage ending.68 In addition, because 
pre-existing conditions were only excludable from employer coverage for a period of one 
year, re-entering the labor force in the second post transplant year would ensure employer 
coverage by the time Medicare's coverage expired at the end of the third post transplant 
year. The USRDS data contain more detailed information on insurance payer after 1995; 
however the source of private coverage is not specified so I am unable to test for the 
presence of ESI explicitly. 
To look for evidence of a delayed re-entry into the labor force post transplant in 
the 'after' period of the study, I estimate a basic Cox Proportional Hazard model, with 
'time' measured at the specified follow up periods (6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 4 
years, and 5 years). Results of this estimation are in Table 3. The coefficient on "Low 
Income*Post" suggests that the probability of re-entering the labor force at any given 
68
 Also note that follow up visits at "Year 2" do not necessarily take place exactly 2 years after 
transplantation. Therefore, these patients may be re-entering the labor force closer to the coverage 
expiration date than the graphs would indicate. 
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time period is 15 percent lower for low income individuals after the coverage extension. 
While this exercise provides suggestive evidence that re-entry into the labor force was 
delayed among this group relative to the high income control group, the follow up 
periods provide only a rough estimate of the actual time of re-entry. 
The USRDS data set does not contain information on hours worked, but it does 
classify workers as working part time or working full time. Figures 6 and 7 show the 
percentage of patients working full time and part time, respectively, for the low income 
treatment group69. While the percentage of low income patients working full time after 
the policy change appears relatively constant before and after the policy change, there is a 
substantial decrease in the percentage of low income workers working part time. Figures 
8 and 9 contain the same information for the high income treatment group. Among high 
income patients, there is a decrease in the number of patients working full time, and a 
substantial decrease (although much smaller than that for the low income group) in the 
percentage of patients working part time. The overall drop in participation suggests that 
these part time workers exited the labor force altogether, rather than transitioning to full 
time work. 
Examining transitions between the no work, part time, and full time states 
supports the information conveyed by the descriptive analyses. First, a greater 
percentage of low income individuals dropped out of the labor force entirely between 
years 1 and 3 before the policy change than after. Transitions from working to not 
working between the first and second year are 4 percentage points greater before the 
691 do not condition on participation in the labor force. Conditioning on participation in the labor force 
shifts the lines in Figures 4 and 5 up but does not change the patterns or relationships shown in the figures. 
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policy change compared to after, and transitions from working to not working between 
the second and third year are 6 percentage points greater before the policy change 
compared to after. 
The transition patterns also support the descriptive evidence of a reduction in the 
number of part time workers after the policy change for both income groups. Before the 
policy change, approximately 20 percent of those individuals not working at 6 months 
were employed part time in year 1. After the policy change, roughly 5 percent of 
individuals not working at 6 months were employed part time in year l70. This is true for 
both the low and high income cohorts. During the second post transplant year, transitions 
from not working to working part time fell from 12 percent to 7 percent for the high 
income cohort and from 15 percent to 8 percent in the low income cohort. Due to the 
unbalanced nature of the panel (due to individuals leaving the sample due to graft failure, 
not attending a follow up visit, or not providing information on key variables), some of 
the changes in participation rates between follow up periods are purely cross sectional 
and therefore not reflected in an analysis of individual transitions. 
Overall, the descriptive evidence reveals a few noticeable patterns. First, the 
increase in participation between years 1 and 2 for the low income group after the policy 
change suggests that individuals may have delayed their re-entry into the labor force. 
This pattern is supported by results of the hazard model. Both the descriptive time plots 
of the percentage of individuals working part time and an analysis of labor force 
transitions suggest a steep decline in the percentage of individuals working part time after 
70
 Transitions from not working at 6 months to working full time at 1 year were relatively similar before 
and after the policy change (19.08 before and 16.28 after) for the low income group. This suggests that the 
decline in overall participation rates is driven by this reduction in part time workers. 
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the policy change. Patterns among full time workers are relatively similar before and 
after the policy change for the low income group, so these part time workers appear to 
have exited the labor force entirely. Lastly, participation declined between years 1 and 3 
among low income patients before the policy change. To the extent that this is related to 
a lower health status associated with coverage expiration as shown in Woodward et al. 
(2001) or an attempt to qualify for disability or Medicaid benefits upon coverage 
expiration, my estimates of labor supply effects in the difference-in-differences models 
beyond year 2 will be biased towards zero if this effect is not picked up by the high 
income control group who may not have experienced a similar health decline or might 
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have been less likely to take advantage of public programs . 




4. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
In order to confirm the magnitude and test the statistical significance of the 
descriptive estimates, I first do simple difference-in-differences calculations for follow up 
visits at 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, and 3 years post transplant. Then, I estimate the 
difference-in-differences regressions with linear probability models72. Finally, I apply 
the methodology outlined in Lewbel (2007) to attempt to correct the estimates for the 
misclassification of individuals into the treatment (Medicare patients) and control 
(privately insured) groups. 
4.1. Simple Difference-in-Differences Estimates 
To quantify the magnitude of the relative decrease in labor force participation for 
the low income treatment group, I calculate simple difference-in-differences estimates at 
6 months, 1 year, 2 years, and 3 years post transplant. These calculations are found in 
Table 4. At 6 months post transplant, there is a 9.44 relative percentage point decrease in 
participation rates for the low income treatment group. At 1 year post transplant, there is 
721 estimate linear probability models for ease of computation. The full set of "state*year" interactions 
makes estimating non linear models more difficult. However, I estimate both linear probability and logit 
models, with treatment effects calculated using the method outlined in Ai and Norton (2003), in models 
excluding the "state*year" interactions and find similar results. Therefore, I conclude that my results are 
robust to more appropriate non-linear models. Given the difficulty in interpreting interaction terms in 
standard logit and probit models, I do not attempt to estimate an ordered probit or multinomial logit model 
for the no work-part time-full time decision. 
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a 5.53 percentage point relative decrease in labor force participation. At 2 years and 
beyond, the difference turns positive. This is consistent with the theoretical predictions 
that income effects should not be present beyond the third year, but here the difference 
turns positive during the second year. 
4.2. Difference-in-Difference Regressions 
Tables 5 through 8 contain estimation results of participation equations 
estimated for follow up visits at 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, and 3 years, respectively. 
Equations are estimated with linear probability models73. For each follow up period, I 
estimate pooled regressions and then separate models for men and women. Regression 
results largely support the information conveyed by the simple difference-in-differences 
calculations, although the estimated policy effects are slightly larger in magnitude with 
the inclusion of the control variables and "state*year" effects. There is an 11.6 
percentage point relative decline in labor force participation rates for the low income 
treatment group 6 months after transplantation. The effect is slightly larger for women (-
13.3 percentage points) than for men (-12.0 percentage points). At 1 year post transplant, 
the effect becomes smaller, but still statistically significant. These effects are significant 
at the 1 percent level. At 1 year, there is roughly an 8 percentage point relative decrease 
for the low income treatment group. At 1 year post transplant, the estimated policy effect 
for men (-8.0 percentage points) is slightly larger than the estimated policy effect for 
women (-7.7 percentage points). All three policy coefficients are significant at the one 
731 also check the robustness of the results to the use of logit models. I compute the interaction effect (or 
policy effect) of the y3 coefficient from the logit models using the method outlined in Ai and Norton 
(2003), although for ease of computation I omit the set of "state*year" interactions and find similar results. 
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percent level. At two and three years post transplant the policy coefficients become 
slightly positive, which would suggest that low income individuals are actually working 
more relative to the high income individuals after the policy change, however the 
differences are not significant (P= 0.933 and P=.173 in pooled models at 2 and 3 years 
post transplant, respectively). 
To test for differential effects by age, I estimate separate models for individuals 
ages 25 to 40 and 40 to 55. At 6 months after the transplant, the policy coefficient for the 
older age group is nearly twice as large as the policy coefficient for the younger group (-
0.139 compared to -0.089), but this difference diminishes at 1 year following the 
transplant (-0.074 compared to -0.088). Statistical significance disappears for both 
groups at two and three years following the transplant, as in the previous models. 
While we might initially expect any effect to disappear at year three rather than 
year two, if individuals are returning to work during the second year in anticipation of 
losing their coverage in the third year, then the negative effect should disappear in year 
two. This is purely speculative, and I do not have any way of confirming this in the data. 
It is also possible that the health or insurance effects discussed in the conceptual 
framework are responsible for the increase in the second year, but it is unclear why these 
effects would only begin to dominate income effects in the second post transplant year. 
As mentioned previously, there is some mis-assignment of individuals into the 
treatment and control groups because zip code income is not a perfect proxy for insurance 
status. Lewbel (2007) shows that in this type of situation, an unbiased estimate can be 
obtained by dividing the biased estimate of the policy effect by the sum of the proportion 
of truly treated individuals in the treatment and the proportion of unaffected individuals 
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in the control group, less 1. According to USRDS data from 1995 to 2001, when 
information on insurance payer is available, 65 percent of individuals in the low income 
group were Medicare patients, while only 30 percent of high income individuals were 
coded as Medicare patients, meaning that 70 percent were privately insured. According 
to Lewbel's (2007) method, using, for example, a biased estimate of a 10 percentage 
point relative decrease, I would divide 10 by ((.65+.7)-l) to obtain an unbiased estimated 
policy effect of 28.5774. 
Table 11 reports the policy effects obtained from the linear probability models 
and the estimates corrected using Lewbel's method at 6 months and 1 year after 
transplant. Using Lewbel's (2007) weighting method, the estimated policy effects 
balloon to declines of roughly 35 percentage points at 6 months and 23 percentage points 
at 1 year following transplantation. This dramatic increase, though somewhat unsettling, 
is a product of the fact that zip code incomes are only a weak proxy for insurance status. 
Because we can be certain that at least a portion of the control group is affected by the 
policy and a portion of the treatment group is not, the estimated policy effects generated 
from the high and low income comparisons are likely biased towards zero. Therefore, the 
actual policy effect probably lies somewhere in between the baseline and 
misclassification corrected estimates. 
If we consider the percentage change in the amount of insurance coverage to be 
100 percent (if the change in coverage was an additional 2 years and we measure this 
change over the midpoint of 1 and 3 years), these results suggest magnitudes similar to 
74
 Intuitively, if there were zero misclassification, the weight would be 1 and the estimates would be 
unchanged. In the case of complete misclassification, where treatment is 50 percent in each group, the 
weight approaches infinity and the treatment effect is undefined. 
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but slightly greater than those found by Winkler (1991) and Moffrtt and Wolfe (1992). 
These estimates suggest that overall, for men and women combined, a 10 percent 
increase in the amount of medication coverage leads to a 1.2 to 3.3 percentage point 
decline in labor force participation at 6 months and between a 0.8 and 2.3 percentage 
point decline at 1 year. 
If the medications are valued as their cash equivalents, it is also possible to 
express these magnitudes as income effects. The average zip code household income of 
low income transplant recipients is approximately $25,000 per year. The $8,00075 
average increase in income resulting from the coverage increase translates into a percent 
change in income of roughly one third. Using the approximate range of a 10 to 30 
percentage point reduction in participation implies that a one percent change in income 
results in a -0.3 to -0.9 percentage point reduction in participation76. 
To attempt to take into account possible changes over time in health status, I 
include in the regressions a variable from the USRDS data that measures a patient's 
serum creatinine level. As Danovitch (2005) explains, serum creatinine levels are the 
strongest predictor of a successful long term outcome, with higher measured levels 
indicating a higher probability of graft failure. Although this variable is negative and 
significant as expected, it does not change the magnitude or significance of the "Low 
Income*Post" coefficient in any of the models. Similarly, including dummy variables for 
the year after transplantation in which an individual's graft failed, if the individual 
75
 Recall that the average cost of the medications is $10,000 per year, for which Medicare enrollees receive 
an 80 percent subsidy ($8,000). 
76
 Given the wide range of income elasticities reported in the labor supply literature (some of which are 
positive), it is difficult to make a direct comparison with other studies. 
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experienced a failure within five years, does not change the policy coefficients, although 
this set of dummy variables removes the significance of the creatinine measure. 
Separating the sample by employment status, three year graft survival rates are 
lower for those either working part time or not working at all when compared to those 
working full time. This result holds in both periods. This suggests that health status is an 
important determinant of employment status. As mentioned before, because the 
percentage of part time workers in both periods converge to the same level, the 
percentage of patients working part time in the "after" period may represent the actual 
percentage of patients healthy enough to work in a limited part time capacity. Before the 
coverage extension, these patients may have felt pressure to return to work at 6 months or 
1 year following transplantation in order to cover their medications beyond 1 year and 
then left the labor force due to health reasons. There is no urgency to re-enter the labor 
force during this period after the coverage extension. I attempt to find evidence of this 
hypothesis by looking for differences in creatinine levels and three year failure rates 
before and after among those working part time. Observing statistically worse health 
measures among part time workers in the "before" period would lend support for the 
77 
hypothesis that they drop out of the labor force due to health reasons . Unfortunately, 
both tests are inconclusive, so the reason for the decline in low income participation 
7R 
between years one and three in the "before" period remains an unanswered question . 
Without Medicare claims data, I cannot test for the presence of any health complication other than graft 
loss and its associated effects that could lead to an exit from the labor force. 
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 Restricting the sample to those who did not experience a graft failure within five years does not change 
the results in any substantial way. Participation declines for the low income group by 11 percentage points 
at 6 months relative to the high income group and by 8 percentage points at one year. The policy 




Using data from the USRDS, I find evidence to suggest that Medicare's increased 
medication coverage led to significant decreases in labor force participation. Descriptive 
evidence suggests that this drop occurred primarily among part time workers. These 
results suggest that the observed labor supply responses among low income women found 
in studies of Medicaid expansions are also present among other demographic groups, 
even without means testing or endogenous participation. The substantial decreases in 
labor force participation after Medicare's drug coverage extension at 6 months and 1 year 
after transplantation suggest dominant income effects, even in the presence of other 
factors that would be expected to increase labor supply, such as health improvements and 
possible wage increases due to a lower reliance on employer provided health insurance. 
This study has a few limitations. First, recipients of kidney transplants are likely 
to be less healthy than the general population. The treatment-control approach used in 
this study accounts for the fact that these patients may have lower labor force 
participation rates overall, but it does not account for the fact that they may be more 
responsive than the general population to the income effects created by public insurance 
provision. However, if we believe that these patients are more responsive than the 
general population, then the estimates found in this study could represent possible upper 
bounds on the responsiveness of the general population. The reason for the sharp 
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decrease in participation between the first and third post transplant years for low income 
patients transplanted before the coverage extension, in particular among part time 
workers, remains an unanswered question. I have attempted to explore the possibility 
that the decline is caused by changes in health status or the incentive to stop working and 
enroll in the disability or Medicaid program but have not reached a definitive conclusion. 
Another limitation is the use of zip code median incomes to assign individuals 
into the treatment and control groups. While zip code incomes are an imperfect proxy for 
insurance status, I attempt to correct the estimates to take into account the 
misclassification as described in Lewbel (2007). This correction produces estimates that 
are three times as large due to the weakness of zip code incomes as a proxy for insurance 
status. Another potential problem with using zip code incomes is that the observed 
difference between high and low income patients' labor force participation rates before 
and after the policy change might reflect changes in labor market opportunities over time 
between high and low income zip codes. However, to control for this I include county 
level unemployment rates in the analysis. The decrease in participation is not mirrored 
by trends from the overall population. According to CPS data, participation increased 
steadily over the 1990 to 2000 period from 73 to 78 percent among individuals age 25 to 
55, the age range used in this study. To control for policy changes at the state level over 
time, I include state*year dummies. 
Possible extensions to this research include investigating the extent to which the 
decline in labor force participation among low income kidney transplant recipients may 
have contributed to the improved graft survival rates found in Woodward et.al. (2001). 
This health production angle follows Ruhm's (2000) work investigating the impact of 
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unemployment increases on health outcome measures. In addition, state Medicaid rules 
regarding ESRD may provide useful variation to study other behavioral effects related to 
public health insurance provision. 
Medicare's coverage of immunosuppression medications for kidney transplant 
recipients provides a unique opportunity to explore labor supply responses to the 
provision of public insurance among a large number of relatively healthy men and 
women of prime working age and of all income levels. This particular policy is also free 
from other problems that plague existing studies of behavioral effects related to public 
insurance programs, such as low take up rates and endogenous selection into the 
Medicaid program. The observed responses to income effects associated with the 
increased transfer payment suggest that labor supply discouraging income effects are 
important among a more heterogeneous group than the populations usually studied in 
other public health insurance programs. 
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Table 1: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
LFP LFP = 1 if the individual is coded as working full time, working 
part time, or seeking employment 
Female Female = 1 if the individual is female 
Black Black = 1 if the individual is black 
Low Income Treatment group (median income deciles 1,2, and 3) 
(LowY) 
High Income Control Group (median income deciles 9 and 10) 
Before Transplants occurring between 1/1/1991 and 7/1/1993 
After (Post) Transplants occurring between 7/1/1995 and 12/31/1997 
Age Patient's age in years at recorded follow up date 
Median Income Median individual income in the zip code of the individual's 
residence taken from the 2000 US Census 









































Notes: Sample includes follow up visits recorded at 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 
and 4 years after transplantation for individuals between the ages of 25 and 55. "Before" 
refers to individuals transplanted between 1/1/1991 and 7/1/1993 and "After" refers to 
individuals transplanted between 7/1/1995 and 12/31/1997. 
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Notes: Cox proportional hazard model for observations between 6 months and 4 years 
after transplantation. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent 
level, respectively. 
Table 4: Simple Difference-m-Difference Calculations 
6 Months after Transplant 
Low Income Before 
77.50 
High Income Before 
82.54 
Low Income After 
53.51 









1 Year After Transplant 
Low Income Before 
78.99 
High Income Before 
85.72 
Low Income After 
59.65 









2 Years After Transplant 
Low Income Before 
73.28 
High Income Before 
84.25 
Low Income After 
63.52 









3 Years After Transplant 
Low Income Before 
65.84 
High Income Before 
81.95 
Low Income After 
62.21 









Notes: Results are from simple "difference-in-differences" calculations at each specified 
follow up period (6 months after transplant, 1 year after transplant, 2 years after 
transplant and 3 years after transplant). All numbers are percentage points. 















































N 7,764 4,708 3,056 
Notes: Results are from linear probability models. *,**,*** denote statistical significance 
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Absolute values of t-statistics are in 
parentheses. Predicted probabilities fall between zero and 1 for 100% of observations. 



















































Notes: Results are from linear probability models. *,**,***. denote statistical significance 
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Absolute values of t-statistics are in 
parentheses. Predicted probabilities fall between zero and 1 for 100% of observations. 



















































Notes: Results are from linear probability models. *j**)*** denote statistical significance 
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Absolute values of t-statistics are in 
parentheses. Predicted probabilities fall between zero and 1 for 100% of observations. 
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Notes: Results are from linear probability models. *5**5*** denote statistical significance 
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Absolute values of t-statistics are in 
parentheses. Predicted probabilities fall between zero and 1 for 100% of observations. 
Table 9: Policy Effects with Misclassification Correction 
LPM Lewbel 
Pooled 6m -0.116 -0.331 
Female 6m -0.133 -0.380 
Male 6m -0.120 -0.346 
Pooled lYr -0.079 -0.226 
Females lYr -0.080 -0.229 
Males lYr -0.077 -0.220 
Notes: Lewbel estimates for the LPM models were obtained using the weighting method 
explained in the text. 
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Hours of work decrease 
Panel (a): Hours of work decrease due to income effect 
Consumption 
Individual drops out 
of labor force 
Panel (b): Individual drops out of labor force 
Notes: Both panels show the effect of the extra medication coverage on an individual's 
consumption-leisure budget line. Non labor income increases by the amount of coverage 
and produces an income effect that should decrease labor supply along both the hours and 
participation employment margins. $8,000 equals the average yearly medication cost 
($10,000) with Medicare part B's 80 percent subsidy. 
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leisure in good health 
Preferences over 
consumption and 




Panel (a): Improved health lowers reservation wage and increases labor supply 
Consumption 
$8,000 
Hours of work 
increase 
Leisure 
Panel (b): Wages increase due to improved health increases hours worked 
Notes: Panel (a) shows the effect of a lower reservation wage. As preferences for consumption (and 
therefore work) increase, the individual's indifference curve becomes flatter. Assuming dominant 
substitution effects (upward sloping labor supply curves) both effects increase labor supply along both the 
hours and participation employment margins. Panel (b) shows the effect of a wage increase resulting from 
improved health. The slope of the solid line gives the individual's market wage rate in an unhealthy state, 
while the slope of the dotted line gives the individual's market wage rate in a healthier state. 






1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Year 
• Months 
Notes: Between July 1,1993 and July 1,1995, Medicare phased in the increased 
coverage for immunosuppresion medications. Before July 1, 1993, coverage lasted for 
12 months. After July 1, 1995, coverage lasted for 36 months. 
Figure 4: Treatment Group Participation Rates by Time of Follow Up 
Years After Transplant 
-Low Income Before — • Low Income After 
Notes: Labor force participation rates for the low income treatment group measured at 
specified time intervals (6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, and 4 years) following 
transplantation. Sample includes only individuals with functioning kidneys at each time 
interval. "Before" refers to individuals transplanted 1/1/1991 to 7/1/1993. "After" refers 
to patients transplanted 7/1/1995 to 12/21/1997. 









Years After Transplant 
-High Income Before — - High Income After 
Notes: Labor force participation rates for the high income control group measured at 
specified time intervals (6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, and 4 years) following 
transplantation. Sample includes only individuals with functioning kidneys at each time 
interval. "Before" refers to individuals transplanted 1/1/1991 to 7/1/1993. "After" refers 
to patients transplanted 7/1/1995 to 12/21/1997. 
Figure 6: Percentage of Low Income Patients Working Full Time 
Years After Transplant 
• Low Incoms Before — Low Income After 
Notes: Percentage of patients working full time for the low income treatment group 
measured at specified time intervals (6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, and 4 years) 
following transplantation. Sample includes only individuals with functioning kidneys at 
each time interval. "Before" refers to individuals transplanted 1/1/1991 to 7/1/1993. 
"After" refers to patients transplanted 7/1/1995 to 12/21/1997. Percentages are not 
conditioned on participation in the labor force. 
Figure 7: Percentage of Low Income Patients Working Part Time 
Y ears Aflar Transplant 
• Low Income Before — -Low Income After 
Notes: Percentage of patients working part time for the low income treatment group 
measured at specified time intervals (6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, and 4 years) 
following transplantation. Sample includes only individuals with functioning kidneys at 
each time interval. "Before" refers to individuals transplanted 1/1/1991 to 7/1/1993. 
"After" refers to patients transplanted 7/1/1995 to 12/21/1997. Percentages are not 
conditioned on participation in the labor force. 
Figure 8: Percentage of High Income Patients Working Full Time 
Y e ars After Tr ansplant 
•High incDme Before — -High Income After 
Notes: Percentage of patients working full time for the high income treatment group 
measured at specified time intervals (6 months, 1 year, 2 years. 3 years, and 4 years) 
following transplantation. Sample includes only individuals with functioning kidneys at 
each time interval. "Before" refers to individuals transplanted 1/1/1991 to 7/1/1993. 
"After" refers to patients transplanted 7/1/1995 to 12/21/1997. Percentages are not 
conditioned on participation in the labor force. 
Figure 9: Percentage of High Income Patients Working Part Time 
2 
Years Ate Transplant 
High Income Before — • High. Income After 
Notes: Percentage of patients working part time for the high income treatment group 
measured at specified time intervals (6 months, 1 year, 2 years. 3 years, and 4 years) 
following transplantation. Sample includes only individuals with functioning kidneys at 
each time interval. "Before" refers to individuals transplanted 1/1/1991 to 7/1/1993. 
"After" refers to patients transplanted 7/1/1995 to 12/21/1997. Percentages are not 
conditioned on participation in the labor force. 
PART 3: DO SOCIAL NETWORKS HELP TO EXPLAIN GEOGRAPHICAL 
VARIATION IN MEDICAID ENROLLMENT? 
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INTRODUCTION 
Although Medicaid eligibility levels increased throughout the 1990s, these 
eligibility increases have not fully achieved their goal of providing health insurance to the 
low income uninsured due to less than 100 percent take up rates. While researchers have 
studied many determinants of insurance coverage and Medicaid enrollment, a large 
portion of the cross community variation in uninsurance rates remains unexplained 
(Cunningham and Ginsburg (2001)). This paper investigates whether social networks, 
measured by racial and ethnic concentration in housing patterns, can explain any of the 
variation in Medicaid enrollment. 
As many studies have documented, Medicaid expansions have not been effective 
in covering all uninsured children. Despite increases in the income at which households 
lose Medicaid eligibility, many eligible children remain without health insurance. 
Thorpe and Florence (1998) report that 15.5 percent of children were uninsured in 1989, 
and despite substantial Medicaid eligibility increases, 9.1 percent of children were still 
uninsured in 1994. Similarly, Selden, Banthin, and Cohen (1998) estimate that between 
2.7 and 2.9 million children were eligible for Medicaid but not enrolled in 1994. Aizer 
(2007) demonstrates that participation in Medicaid among eligible individuals may lower 
overall health care costs due to the benefits of preventative care. These cost savings 
come from avoiding costly hospitalizations by treating problems before they require 
treatment in emergency rooms. If enrollment in Medicaid can lower overall health care 
154 
costs, then a clearer understanding of why individuals enroll or do not enroll is an issue 
worthy of further study. 
In recent years economists have become interested in the role that social networks 
play in disseminating information about the availability of public programs. Language 
and other barriers may prevent individuals from racial and ethnic subgroups from 
enrolling in programs for which they are eligible. Individuals who are in more frequent 
contact with other individuals from their own ethnic group should be more likely to enroll 
in public programs due to the presence of "network effects". This could be due to direct 
verbal information sharing among members of the same ethnic group or due to learning 
through observing the behavior of others. Aizer (2007) finds that outreach campaigns 
that specifically target Spanish speaking populations in California were effective in 
increasing Medicaid enrollment, which suggests that informational barriers are significant 
determinants of Medicaid enrollment. A better understanding of the role that social 
networks play could have important implications for how information about public 
assistance programs is communicated to racial and ethnic subgroups. 
Studies in the social sciences that examine how individuals' behaviors are 
determined by those around them can be classified into two groups. The first group 
contains studies of "peer effects", in which an individual's behavior is influenced by 
people the individual knows and has regular contact with, such as individuals living on 
the same street, working in the same office, or attending the same school (Case and Katz 
1991, Evans, Oates, and Schwab 1992, Aaronson 1992, Borjas 1995, Ginther, Havemann, 
and Wolfe 2000). The second group consists of studies of "network effects", where an 
individual's network is defined at a broader geographic level, such as the city or MSA of 
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residence, and does not just contain people with whom an individual has regular, frequent 
contact, but rather contains all individuals of the same race, ethnicity, or language group. 
The argument behind network effects is that information sharing is greater in larger 
networks and that individuals can obtain information over a larger area than simply their 
street, school, or office. For example, in addition to learning from or observing the 
behavior of close friends and family, casual acquaintances and random encounters may 
also be avenues through which people can obtain information about public programs. 
This may work through improved information about program details, decreased stigma, 
or mimicking behavior. Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan (2000), Aizer and Currie 
(2004) and Deri (2005) define social networks over broad geographic areas such as the 
zip code or Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). Each study tests the hypothesis that 
information can be diffused and shared over larger areas in a way that does not require 
close one on one contact among peers. 
Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan (2000) find that individuals from non-
English-speaking language groups with stronger social networks, as measured by the 
number of individuals in the same metropolitan area who speak their language, are more 
likely to participate in welfare programs79. Similarly, Deri (2005) studies patterns in 
health care utilization in Canada and finds that individuals who live in metropolitan areas 
where a larger fraction of the population speaks their native language are more likely to 
utilize medical services. Aizer and Currie (2004) find strong suggestive evidence of 
79
 The authors define "welfare use" as receiving any income from public assistance programs other than 
Social Security. This income may come from Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) or other 
programs such as Heating Assistance. The authors are unclear whether in-kind transfers, such as food 
stamps, are reported as income from public assistance 
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network effects among Black and Hispanic mothers with respect to publicly provided 
pre-natal care in California, but the authors conclude that their network estimate is 
picking up the effect of omitted regional characteristics. These studies draw from a 
sociology literature that describes how information diffuses throughout a population. 
Strang and Meyer (1993) contend that information is more likely to be passed between 
individuals who are culturally similar, and therefore the diffusion of information is likely 
to be greater when individuals have more contact with others from their own reference 
groups. Network effects studies use this concept to model the observed effects of group 
behavior on individual behavior in large geographic areas where individuals have a 
greater probability of contact with others of the same racial or ethnic group. 
The fundamental question is whether the observed positive effects of networks on 
program participation are a result of information sharing resulting from the networks 
themselves or some omitted regional or group characteristic that simultaneously increases 
program enrollment among an individual and others in her network. Given the 
contrasting results of these studies (Bertrand, Luttmer and Mullainathan 2000, Deri 2005, 
and Aizer and Currie 2004), the role of social networks in spreading information about 
public programs is not clear. This study borrows from the methods of existing studies of 
network effects to estimate the impact of social networks on child enrollment in the 
Medicaid program. While existing studies define the size of an individual's network as 
simply the fraction of an area's population that belongs to their racial, ethnic, or language 
group, this study uses measures that incorporate spatial distribution patterns to calculate 
the potential size and strength of an individual's social network. This paper also uses a 
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larger level of geographical aggregation and is therefore less prone to bias from omitted 
or unobservable regional characteristics. 
I use the network measures originally suggested by Bertrand, Luttmer, and 
Mullainathan (2000) and later adopted in Aizer and Currie (2004) and Deri (2005). The 
identification strategy employed in this paper differs slightly from these previous studies 
in that I also allow for cross group effects of networks from reference groups other than 
the individual's own-group. These cross group effects may reflect the presence of 
omitted regional characteristics that increase enrollment among all groups in an area and 
may include possible spillover effects of contact between individuals of different 
groups80. If information sharing and learning are greater among individuals from the 
same reference group, network effects can be identified by looking for differential own-
group effects of the network variables. 
Overall, the results of this study are mixed at best and do not support the 
importance of network effects in determining child enrollment in Medicaid. I do not find 
evidence of network effects when networks are defined along racial and ethnic lines, and 
I find only weak evidence that networks are important among individuals who speak only 
Spanish. Even when using arguably more precise measures of the availability of network 
contacts, such as the residential housing measures computed by the U.S Census Bureau, I 
do not find evidence that networks defined at the MSA level are an important determinant 
of Medicaid enrollment. It is possible that the only network effects strong enough to be 
identified in an econometric analysis are those defined by language, such as in Bertrand, 
80
 Because it is unclear whether these cross group effects capture the effects of omitted regional 
characteristics or interaction between members of different groups (or some of both), it is not possible to 
attach a definitive meaning to their estimated coefficients. 
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Luttmer, and Mullainathan (2000) and Deri (2005). While analyzing smaller geographic 
areas may help to uncover network effects among English speaking racial and ethnic 
subgroups, the analysis would face the same challenges of adequately controlling for 
neighborhood characteristics encountered by Aizer and Currie (2004). 
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CHAPTER 1 
1. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
This study draws upon two existing literatures: the literature on the take up 
responses to recent Medicaid and SCHIP expansions and the literature on the role of 
social networks in spreading information about the availability of public programs. The 
goal of this paper is to link these two literatures by offering network effects as an 
explanation for some portion of the geographical variation in Medicaid and SCHIP 
coverage. 
1.1. The Effect of Medicaid Expansions and Medicaid Enrollment 
Yelowitz (1995) provides a detailed summary of legislation related to Medicaid 
expansions. The Sixth Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1986 (SOBRA 86) allowed states 
to cover children under the age of two with incomes below 100 percent of the federal 
poverty line beginning in 1987 and allowed states to gradually increase this age cutoff by 
one year beginning in 1988 until all children under 5 years of age were included. The 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 (OBRA 1987) allowed states to expand 
coverage to children under the age of eight and increased the income cutoff to 185 
percent of the federal poverty line for infants. The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1989 
(OBRA 89) required states to cover all children under the age of six with family incomes 
below 133 percent of the federal poverty line, and the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 
1990 (OBRA 90) required states to cover all children under age nineteen with incomes 
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below 100 percent of the federal poverty line . In addition to these changes, the 
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA 97) created the State Child Health Insurance 
Program (SCHIP), which extended coverage to older children of poor families. 
Despite increases in Medicaid eligibility levels throughout the 1990's, many 
children remained without insurance. Seldin, Banfhin, and Cohen (1998) estimate that in 
1994 there were between 2.7 and 2.9 million children eligible for Medicaid but 
uninsured. The authors use data from the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 
(MEPS) to estimate the effectiveness of federally mandated expansions, state eligibility 
expansions, and the joint eligibility with the Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) program in enrolling children in Medicaid. They find that, overall, about half of 
children eligible for Medicaid enrolled in the program, that take up rates among newly 
eligible children were approximately 70 percent in 1996, and that children eligible 
through the AFDC program were more likely to be enrolled in Medicaid. Similarly, 
Thorpe and Florence (1998) study expanded Medicaid eligibility and child health 
insurance coverage. The authors report that Medicaid coverage of children grew from 
8.3 percent in 1989 to 10.3 percent in 1994. Despite the increases in Medicaid eligibility 
levels, 9.1 percent of children remained uninsured in 1994. The large numbers of 
uninsured children, even after the Medicaid expansions of the late 1980s through the mid 
1990s, were a large motivating factor in the creation of the SCHIP program. 
The SCHIP program was designed to cover children from families with incomes 
above the threshold for Medicaid eligibility yet too low to afford private insurance 
81
 This provision was phased in one year at a time between the years 1991 and 2002 to cover children 
between the ages of 6 and 18. 
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coverage. LoSasso and Buchmueller (2004) report that the introduction of SCHIP was 
about as effective in enrolling children as previous Medicaid expansions. The authors 
estimate that between 4 and 10 percent of children who became eligible for public 
insurance through SCHIP gained insurance coverage. Kroenbush and Elbel (2004) find 
that enrollment procedures influenced enrollment rates, particularly that waiting periods 
and premiums negatively impact enrollment. Similarly, Wolfe and Scrivner (2005) find 
that less complicated enrollment procedures were associated with greater program 
enrollment. The authors estimate that 21 percent of children with incomes below 300 
percent of the poverty line were uninsured in the year 2000. One potential pathway for 
social networks to influence enrollment is by reducing the administrative burden of 
enrollment through greater information sharing. 
According to several studies, race and ethnicity are strongly correlated with 
insurance coverage. Racine et al. (2001) use data from the National Health Interview 
Survey (NHIS) to examine the effectiveness of the 1988 to 1995 Medicaid expansions in 
enrolling children. Specifically, the authors examine changes in coverage, utilization, 
and health status among poor white, black, and Hispanic children. Medicaid enrollment 
rates increased by 16 percentage points, 22 percentage points, and 23 percentage points 
for these groups, respectively. While the authors consider the differential effectiveness of 
the expansions in enrolling children across racial groups, the study does not consider 
what effect information and networks might play in explaining some of these differences. 
The reasons for these ethnic and racial disparities are unclear. They could reflect the 
preferences of certain groups for public programs. For example, some cultures might 
encourage reliance upon family rather than the government for health care needs. 
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Alternatively, these differences could be driven by unobservables that are not captured 
with a standard set of controls. If differences in access to information on the availability 
of public programs are driving the differences, then social networks may explain some of 
the differences in Medicaid enrollment across ethnic and racial groups. 
There remain many unanswered questions regarding the large numbers of eligible 
but uninsured children. In a pre-SCHIP study, Cunningham and Ginsburg (2001) use 
data from the 1996 and 1997 Community Tracking Study to decompose the determinants 
of insurance status. The authors find that 71 percent of the differences in cross 
community uninsurance rates are explained by race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status, 
while 29 percent of the variation remains unexplained. The authors explain that 
differences in uninsurance rates across communities are caused by differences in need or 
demand for medical services, income differences, cultural differences82, insurance costs, 
state Medicaid policy, and regional employer characteristics with respect to the 
availability of employer sponsored insurance. The data also reveal that higher 
percentages of Hispanics and Spanish speakers in a community increase uninsurance 
rates, along with lower education, lower incomes, lower levels of health, lower 
employment, and more stringent Medicaid eligibility standards. 
Overall, Cunningham and Ginsburg (2001) find that 33 percent of the cross 
community variation in uninsurance rates is caused by differences in population 
characteristics, such as race ethnicity, and socio economic status. The authors find that 
25 percent of the cross community variation in uninsurance rates is due to employment 
82
 The authors control for cultural differences with variables that measure the racial and ethnic composition 
of a city, such as percent white, percent Hispanic, and percent Black. 
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related factors and 12.7 percent due to Medicaid eligibility differences, with a large 
portion of the cross community variation in uninsurance rates remaining unexplained. 
My study examines whether social networks can explain any of the variation in insurance 
status by looking at the effect of social networks on Medicaid enrollment. 
1.2. Studies of Peer and Network Effects 
In general, studies of peer and network effects require an outcome to be studied 
and a criterion for classifying individuals into peer groups or networks. Typically in the 
"peer effects" literature, researchers hypothesize that an individual's behavior is 
determined by the behaviors of people with whom the individual has regular, direct 
contact, regardless of race, ethnicity, or other exogenous characteristic. More recent 
work on "network effects" (Bertrand Luttmer, and Mullainnathan 2000, Aizer and Currie 
2004, Deri 2005, Centola and Macy 2007) has expanded the geographic dimension of an 
individual's network to contain all individuals in a geographic area, defined at broader 
geographic areas, such as a zip code or Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), who belong 
to the same racial, ethnic, or language group. The assumption underlying this definition 
of networks is that, holding other relevant factors constant, individuals are more likely to 
share information with or learn from the behavior of other individuals of the same race or 
ethnicity. For example, individuals of the same race or ethnicity may attend the same 
churches, send their children to the same schools, or engage in similar social or cultural 
events. The key difference between the two is that in the "peer effects" literature, 
specific location, such as the street, city block, office, or school classroom defines the 
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network, whereas in the "network effects" studies, networks are defined by broader 
geographic areas such as the zip code or MSA and race/ethnicity. 
The conceptual framework underlying this broader definition of an individual's 
network is based on the ideas presented by Granovetter (1973), who describes networks 
as containing "strong ties" and "weak ties." The author defines strong ties as one's close 
friends, while weak ties consist of acquaintances and random encounters. Studies of 
network effects that focus on broad geographic areas primarily measure the importance of 
weak ties, whereas studies of peer effects are more likely to be capturing the effect of 
strong ties. Granovetter describes the importance of these weak ties in forming an 
individual's network: 
"The overall social structural picture suggested by this argument can be seen by 
considering the situation of some arbitrarily selected individual-call him Ego. 
Ego will have a collection of close friends, most of whom are in touch with one 
another-a densely knit clump of social structure. Moreover, Ego will have a 
collection of acquaintances, few of whom know one another. Each of these 
acquaintances, however, is likely to have close friends in his own right and 
therefore to be enmeshed in a closely knit clump of social structure, but one 
different from Ego's. The weak tie between Ego and his acquaintance, therefore, 
becomes not merely a trivial acquaintance tie but rather a crucial bridge 
between the two densely knit clumps of close friends. To the extent that the 
assertion of the previous paragraph is correct, these clumps would not, in fact, 
be connected to one another at all were it not for the existence of weak ties (p. 
1363)." 
Thus, two assumptions underlie the measurement of network effects. First, individuals 
are more likely to interact with and therefore pass information to individuals from their 
own racial or ethnic group. This is due to a greater likelihood of interaction between 
individuals of the same group and may also result from greater levels of trust among 
1 
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members of the same ethnic group . Information can be passed through direct, verbal 
contact or by observing and mimicking the behavior of others. Second, information can 
be passed over broader geographic areas than simply those with whom an individual has 
direct, frequent, regular contact either through acquaintances or random encounters with 
individuals of the same ethnic group. Both of these assumptions are supported by the 
sociology literature. 
Studies of peer and network effects suffer from similar identification problems. 
As described in Manski (2000), causal estimates of the behavior of one's group on the 
individual's behavior may reflect one of three effects: an endogenous effect, where the 
group's behavior influences the individual's behavior, an exogenous effect, where 
common exogenous characteristics of a group's members affect individual behavior, or a 
Correlated effect, where the behavior of a group may be correlated with the behavior of 
an individual due to common characteristics or constraints. While the endogenous effect 
most closely describes the idea of a peer effect, researchers worry about the "reflection 
problem" which occurs when the behavior of the individual causally affects the behavior 
of his or her group. There are two levels to the "reflection problem", one conceptual and 
one mechanical. The conceptual problem is that behavioral influences can flow both 
from an individual to the group and from the group to the individual. The mechanical 
problem is that oftentimes the individual's outcome is included as being part of the group 
outcome. The mechanical reflection problem is solved by dropping the individual from 
the calculation of group behavior, while the conceptual problem becomes less of an issue 
This idea is developed more fully in chapter 1.2.2. 
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as group sizes become large and the geographic definition of a network or peer group 
increases. 
Correlations between individual and group behavior will reflect an exogenous 
effect if some characteristic of the group, such as average income or education, affects 
the outcome of interest for the individual and her group, thus producing a correlation not 
caused by the group's behavior influencing that of the individual. Correlations between 
individual and group behavior will reflect a correlated effect if some neighborhood 
characteristic, such as the presence of welfare offices or effective outreach campaigns 
designed to increase enrollment in a public program, increase the probability that both the 
individual and members of her network will behave similarly. In this situation, the 
correlation between individual and group behavior is driven by some omitted 
characteristic common to the individual and the members of the peer or network group 
and does not result from a causal influence of the group's behavior on the behavior of the 
individual. Researchers have dealt with these identification issues by using instrumental 
variables or studying situations where individuals are randomly assigned to peer groups. 
In this study I adopt the quality-quantity interaction approach developed in BLM (2000) 
to deal with these identification issues. 
1.2.1. Peer Effects Literature 
The peer effects literature in economics is extensive. Researchers have studied 
the effects of peer influences on many different outcomes, including youth education and 
criminal activity, labor market outcomes such as wages and unemployment, stock market 
participation, and enrollment in public programs. Aaronson (1992) finds that high school 
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graduation and college enrollment rates are highly correlated within zip codes, while 
Borjas (1995) similarly finds correlations within Census tracts in education and labor 
market outcomes. The author attributes the persistent differences in these outcomes to 
neighborhood effects. More recently, Ginther, Haveman, and Wolfe (2000) find that 
such neighborhood (defined in their study as the Census tract) correlations disappear 
when controls for family background are included. 
There is a literature that considers the effects of peer influences on job search84. 
Recent papers include Bayer, Ross, and Topa (2005) and Wabha and Zenhou (2005). 
Bayer, Ross, and Topa (2005) find that individuals are more likely to work with others 
from the same city block, while Wabha and Zenou (2005) find that individuals in Egypt 
are more likely to find jobs through friends than through other channels. Other behaviors 
that have been studied include stock market participation (Hong, Kubik, and Stein 2004) 
and Medicare participation (Beiseitov, Kubik, and Moran 2004). Hong, Kubik, and Stein 
(2004) find that individuals who classify themselves as "social" are significantly more 
likely to invest in the stock market, and Beiseitov, Kubik, and Moran (2004) find that 
social individuals are less likely to enroll in Medicare managed care but are more likely 
to purchase a Medigap policy. 
Two widely cited studies, Case and Katz (1991) and Evans, Oates, and Schwab 
(1992), are early examples of peer effects studies and highlight the empirical difficulties 
Ioannides and Loury (2004) provides a survey of the literature on the impact of peer influences on job 
search. 
85
 In both studies, the authors measure the degree of sociability from two questions in the Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS). The firsts asks whether the individual has good friends in the neighborhood, and 
the second asks how many times they get together with friends. 
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associated with drawing inferences between individual and group behavior. While the 
former finds strong evidence of peer influences, the latter finds that peer effects disappear 
after correcting for endogeneity. Case and Katz (1991) study the effects of peer 
influences on criminal activity and drug use for individuals ages 17 to 24. The authors 
define an individual's network as being one to two blocks in size and estimate peer 
effects including the observed behavior of neighbors as regressors in their models. The 
results indicate that peer behaviors significantly affect youth involvement in crime, drug 
use, alcohol use, and attending church. The authors point out several potential sources of 
bias that might be driving their large and significant estimates of peer effects. In 
particular the authors caution that the relationships between individual behavior and peer 
behavior may be a result of omitted neighborhood characteristics, such as the degree of 
police presence, which may result in more crime being committed by both the individual 
and his group members independent of any causal influence of the group on the 
individual. 
Due to the difficulty in inferring causality from observed correlations among the 
behavior of group members, Evans, Oates, and Schwab (1992) address the possibility that 
choice of location, and therefore choice of peers, is endogenous. The authors study the 
effect of living in a disadvantaged neighborhood on the probability that a teenager 
becomes pregnant. Single equation estimation reveals that attending a school in which a 
greater proportion of students are economically disadvantaged increases the probability 
of teenage pregnancy. To instrument for an individual's school characteristics, the 
authors use characteristics of the metropolitan area, such as the unemployment rate, the 
poverty rate, and percentage of college educated adults. In the second stage regression 
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the coefficient on the key variable, the percentage of economically disadvantaged 
students, changes sign and becomes insignificant. This result suggests that all of the 
observed correlation between individual behavior and group characteristics can be 
attributed to a family's choice of location. The authors conduct a similar analysis of high 
school dropouts, and again find that single equation methods show a positive and 
statistically significant peer effect, while the result disappears in two stage estimation 
designed to account for the endogeneity of location choice. 
More recently, researchers have attempted to overcome these endogeneity issues 
by focusing on situations in which individuals are randomly assigned to their peer groups. 
For example Ludwig, Duncan, and Hirschfield (2001) use data from the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Moving to Opportunity (MTO) randomized 
housing experiment to estimate the effect of one's neighbors on juvenile crime. Due to 
the random assignment of families into one of three groups, endogenous location 
selection is not likely to be a problem in this study, although the authors point out that 
participation in the program is non random. The authors find that teens who left poor 
neighborhoods were 30 to 50 percent less likely to commit violent crimes than those in 
the control group who remained in the poor neighborhoods, but they allow for the 
possibility that lower income areas may have more police monitoring than higher income 
areas. This would reflect a "correlated effect" rather than any causal link between 
neighborhood and individual behavior. Katz, Kling, and Liebman (2001) conduct a 
similar experimental peer effects study. The authors study households who received 
86
 The experimental group received housing subsidies and search assistance to move to low poverty areas, 
the Section 8 only comparison group received subsidies but no constrains on where to locate, and the 
control group received no assistance from MTO. 
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public housing vouchers through a random lottery. The authors find no evidence of short 
term impacts on the employment and earnings of parents but find that children had lower 
rates of asthma attacks, injuries, and crime victimization. 
In other experimental studies researchers have examined the case of randomly 
assigned college roommates. Sacerdote (2001) studies peer effects among randomly 
assigned roommates at Dartmouth College. Results suggest that peer influences are 
important with respect to grade point average as well as social decisions, such as whether 
to join a fraternity. Similarly, Rao, Mobius, and Rosenblat (2007) test for peer effects 
among college roommates with respect to flu vaccination. The authors find that a 10 
percent increase in the number of peers who receive flu shots increases the probability 
that an individual receives a flu shot by 8.3 percentage points. Both studies argue that the 
randomness of roommate assignment circumvents the usual selection issues that are of 
concern in non experimental settings. 
1.2.2. Network Effects Literature 
Each of the previously described studies considers the effects of direct contact with 
group members on the behavior of an individual. Other researchers have defined an 
individual's social network as containing individuals from a similar racial or ethnic group 
over a much broader geographic area. Strang and Meyer (1993) consider the question of 
how information diffuses throughout a population. In order for diffusion to take place, an 
individual who has not adopted a certain behavior must come into contact with an 
individual that has adopted the behavior. The authors argue that diffusion among 
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individuals falling into the same reference group should be more rapid than when the 
individuals fall into different reference groups: 
"Such effects may operate via perceptions built into the actors involved. The 
individual or organization's cognitive map identifies reference groups that 
bound social comparison processes. Rational mimicking requires prior and 
potential adopters be understood as fundamentally similar, at least with 
respect to the practice at issue. Perceptions of similarity may enhance rates of 
diffusion for additional reasons, as actors find themselves enmeshed in 
competitive emulation (P. 491)." 
This idea underlies the assumption that individuals who are in closer contact with others 
in their own racial or ethnic group should be more likely to pass information regarding 
eligibility and availability of public programs87. 
Centola and Macy (2007) argue that the diffusion of certain behaviors, such as the 
spread of job information and the adoption of new technologies, spread more rapidly 
among larger networks of weak ties. This suggests that broader geographic definitions of 
networks might be more appropriate for measuring an individual's network than simply 
the people with whom the individual has frequent, direct contact. The authors describe 
the adoption of technologies and behaviors as "complex contagions", where multiple 
exposures to prior adopters are necessary for an individual to adopt the behavior. As 
individuals observe more people adopting a certain behavior, the individual begins to 
view the behavior as being more credible and legitimate (for example, through decreased 
stigma) and therefore will be more likely to adopt the behavior. 
87
 Other recent network studies include Christakis and Fowler (2007), which considers the diffusion of 
obesity through a population, and Conley and Udry (2005), which studies the adoption of a new technology 
among farmers. Both find evidence of network effects. These works differ from the papers discussed in 
the text in that they do not emphasize the impact of racial or ethnic similarity in the diffusion of 
information. They also focus on direct one on one contact between individuals by collecting individual 
specific information on whom they associate with and obtain information from. 
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The main work from which I draw is Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan (2000) 
(henceforth referred to as BLM). I adopt the network measure put forth in their study, 
but. I use a slightly different identification strategy*^. BLM (2000) examine the role of 
social networks on welfare participation. The authors use data from the Public Use 
Micro Samples (PUMS) for the year 1990 to test the hypothesis that individuals with 
bigger social networks are more likely to enroll in welfare programs due to the greater 
availability of information obtained from others in their network. To define the size of an 
individual's social network, they use the fraction of individuals in an MSA who speak the 
same language. To the extent that researchers are concerned with the possibility that 
individuals may choose to locate in places where more potential contacts are available, 
the authors claim that MSA level data is superior to zip code level data because it is more 
difficult to move between MSAs than between zip codes within an MSA. This reasoning 
suggests that network effects measured over broader geographic areas are less likely to 
suffer from the endogeneity biases associated with studying smaller peer groups. 
BLM introduce a "contact availability" variable, which measures the density of 
each language group in an MSA. To obtain their measure of networks, the authors 
interact the contact availability measure with the mean welfare use of each language 
group in the entire United States. Using the mean welfare use of each language group 
within an MSA introduces the possibility that omitted MSA level characteristics could 
bias the estimated effect of networks on the probability of welfare participation. This 
bias will be present if these omitted characteristics both increase the mean welfare use 
88
 Whereas the BLM (2000) paper restricts the estimated network effect to be identical for all groups, I 
enter each group's network variables separately into the regression and test for differential own-group 
effects with an own-group dummy interaction. The reasons for this setup are discussed in chapter 3. 
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measure within the MSA and increase the probability that an individual belonging to that 
group also uses welfare. For example, advertising that targets a specific language group 
in an MSA could increase the probability that everybody in the MSA from that language 
group enrolls in welfare, producing a correlation between individual and group behavior 
not caused by information sharing within the group. 
This network measure consists of two components- one that measures the quality 
of the network (mean use of the group) and one that measures the size of the network (the 
fraction of people who speak the same language). These quality and quantity measures 
are designed to capture the probability that an individual has contact with someone who 
is enrolled in the program of interest, and therefore has information about the program's 
details, such as eligibility levels and enrollment procedures . As mentioned previously 
these could be contacts with close friends (strong ties) or contacts with random 
individuals from the same ethnic group (weak ties). 
Even if individuals who are more likely to enroll in a program choose to locate in 
places with a higher proportion of members from their own ethnic group, the effect of the 
quantity measure on the probability of welfare use should be larger for groups with 
higher enrollment rates if information sharing is occurring. The interaction term picks 
this up. If there is no information sharing or learning occurring, then the effect of 
network quantity on enrollment should not be any greater in areas where more 
89
 This quality-quantity interaction strategy used by BLM (2000) is consistent with Doreian's (1981) 
proposed method for appropriately measuring the effect of networks in a multiple regression setting. The 
author argues that in order to measure how information diffuses throughout a population, researchers must 
have information regarding both the number of adopters (represented in BLM (2000) by the network 
quality mean participation measure) and some spatial measure that captures the probability that an 
individual actually makes contact with one of these adopters (represented here by the quantity ethnic 
composition measure). 
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information is available. The authors explain that the uninteracted measures of quality 
and quantity should capture many of the omitted variable biases usually encountered in 
studies of peer and network effects, while the differential effect measured by the 
interaction term would be suggestive of network effects. For example, if outreach efforts 
target areas with larger populations of ethnic subgroups, individuals in these areas should 
be more likely to enroll in the program. Such a correlated effect would be absorbed by 
the uninteracted network quantity measure. This approach is valid as long as these 
potential sources of bias are not correlated with both the quality and quantity variables, 
which explains the use of a quality measure calculated at the national level. By focusing 
on differences across groups within MSA's, the authors are able to add both group and 
local area fixed effects. 
The results support the hypothesis that network effects increase the probability of 
welfare participation. The authors test for networks at two geographical levels, the 
Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA) and Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). 
Magnitudes of the results suggest that networks increase the responsiveness to welfare 
policy shocks by 27 percent in the PUMA regressions and 15 percent in the MSA 
regressions. The authors compare these results to "naive" models, which contain only the 
mean use of each group and mean use within each PUMA. These measures are 
consistent with measures from the early (non-experimental) peer effects literature that 
include only a measure of group behavior as an independent variable designed to identify 
the effects of group behavior on individual behavior. In these regressions, the 
magnitudes are 115 and 193 percent greater, respectively, than models that use the 
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quality-quantity interaction. The authors suspect that these large differences are due to 
omitted variable biases. 
In a similar study, Deri (2005) similarly adopts this quality-quantity identification 
strategy to study health care utilization patterns in Canada. Network measures are 
constructed as in the previous papers- network quantity is measured by the fraction of 
individuals in an area who speak a language and network quality is measured by the 
mean health service utilization of the language group nationally. This directly follows 
the BLM (2000) definition of network quality. The author uses two levels of 
aggregation. The first is the Census Sub Division (CSD), of which there are 5,984 in 
Canada and the Consolidated Census Sub Division (CCS), of which there are 2,607 in 
Canada90. Results suggest that networks are positively associated with health services 
utilization. Networks are found to be significant determinants of utilization at both levels 
of aggregation and therefore the author concludes that results are not driven by location 
selection. 
In a study that examines network effects among racial and ethnic groups (rather 
than language groups as in BLM 2000 and Deri 2005), Aizer and Currie (2004) explore 
the effect of social networks on the utilization of publicly provided prenatal care with zip 
code level data in California for the years 1989 to 2000. Aizer and Currie adopt the 
methodology of BLM (2000) to test for the existence of network effects among white, 
Black, and Hispanic mothers. To create their measure of networks, the authors interact 
Deri (2005) explains that there is wide variability in the size of these CSDs, both in terms of land area 
and population. The CSD with the largest population is Toronto (population 2,385,421 in 1996), while the 
smallest CSDs contain less than 100 individuals. In terms of land area, the largest CSD is Kenora, Ontario 
(401,003 square kilometers) and the smallest have land areas less than 1 square kilometer. 
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the fraction of women in an individual's zip code and ethnic group that used publicly 
funded prenatal care with the proportion of new mothers in a zip code who belong to the 
individual's ethnic group. If the effect of the fraction of women in an individual's ethnic 
group that used the publicly provided prenatal care is caused by omitted variables or 
endogeneity issues, then finding larger effects among women with larger networks 
(measured by the proportion of new mothers belonging to the same ethnic group) could 
be taken as evidence of information sharing. That is, the interaction term acts to separate 
the network effect from the effects of omitted variables or the endogeneity of location 
choice. This quality-quantity interaction scheme is similar to that used in BLM (2000). 
The authors' baseline results indicate that network effects are an important 
determinant of the probability of using publicly funded prenatal care, although the effect 
diminishes in size and significance for blacks and whites when additional controls and 
fixed effects are added. However, the estimated effect of networks remains among 
women having their second and third publicly funded delivery, which the authors take to 
indicate that the correlation between individual and group use is driven primarily by local 
hospital behavior. This result is an example of a correlated effect and could be a product 
of the authors' choosing a level of aggregation (the zip code) that is too small to 
adequately deal with local omitted characteristics. The authors conclude that the 
observed correlations between individual and group behavior are the result of something 
other than information sharing within networks. In this study I adopt the quality-quantity 
network measures used by BLM (2000), Aizer and Currie (2004), and Deri (2005) to 
study network effects at a more broadly defined geographic area, the MSA, that should 
not be subject to bias from local area omitted or unobservable characteristics. 
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CHAPTER 2 
2. IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY 
The previously described studies of network effects differ along three key 
dimensions: the geographic area over which networks are defined, the network quantity 
measure, and the network quality measure. The geographic definition of networks that I 
use is the MSA, of which there are 240 in my Current Population Survey (CPS) data.91. 
BLM (2000) argue that MSA data are superior to the zip code level data, the geographic 
area used in Aizer and Currie (2004), because it is easier to move across zip codes within 
MSAs than to move across MSAs. Thus, location choices are less likely to be 
endogenous if one uses MS As92. 
One potential drawback of using MSAs in this context is that they may be too 
large to reflect what information any given individual in the data is exposed to. While in 
MSA data any significant effects would be less likely to be driven by endogeneity or 
omitted area characteristics, it is also less likely that all true effects will be found 
econometrically. However, this broader geographic definition is consistent with Centola 
and Macy's (2007) assertion that weak ties, or contacts with acquaintances or informal 
911 cannot use the Census PUMS data as BLM (2000) did because the data do not contain detailed 
insurance information. Census data would be preferable because they are representative at smaller 
geographic levels and contain more classifications of ethnic and language groups. 
92
 Brueckner (2000) provides a survey of the welfare migration literature, which finds little or no effect of 
welfare benefit generosity on migration patterns. Thus, it is less likely that individuals are moving based 
on Medicaid generosity. Additionally, Kaestner, Kaushal, and Van Ryzin (2003) find that overall 
migration rates between 1992 and 2000 among low income unwed mothers was roughly 30 percent over 
this 8 year period and that the majority of this migration was within state. Only 3 percent moved out of 
state. 
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random encounters, are effective in spreading information. They say this is true because 
multiple exposures to individuals engaged in behaviors may be required for that behavior 
to spread through a population. With regard to public programs, this may work through 
increased information sharing, learning by observation, or decreased stigma. As people 
view more individuals engaging in a behavior, they may start to view that behavior as the 
social norm. If this is the case, then analyzing the effect of networks on Medicaid 
enrollment at a broader geographic level, such as the MSA, is appropriate. 
2.1. Measures of Network Quantity 
To measure network quantity, I use housing measures published by the U.S. 
Census Bureau for each decennial Census. These measures take into account not only the 
fraction of people in an MSA from a racial or ethnic group, but also how they are 
spatially distributed throughout the MSA. Therefore, these measures may better capture 
the probability of interaction between group members compared to BLM's (2000) and 
Deri's (2005) simple percentages of individuals belonging to a group. The network 
* 
quantity variable is theoretically designed to capture the number of available contacts, so 
spatial distribution is an important part of the likelihood of an individual making contact 
with someone in her ethnic group. This is consistent with the argument advanced by 
Doreian (1981), which argues that studying network effects in a multivariate setting 
requires that measures of networks take into account both the likelihood that a potential 
contact is a prior adopter of a behavior (the network quality) and the spatial distribution 
of these potential contacts in relation to the individual (the network quantity). 
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To see why this is true, consider two equally sized MS As with 10 percent 
Hispanic populations. If in the first MSA Hispanics are uniformly distributed throughout 
the entire land area, while in the second MSA Hispanics are tightly clustered around each 
other, the probability of one Hispanic making contact with another would be greater in 
the second MSA. Simply using the fraction of the population that belongs to a group, in 
this case 10 percent, treats these two areas equally in measuring network quantity. While 
this measure is not as specific as using racial composition at a smaller level, such as the 
zip code, the greater specificity of the measure mitigates some of the measurement error 
associated with aggregating up to a broader geographic level. Maps are useful in 
explaining this idea. Consider two Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), Boulder, 
Colorado and Reading, Pennsylvania, where approximately 10 percent of the population 
in each area is Hispanic. Figures 1 and 2 contain regional maps from the 2000 U.S. 
Decennial Census. In Figure 1, Boulder, Colorado, areas with higher percentages of 
Hispanics are scattered throughout the region. There are two areas with populations 
comprised of more than 50 percent Hispanics located near Longmont and Lafayette. 
These areas are not located close to one another. Conversely, in Reading, Pennsylvania, 
an MSA with the same fraction of Hispanic individuals as Boulder, areas with greater 
than 50 percent Hispanic populations adjoin each other around the city of Reading. 
While simply using the fraction of individuals that are Hispanic as the measure of 
network quantity would treat these two MSAs equally, clearly there is likely to be more 
within group interaction among Hispanics in Reading, where areas with large Hispanic 
populations are clustered around each other. Therefore, I argue that these measures are 
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more precise than the ones used in BLM (2000). For comparison, I estimate models 
using the simple proportion of the MSA that belongs to a group. 
Of the 19 housing segregation measures calculated by the US Census Bureau, I 
select two measures that are consistent with the network effects hypothesis. The 19 
Census measures were originally proposed in Massey and Denton (1988). The authors 
propose five classifications of measures: measures of evenness, measures of exposure, 
measures of centralization, measures of concentration, and measures of clustering. Of the 
five classes of measures, clustering and concentration best reflect the number of potential 
contacts that a given individual could have with members of her own group within the 
MSA. Measures of evenness are designed to capture the distribution of minority 
members across areas. Unfortunately, these measures focus only on distribution and do 
not adequately capture the actual numbers of group members in an area. Measures of 
exposure reflect the probability of minority group members making contact with 
members of the majority reference group white population. The interaction between 
minority and majority group members is not the hypothesis tested in this paper. 
Measures of centralization reflect the degree to which group members locate near the 
center of the city. Network effects can occur anywhere in a metropolitan area, not just in 
the central business district, so these measures are not fully consistent with the goal of the 
network quantity variable. 
The two measures chosen to gauge network quantity are absolute clustering and 
absolute concentration. Alternative clustering measures proposed by Massey and Denton 
93
 In this section I use the term "minority" to be consistent with the language used in Massey and Denton 
(1988) and in the Census documentation. 
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(1988) are "spatial proximity", "relative clustering", and "distance decay interaction." 
Spatial proximity and relative clustering compare clustering among minority groups to 
clustering among the majority reference white population. Thus, it is possible that two 
MSAs with similar minority clustering can have different values due to differences in 
spatial patterns among whites. This is not desirable for measuring network quantity 
because network quantity is supposed to capture interaction within groups, and therefore 
should be invariant to segregation patterns among other groups. Distance decay 
interaction measures the probability that a member of one group encounters a member of 
her group from a different tract. This measure ignores possible within tract interaction 
and therefore is a less desirable measure of the number of potential contacts. Alternative 
concentration measures are "delta" and "relative concentration". These measures are also 
computed relative to the majority white population and therefore present the same 
difficulties as the spatial proximity and relative clustering measures. Formulas for the 
measures used, absolute clustering and absolute concentration, are reported in Table 2. 
These measures were chosen because they are consistent with the "contact availability" 
variables used in other network studies, and the measures are directly comparable across 
MSAs. 
Clustering measures "the extent to which areal units inhabited by minority 
members adjoin one another, or cluster, in space."94'95 Individuals living in more 
clustered MSAs should be more likely to have contact with other individuals in their 
94
 A technical appendix describing these 19 measures from Massey and Denton (1988) is available at 
www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/housing_patterns/app_b.htrnl. 
95
 Massey and Denton (1988) use the terms "areal units" and "Census tracts" synonymously. 
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racial group than individuals living in less clustered MSAs due to the larger number of 
group members in nearby areas. The clustering measure varies from 0 to 1, with higher 
values indicating increased clustering among minority groups. The formula is given by: 
n y- n V n n 
I (^i-Z cifx ,.)- ( ^ - E I cu) 
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Absolute Clustering = (1) 
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where n is the number of census tracts in an MSA, x,- is the size of the minority 
population of tract i, and c,y is a distance weight that declines as the distance between 
tracts i andy gets larger, where the distance between tracts is measured as the distance 
between their centers. This weight is chosen to decline rapidly with distance so as to 
approximate contiguity. X is the total minority population of the MSA and U is the total 
population of tract i. The second term in the numerator and denominator is designed to 
adjust for total MSA land area by summing the distance between all tracts. Holding 
constant the total minority population, X, a larger total land area will result in a lower 
clustering value. 
In equation (1), the numerator of the formula refers to the average number of 
minority group members, while the denominator refers to the total population. Measures 
from each census tract are weighted by the distance between itself and the other census 
tracts, such that having higher proportions of minority group members in nearby tracts 
will increase the clustering measure. Higher values of the clustering measure indicate 
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will increase the clustering measure. Higher values of the clustering measure indicate 
that tracts with above average minority populations tend to be located more closely to 
other tracts with above average minority populations. 
Massey and Denton (1988) point out that the calculation of this measure is 
complex and results in a very large (n x n) set of terms, which makes motivating the 
intuition behind the measure challenging. However, it is possible to consider how each 
component of the formula affects the value. As (x; IX) increases, the clustering value 
increases. This means that having a higher proportion of an MSA's group members in 
tract i increases the marginal effect of tract i on the clustering value. As (x/ tj) increases 
for a given tract, the clustering measure increases. However, as the distance between 
tracts i and 7 increases, this marginal impact of (x/tj) decreases96. 
It may be useful to consider a special case in order to motivate the intuition 
behind the formula. Consider a Census tract y where all members of the tract are minority 
members. In this case, the xy and tj terms will be equal and the "contribution" of this tract 
to the clustering measure will be 1, weighted by its distance away from tract /. These 
values are calculated for each tract i and all of the other j tracts. As the number of 
minority members in tract j , Xj makes up a larger proportion of the total population of 
area/ tj, the clustering measure will increase. As the distance between tracts increases, 
the j tracts are given less weight. All else equal, adding minority group members to an 
MSA will increase the clustering value. As the sum of the x terms approaches the sum of 
Although the measure is computed by summing the x and t values separately (that is, (x/ tj) does not 
appear directly in the equation) the intuition still holds. This is true because the effect of a given tract, j , on 
the marginal effect of tract i depends on the ratio of the minority to majority population as well as the 
distance between the two tracts. 
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the t terms (or as the minority population of an MSA comprises a greater share of the 
total population of the MSA), the clustering value will approach 1. The value may 
approach zero in two cases. If there were no minority group members in an area the 
clustering value would be equal to zero. The clustering value will approach (but not fully 
reach) zero if tracts containing minority group members are sufficiently separated (or 
buffered) by tracts that contain no minority group members, such that the distance weight 
reduces the marginal impact of these tracts on the clustering value to approach zero. 
In MSAs with high clustering values, group members will be in closer proximity 
to other areas with large populations of their own group than in MSAs with lower 
clustering values, where areas with above average minority populations will be located 
further from one another. Ceteris paribus, having larger clusters of group members in an 
MSA should result in more potential for contact and communication between group 
members than in areas where group populations are more randomly scattered throughout 
an MSA. Again, consider the case of two MSAs with equal Hispanic populations, 
Boulder, Colorado, and Reading, Pennsylvania. Although each MSA contains roughly 
10 percent Hispanics, the clustering value for Boulder is 0.059 compared to 0.251 in 
Reading. The clustering measure reflects the greater likelihood of interaction among 
Hispanics in Reading, even though each area contains the same fraction of Hispanic 
individuals. 
Another potential measure of network quantity is absolute concentration. 
Concentration "refers to the relative amount of physical space occupied by a minority 
group in a metropolitan area." This measure varies from 0 to 1, with a value of 1 
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indicating that a minority group has achieved maximum spatial concentration. The 
formula is given by: 
£ xiai _ ' tjO.. 
'=1 X /=i J , 
1 -
Absolute Concentration = (2) 
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where a, is the land area of tract i, ni is the rank of the tract where the sum of the total 
population, tj, is equal to the total minority population, X, when the tracts are ranked 
from smallest in size to largest. For example, if the total population of the smallest tract 
were equal to or greater than the total minority population, the value of ni would be 1. 
This suggests that all group members could fit into the smallest tract. T\ is the sum of the 
total population in area 1 to «/, and T2 is the sum of the total population in n2 up to area n, 
where n2 is defined as the rank of the tract where the sum of the total population, tj, is 
equal to the total minority population, X, when the tracts are ranked from largest in size to 
smallest. For example, if the total population of the largest tract were equal to or greater 
than the total minority population, then xii would be equal to 1. 
In equation 2, the numerator of the expression measures the difference between 
the average land area inhabited by members of a group less the land area they would 
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inhabit under maximum spatial concentration . The denominator measures the 
difference between the land area that group members would inhabit under minimum and 
maximum concentration. As groups inhabit less land area, the first term in the numerator 
decreases and the measure becomes larger (note that the fraction is subtracted from 1 so 
that greater concentration results in a larger concentration measure). Again, it is useful 
to consider a special case. Suppose that members of a group have achieved maximum 
spatial concentration in an area. In this case, the two terms in the numerator would be 
equal and the value of concentration would be 1 (Concentration = 1-0). In the opposite 
case of minimum spatial concentration, the numerator and denominator would be equal, 
and the value of concentration would be zero. The first term in the numerator and 
denominator would be equal, such that the fraction would be equal to 1. Subtracting this 
from 1 leaves a value of zero. Individuals living in more concentrated MS As may also be 
more likely to have contact with other individuals from their racial group due to their 
closer proximity to other group members. Each measure is computed using non-Hispanic 
whites as the reference population, so I have measures only for blacks, Hispanics, and 
Asian-Pacific Islanders. 
Consider two MS As with an equal fraction of the population that is Hispanic. In 
Naples, Florida and Las Vegas, Nevada Hispanics comprise roughly 20 percent of the 
total population. However, in Las Vegas, these 20 percent are spread over a larger land 
area (concentration value is 0.646) than the 20 percent in Naples (concentration 0.903). 
If the probability of making contact with another group member increases as groups 
97
 Maximum spatial concentration refers to a situation where all members of a group live in the smallest 
tracts, and minimum spatial concentration refers to a situation where all members of a group live in the 
largest tracts. 
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inhabit smaller areas, then there should be a greater likelihood of contact between 
Hispanic individuals in Naples than in Las Vegas. Simply using the fraction of the 
population that belongs to a group, in this case 20 percent, would treat these two areas 
equally in measuring network quantity98. 
The hypothesis tested in this paper is that, all else equal, individuals with a greater 
availability of potential contacts with members of their own racial or ethnic group will 
facilitate the sharing of information, either through direct verbal contact, through learning 
by observation, or through decreased stigma. Clustering is used as a more precise 
measure of the availability of potential contacts than a simple fraction or proportion 
because clustering takes into account the possibility that group members may congregate 
in certain areas within the MSA. To the extent that individuals spend more time 
engaging in activities, such as work, leisure activities, or attending doctor's 
appointments, near their residence, having nearby neighborhoods within the MSA with 
larger populations of people from their own group should result in a greater likelihood of 
contact than if neighborhoods with large populations of people from their own group are 
located further away. Concentration is used as a more precise measure of the potential 
for contact between group members because, all else equal, if the population of a group 
within the MSA occupies less physical space, then there should be a greater likelihood of 
interaction between group members than if group members are randomly scattered over a 
larger area within the MSA. 
Concentration is more difficult to see in a Census racial map. The highest category measuring the 
percentage of an area that a group comprises is "50 to 100 percent" and this makes concentration hard to 
distinguish since areas of 50 percent and 100 percent composition are depicted equivalently in the map. 
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It is also possible that clustering and concentration may work together to increase 
the likelihood of making contacts. If a cluster of neighborhoods occupies less land area, 
then its effect on the probability of contact should be even greater. Similarly, if more 
concentrated populations tend to locate in neighborhoods close to one another, the 
probability of contact will be greater. For example, if there are three neighborhoods in an 
MSA that contain all of the group's members, then having these three neighborhoods 
located adjacent to one another should result in more contact than if these neighborhoods 
are located at opposite ends of an MSA. In either case, the land area occupied by the 
group would be the same, but the probability of interaction between individuals from 
different neighborhoods would be greater in the former case. 
It is also possible that there may be a benefit to interaction between groups. If 
Hispanic individuals, for example, are more likely to have information about a particular 
program than other groups (perhaps because a greater proportion of the Hispanic 
population is eligible for a program), then interaction between blacks and Hispanics or 
Asians and Hispanics could be beneficial. This suggests that too much clustering or too 
much concentration might not be ideal for spreading information about the availability of 
public programs. My estimation strategy will control for these potential cross group 
spillover effects. 
2.2. Measures of Network Quality 
Measuring network quality at the MSA level is impractical with CPS data since 
the CPS is not representative at the MSA level for all parts of the country. While it 
would be possible to calculate mean enrollment rates for each group at the national level 
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as in BLM (2000), I have only three groups in the data compared to the 42 language 
groups in BLM (2000). With three groups and two years of data, there would be very 
little variation in the quality measure. As an alternative, I calculate enrollment rates for 
each racial group at the Census region level". The estimated effects of these regional 
enrollment rates may reflect a number of factors, such as regional differences in Medicaid 
eligibility levels, the prevalence of employer sponsored insurance, or general attitudes 
about enrollment in public programs. Therefore, it will be difficult to attach any specific 
economic meaning to the estimated coefficients on the uninteracted network quality 
variable. 
Moving from the MSA to the region level may alleviate concerns about MSA or 
state level unobservables that could lead to correlations between group and individual 
enrollment; however there is still a danger that there may be regional unobservables that 
could lead to such correlations. For example, employer sponsored insurance is less 
prevalent in southern states, which may lead to regional correlations between individual 
and group enrollment. The quality-quantity interaction variable is designed to mitigate 
this concern by testing for a greater effect of group enrollment on individual enrollment 
in areas where individuals have more potential contact with members of their own group 
(measured by the network quantity variable). However, it is possible that these regional 
factors may also be correlated with the network quantity variable. For example, if regions 
with lower rates of employer sponsored insurance also tend to have larger network 
quantity values for certain racial or ethnic groups, then the coefficient on the interaction 
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 There are nine Census regions represented in CPS data: New England, Middle Atlantic, East North 
Central, West North Central, South Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central, West, and Pacific. 
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term will be biased. This will only be a problem to the extent that the impacts of such 
regional unobservables are not soaked up by the uninteracted network variables, which 
are designed to capture such omitted characteristics that may be correlated with both the 
quantity and quality variables. 
While it would be possible to compute a measure based on actual enrollment rates 
at the MSA or state level taken from another data source, this would produce precisely 
the same problem as the early peer effects studies in inferring causality from correlations 
between individual and group behavior. If, for example, the Hispanic population in 
Massachusetts has a higher enrollment rate than the Hispanic population in Indiana, these 
differences could be driven by some omitted or unobservable MSA or state characteristic, 
such as more effective outreach and advertising or easier enrollment procedures. Thus, 
we will observe higher enrollment among the group as well as an increased likelihood of 
enrollment for individuals in the data. This correlation will exist even in the absence of 
information sharing through a network. BLM (2000) deal with this problem by using a 
quality measure computed at the national level. Due to the small number of racial groups 
classified in CPS data, using a national measure is impractical in this study, so I use 
regional enrollment rates as an alternative. 
As a robustness check, I estimate the models with an alternative measure of 
network quality. I construct simulated eligibility instruments, as in Cutler and Graber 
(1996) and Currie and Gruber (1997). I take a national random sample of 300 children 
from each ethnic group in each year and calculate the percent that would be eligible for 
Medicaid by state, s, and year, t, rules with a Medicaid eligibility calculator. This 
measure varies across states and across groups within states based on differences in 
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income levels and family composition across groups at the national level. More 
importantly, this measure should not be correlated with regional or individual level 
unobservables that might bias the effect of the network quantity variables and therefore 
bias the eventual quality-quantity interaction term. To make explicit how this paper 
compares to similar papers in the literature, Table 1 compares the set up of this study to 
the most closely related papers in the literature, BLM (2000), Aizer and Currie (2004), 
and Deri (2005). 
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CHAPTER 3 
3. DATA AND METHODS 
The data used in this study are taken from the March Supplements to the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) for the years 1994 and 2000. The year 1994 was the first year 
in which the CPS asked a question about the language spoken at home. For each year, I 
construct a child-level data set and attach parental characteristics onto each child 
observation. Because multiple children can be a part of the same household, the sample 
is restricted to only the youngest child in the household. The resulting sample contains 
38,756 children from different households. Of these, 27,734 are coded as living in one of 
240 MSAs. Of these 27,734 observations, 10,816 are Black, Hispanic, or Asian-Pacific 
Islander, the three groups for which I have Census segregation measures. In order to 
focus on individuals who are likely to be eligible for Medicaid, the sample is restricted to 
families with incomes below 300 percent of the Federal Poverty Line (FPL)100. The 
resulting sample contains 14,335 children. Of these, 7,461 are Black, Hispanic, or Asian-
Pacific Islander. The segregation measures use white households as the comparison 
group, so I do not have corresponding measures for white segregation. However, all 
children, including white children, are used in the estimation in order to absorb potential 
sources of bias that may be correlated with the quality-quantity interaction term. 
Table 1 on page 1063 of LoSasso and Buchmueller (2004) provides eligibility cutoffs for the year 2000. 
Only two states, Tennessee (400%) and New Jersey (350%), had eligibility thresholds greater than 300 
percent of the Federal Poverty Line. The majority of states were in the 200 percent to 300 percent range. 
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3.1. Data Description 
Parental characteristics include total family income as well as employment and 
education information for mothers and fathers. Child characteristics include the child's 
age and whether or not she is enrolled in Medicaid. The CPS data for these years do not 
ask specifically about enrollment in the SCHIP program, so Medicaid enrollment is taken 
from the question that asks whether the child was covered by Medicaid101. Table 3 
contains descriptive statistics for the sample of children from families below 300 percent 
of the FPL, broken down by year and ethnic group. 
The Census Bureau calculates the segregation measures proposed by Massey and 
Denton (1988) every 10 years using decennial Census data. In order to obtain a value for 
1994, I linearly interpolate values between 1990 and 2000. If MSA level housing 
measures are not volatile from year to year, then this interpolation is a good 
approximation of the segregation measures in 1994. While it would have been preferable 
to use data from 1990 and 2000, the CPS did not begin asking about the language spoken 
at home until 1994. Data for the years between 1994 and 2000 are not used because the 
linearity of the segregation measures would be absorbed by year dummies or a time 
trend, so statistical significance might artificially increase due to the larger sample size, 
with no additional information being contributed by the segregation variables. 
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 Specifically, the Medicaid variable is constructed from two questions in the CPS. The first is a 
household level question that asks: "At any time in the previous year were (you/anyone) covered by 
Medicaid?" The second is a person level question that asks: "Who was that?" These two responses are 
used by CPS to construct a third dichotomous Medicaid variable for each individual. This may miss 
children who are enrolled in SCHIP in 2000, and may also miss individuals who are enrolled in Medicaid 
managed care programs who believe they are privately insured. As long as these reporting errors are not 
correlated with any of the variables of interest in this study, I do not have to worry about biasing any key 
coefficients, although the predictive power of the models will be weakened. 
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Data on Medicaid enrollment and also demographic, employment, and income 
characteristics are taken from the March Supplement to the CPS. However, the March 
surveys do not ask about language. In order to obtain the language variable, I match 
households' March survey information with their surveys from February or April. The 
survey question used to code individuals as being Spanish only speakers is "Is Spanish 
the only language spoken at home by individuals age 15 and over?102" Given that 
individuals younger than 15 are unlikely to make decisions about health insurance, this 
question is ideal for identifying households with significant language barriers to enrolling 
in Medicaid. If networks are an important determinant of Medicaid enrollment, then we 
might expect any estimated network effects to be magnified for those with language 
barriers. This is because language barriers could make the usual channels for obtaining 
information, such as English language advertising and outreach efforts, less effective for 
those who do not speak English. Thus, interactions with other Hispanic individuals, 
particularly those who are bilingual, should be an effective channel through which non 
English speakers should be able to obtain information. This is consistent with the finding 
of Aizer (2007), who found that proximity to bilingual application assistants increases the 
probability of enrollment by 7 to 9 percent among Hispanic individuals. 
Tables 4 and 5 list values of the segregation measures for randomly drawn MS As. 
Each of the nine Census regions is represented in the tables. While there is little variation 
within groups over time in either measure, there is substantial variation both across 
MSAs and across groups within MSAs. Correlation coefficients between black 
102
 Spanish is the only language variable in the data, so I do not do a similar exercise for Asians or African 
Americans. 
195 
concentration and black clustering are -0.01 in 1994 and -0.09 in 2000. For Hispanics, 
the corresponding correlation coefficients are larger at -0.48 and -0.34 in 1994 and 2000, 
respectively. For Asian-Pacific Islanders, the correlation coefficients are -0.39 and -0.54. 
The negative correlations suggest that clustering and concentration are measuring two 
distinct spatial patterns. Clustering seems to better reflect the volume of contacts to 
which an individual is exposed (in a more precise way than the simple fraction because it 
takes into account spatial distribution) while concentration measures the density of group 
members within the MSA. 
In order to quantify the degree of within-group changes in the measures, I 
calculate correlation coefficients between the 1994 and 2000 values for each groups' 
measures. This information is reported in Table 6, which also lists the MSAs with the 
largest absolute changes between 1994 and 2000. The correlation coefficients support 
the qualitative evidence in Tables 4 and 5 regarding the lack of within-group variation 
over time. Correlation coefficients for the clustering variable range from 0.951 for the 
Hispanic measure to 0.982 for the black measure. For concentration, correlation 
coefficients range from 0.904 for the Hispanic measure to 0.982 for the black measure. 
Average changes are very small, generally ranging from 0.01 to 0.02. Clearly, there is 
not much variation over time in these network quantity variables. However, recall that 
networks are identified by the quality-quantity interaction term. This suggests that the 
variation over time in the network variable will be driven primarily by changes in the 
quality measure between 1994 and 2000. Due to the lack of variation over time in the 
network quantity variable, the baseline models estimated use data only from the year 
2000 in order to identify network effects from the cross sectional variation in the network 
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variables. I estimate models using both years of data that include state and MSA fixed 
effects as a robustness check. 
3.2. Estimating Equations 
To look for evidence of network effects, I begin by estimating baseline equations 
of the following form: 
Pr ob{Medicaidi = 1) = Xt'/? + Quantity ? mn + Quality g rX + ylBlackNetworkm + 
y2HispancNetworkm + y^AsianNetworkm + julBlacki * BlackNetworkm + (3) 
ju2HispaniCi * HispanicNetworkm + ju3Asian. * AsianNetworkm +s{ 
Where: (Group) Networkm = Quantity m * Quality r (4) 
Subscripts g, i, m, and r denote racial group, individual, MSA, and Census region 
respectively. Medicaid is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the child is enrolled in 
Medicaid and 0 otherwise. Quantityg)m is the vector of uninteracted segregation 
measures for Black, Hispanic, and Asian groups. Qualityg>r is the vector of group 
regional enrollment measures calculated for white, Black, Hispanic, and Asian groups 
separately. I also include a set of child-age dummy variables. 
If information is more likely to be passed within racial or ethnic groups, then we 
should observe an additional impact of the network variables on individuals from the 
same group. The estimated JJ, coefficients on the Black^Black Network, 
HispaniCi*Hispanic Network, and Asiant*Asian Network variables are therefore the 
coefficients of interest. I also include the appropriate interactions between each of the 
race dummies and each of the quantity and quality measures. As discussed in BLM 
(2000), the effect of the uninteracted quantity measures should capture bias caused by 
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endogenous location selection as well as omitted variable bias correlated with the 
quantity measures. For example, individuals more likely to use public programs may 
choose to live among more individuals of their ethnic group. This would lead to a 
correlation between the probability of enrollment in Medicaid and the quantity measure. 
If the direct, or uninteracted, effect of the quantity variable is driven by some form of 
bias, network effects can be identified by observing a differential effect for groups in 
areas with higher enrollment rates (and therefore more information contained within the 
network). 
In a second specification I look for a differential effect of the network measures 
for children whose parents speak only Spanish. If network effects are responsible for any 
observed significant effects, they should be more important for people with significant 
language barriers. As discussed previously, advertising and outreach could be less 
effective among individuals who speak only Spanish, and there will also be greater 
difficulty in communicating with a large portion of the native population. Individuals 
who do not speak English may be more recent immigrants who would benefit to a greater 
degree from information sharing than individuals who have lived in the country for a long 
period of time and may already be aware of the programs offered by the government. If 
networks are responsible for spreading information throughout the population, these 
effects should be more pronounced among individuals more likely to benefit from 
stronger networks and less likely to benefit from advertising, outreach, or any other 
omitted characteristic that may increase enrollment for native speakers. Aizer (2007) 
finds that proximity to a bilingual application assistant increases enrollment by 7 to 9 
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percent for Hispanic individuals. This suggests that language is a barrier to enrollment 
that networks may help to overcome. 
3.3. Robustness Checks 
As an initial robustness check, I estimate the baseline equation using both years of 
data (1994 and 2000). This will allow for the inclusion of state, MSA, and year fixed 
effects. However, as explained in Chapter 3.1, because the network quantity variable 
does not vary much over time, attempting to identify network effects using within group-
within MSA variation over time may be asking too much of the data. If the results are 
similar to the baseline estimates, then it is reasonable to conclude that any effects found 
in the baseline estimation are not the result of time invariant MSA or state level 
characteristics that are correlated with the quality-quantity interaction term. 
As a second robustness check, I estimate the baseline equation using the 
simulated eligibility instrument described in Chapter 2.2 as the measure of network 
quality. Even though the simulated eligibility instrument is only a proxy for enrollment, 
enrollment and eligibility are correlated103. More importantly, this state level policy 
variable should not be correlated with smaller scale regional or individual unobservables 
that might bias the quality-quantity interaction term. In order for the interaction term to 
I explore the strength of the correlation between eligibility and enrollment in a few ways. First, I run a 
simple regression of individuals in my data of enrollment on the simulated eligibility measure. This returns 
a coefficient estimate of 0.58 with a t-statistic of 37.02. Second, I regress actual state level enrollment 
rates, taken from the Green Book, on the simulated eligibility measure and obtain a point estimate of 0.02 
with a t-statistic of 29.56. The correlation coefficient between enrollment among individuals in the data 
and the simulated eligibility measure is 0.22. The Green Book online version is available at 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wmprints/green/index.html. 
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be biased, one would have to argue that states set Medicaid policy based on something 
correlated with the residential housing patterns of their MS As. 
To verify that the estimated effects are stronger for those more likely to be 
eligible for Medicaid, I construct a "straw man" test of the baseline estimates by 
estimating the model on children who are from families with incomes above 300 percent 
of the FPL. These children are less likely to be Medicaid eligible, so observing any 
significant network effects would cast doubt on the validity of the baseline estimates. It 
is still possible that some children from higher income families could enroll in Medicaid. 
Eligibility for Medicaid is based on monthly income, and the income data in the CPS 
refer to the entire year. Individuals could lose a job or experience a temporary decrease 
in income that would make them eligible for Medicaid for a period during the year. 
Recall that the CPS question asks whether the individual was covered at any point during 
the previous year. It is likely that higher income individuals, who tend to be better 
educated, may be more aware of available public programs than lower educated 
individuals. Higher income individuals also may have stronger preferences for health 
insurance for their children which also make these higher income individuals more likely 
to enroll their children in Medicaid. Nevertheless, eligibility rates are higher among 
lower income households and therefore network effects should be more pronounced for 
these households. 
In a final set of robustness checks, I explore the extent to which the results of this 
study are affected by the chosen methodology. The methodology used in this study 
differs from that used in BLM (2000) in two ways. First, the methodology used in this 
study allows for potential cross group effects, including effects on white children, in 
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order to soak up any MSA level omitted characteristics that may be correlated with the 
quality-quantity interaction term. This is accomplished by separately entering each 
group's network variable into the equation and then identifying the within-group network 
effect with an own-group interaction term. Second, this study allows for different 
estimated network effects for each racial group. To determine the extent to which the 
results of this study are a product of these departures from the BLM (2000) methodology, 
I estimate models similar to those estimated in BLM (2000). First, I estimate a model 
where the quality, quantity, and interaction variables from an individual's own group are 
matched onto each individual, such that the network variable is given by: 
Networkgmr = Quantity gm * Qualitygr (5) 
Subscripts g, m, and r denote racial group, MSA, and region. Since Network varies 
across groups within MSAs, MSA fixed effects are included in these regressions. 
However, because quantity measures are not available for white children, these models 
are estimated only on the subsample of Black, Hispanic, and Asian children. As a 
corollary to this direct replication of the BLM (2000) methodology, I next estimate 




Table 7 contains results of the baseline estimation. Column (1) contains results 
using the simple proportion of group members as the measure of network quantity, 
column (2) contains results using clustering as the measure of network quantity, and 
column (3) contains results using concentration as the measure of network quantity. The 
control variable coefficients, reported in Table Al, have the expected signs. Having 
parents who are not employed increases the probability of enrollment in Medicaid, while 
having parents who are employed either part time or full time decreases the probability of 
enrollment. The probability of enrollment also decreases with education. Having a 
parent with less than a high school education increases the probability of enrollment, 
while the probability of enrollment declines for parents with some college, or a college 
degree or higher. Residing in a single female headed household is positively associated 
with enrollment, while residing in a single male headed household is negatively 
associated with enrollment. 
The coefficients on the "Black;*Black Network", "Hispanicj*Hispanic Network", 
and "Asianj*Asian Network" variables give the differential own-group effects for each of 
the groups. Among the nine own-group interactions, only the coefficient on the Asian 
network variable constructed with the concentration measure is statistically significant. 
The magnitude of 50.93 is very large relative to the other point estimates and is likely a 
product of the small Asian sample size (N = 244). To test for the presence of influential 
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outliers, I calculate dfbetas for this variable. Observing a dfbeta that is greater than the 
threshold value of 2 divided by the square root of n would indicate that the observation is 
an influential outlier. I then look at the distribution of these influential outliers across 
MSAs. Although the influential outliers show no clear pattern across MSAs, dropping 
the 31 influential outliers from the estimation turns the "Asianj*Asian Network" 
coefficient point estimate negative and insignificant (t = 0.96). Other than this one 
unstable result, no significant network effects are present in the baseline estimation. 
If networks are an important determinant of Medicaid enrollment, then we 
should expect a greater effect of the Hispanic network measures on individuals who 
speak only Spanish. Spanish only speakers could be more recent immigrants who would 
benefit to a greater degree from information sharing than individuals who have lived in 
the country for a long period of time and may already be aware of the programs offered 
by the government. If networks are responsible for spreading information throughout the 
population, these effects should be more pronounced among individuals more likely to 
benefit from stronger networks and less likely to benefit from English language 
advertising, outreach, or any other omitted characteristic that may increase enrollment for 
native speakers. To test this hypothesis, I interact the dummy variable for Spanish 
language with the Hispanic network variables. Of the 6,073 observations in the data in 
the year 2000 and from families below 300 percent of the FPL, 433 reside in a household 
where Spanish is the only language spoken by adults. These 433 observations are fairly 
evenly spread over all of the MSAs. MSAs with the largest numbers of Spanish speakers 
are Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA (90 observations) and New York, NY (32 
observations). Numbers of observations in other MSAs range from 1 to 21 (Chicago, IL). 
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To test for differential effects on Spanish only speakers, I interact the Spanish 
dummy variable with the own-group Hispanic interactions. The Spanish dummy is also 
interacted with the Hispanic quality measure and the Hispanic network quantity 
measures. The differential effect of networks on Spanish only speakers is given by the 
coefficients on the "Spanishj* Hispanic Network" variables. Results from this exercise 
are in Table 8. The coefficient on the "Spanish;* Hispanic Network" constructed with the 
fraction measure is positive and significant at the 10 percent level, while the coefficients 
on the "Spanishi* Hispanic Network" variables constructed with the clustering and 
concentration variables are positive and significant at the 1 percent level.104 While the 
differential network effects on Spanish speaking households suggested by the coefficients 
on the "Spanishj* Hispanic Network" variables are positive and significant, I cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that the overall effect of networks on Spanish speaking 
households (given by the sum of the "Hispanicj*Hispanic Network" and "Spanishj* 
Hispanic Network" coefficients) is statistically different from zero in any of the 
models105. However, the positive and significant coefficients on the "Spanish;* Hispanic 
Network" variables suggest that whatever is driving the negative point estimates of the 
These coefficient estimates are robust to dropping MSAs with the largest numbers of outliers: Chicago 
IL, Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA, and New York, NY. It is troubling the "HispaniCi*Hispanic Network" 
coefficients are negative and significant at the 10 percent level in the models using the fraction and 
clustering measures, but these negative effects disappear when observations from Massachusetts are 
dropped from the estimation while the size and significance of the "Spanishj* Hispanic Network" 
coefficients are maintained. I was unable to link this effect to a specific MSA in Massachusetts, and 
dropping the entire New England region produces similar results to dropping Massachusetts. I also 
experiment with adding multiple network measures into the same model. Results are typically weaker, and 
including two network measures in the same equation results in twice as many interaction terms, which 
might be slicing the data too thin. 
1051 can reject the equality of the coefficients ("HispaniCi*Hispanic Network" = "Spanishj* Hispanic 
Network") in the Fraction and Clustering regressions, and I can reject that the joint effect 
("HispaniCj*Hispanic Network" = "Spanish;* Hispanic Network"=0) is equal to zero in all three models. 
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"Hispanicj*Hispanic Network" coefficients is less relevant for Spanish speaking 
households, possibly due to network effects. Even though the overall effect of networks 
on Spanish speaking households is not statistically different from zero, the positive 
coefficient estimates on the "Spanish;* Hispanic Network" variables still may suggest the 
presence of network effects, but the evidence is considerably weaker than if the sum of 
the effects of the two network variables had been statistically significant. 
Results from the baseline estimation show no significant network effects when 
networks are defined along racial or ethnic lines. However, there is weak evidence that 
network effects may be important among individuals who speak only Spanish. This 
suggests that networks operate primarily through language, or that network effects 
defined simply by race or ethnicity are not strong enough to identify econometrically at 
the MSA level. To test the robustness of the differential Spanish language effects, I first 
estimate models using both years of data (1994 and 2000) to determine whether the 
estimates are robust to the inclusion of State, MSA, and year fixed effects106. Results 
from the repeated cross section estimation are similar to the results from the baseline 
estimation with a few exceptions. In the repeated cross section, the coefficient on the 
"Hispanicj*Hispanic Network" variable constructed with the concentration measure is 
positive and significant at the 10 percent level. As before, the coefficients on the 
"Hispanicj*Hispanic Network" variables constructed with the fraction and clustering 
measures are negative and significant at the 10 percent level . Among the three 
"Spanishi* Hispanic Network" variables, none is significant at conventional levels, but 
106
 State fixed effects are included since some MSAs cross state lines. 
107
 Dropping Massachusetts once again eliminates the significance of these coefficient estimates. 
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the "Spanish;* Hispanic Network" variables constructed with the fraction and clustering 
measures approach statistical significance at the 10 percent level (t = 1.56 and t=1.63, 
respectively). As discussed in Chapter 2.2, given the lack of variation over time in the 
network quantity variables, it is not unexpected that the results would become weaker 
with the inclusion of state, year, and MSA fixed effects. Again, the strongest evidence of 
network effects occurs among Spanish speaking households, but the evidence is weak 
because the sum of the "Hispanici*Hispanic Network" and "Spanish;* Hispanic 
Network" coefficients is not statistically different from zero in any of the models. 
As an additional check of the robustness of the results reported in Table 8, I 
estimate the models using the simulated eligibility instrument as the measure of network 
quality. The coefficients on the "Hispanicj*Hispanic Network" variables constructed 
with the fraction and clustering measures are negative, but in this model only the 
coefficient on the network variable constructed with the fraction measure is significant at 
the 10 percent level. As in the pooled cross section, the coefficients on the "Spanish;* 
Hispanic Network" variables are positive but are not statistically significant. T-statistics 
for the coefficient estimates are 1.12, 1.53, and 1.42 for the "Spanish;* Hispanic 
Network" variables constructed with the fraction, clustering, and concentration measures, 
respectively. Thus, the results are weaker when using this alternate measure of network 
quality, but this may be a product of the fact that simulated eligibility is only a proxy for 
actual enrollment rates. As before, I cannot reject that the sum of the 
"Hispanic;*Hispanic Network" and "Spanish;* Hispanic Network" coefficients is equal to 
zero in any of the models. 
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To verify that the estimated differential effects of networks on Spanish speaking 
households is stronger for those more likely to be Medicaid eligible, I conduct a "straw 
man" test by estimating the models using the 7,930 children from families above 300 
percent of the FPL. Of the 7,930 children from families above 300 percent of the FPL, 
92 reside in households where Spanish is the only language spoken by the adults. Results 
from this exercise are reported in Table 11. The coefficients on the "Spanish;* Hispanic 
Network" variables are negative for all three of the network measures. However, it is 
troubling that the coefficients on the "Hispanic;*Hispanic Network" variables are positive 
in all three models. These estimates are significant at the 1 percent level in the models 
that use clustering and concentration to construct the network variable. These effects are 
driven entirely by individuals between 300 and 400 percent of the FPL living in New 
York108. Estimating models on children above 400 percent of the FPL reduces the size 
and significance of both "Hispanic;*Hispanic Network" coefficients. The coefficients on 
the "Spanish;* Hispanic Network" become positive in these models but are not 
statistically significant. Similarly, dropping New York from the estimation eliminates the 
significance of the "HispaniCi*Hispanic Network" coefficients in all three models, while 
the "Spanish;* Hispanic Network" coefficients remain virtually unaffected. I conclude 
that the Spanish language results in Table 8 are robust to this exercise, although this is 
not unexpected given the small number of observations from Spanish speaking 
households. 
Of the 1,854 children from families with incomes between 300 and 400 percent of the FPL, 163 (87 
percent) are coded as having been enrolled in Medicaid at some point during the year. The state with the 
largest number of enrollees from families in this income range is New York (23 observations). 
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Given that the only evidence of network effects thus far is the differential Spanish 
language results, I consider the possibility that these estimated effects may be driven by 
the choice of model specification. If the results are robust to the choice of model 
specification, then we would expect them to appear when simpler models are estimated, 
such as those found in BLM (2000). These models do not include white children in the 
estimation due to the absence of quantity measures and do not allow for potential cross 
group effects. The results of this exercise are reported in Table 12. The coefficient on 
the "Network" variable, now restricted to be equal for all three groups, is insignificant for 
all three network quantity measures, and the coefficients on the "Spanish,* Network" 
variables are negative and not statistically significant. 
To consider the possibility that network effects differ by group and that the 
restriction of equality is responsible for the insignificant coefficients on the "Spanish^ 
Network" variables, I estimate similar models that allow for differential own-group 
effects109. Results of this exercise are reported in Table 13. In these models, the 
coefficients on the "Spanishj* Hispanic Network" variables become positive in all three 
cases, but the only statistically significant effect occurs when the "Spanishj* Hispanic 
Network" variable is constructed with the concentration variable (t = 1.98). However, the 
fact that the "Hispanic Network" variable is not statistically different from either the 
"Asian Network" or "Black Network" variables in any of the models highlights the 
sensitivity of the Spanish language results in these simpler models. Given the lack of 
109
 To do this, I separately enter variables for each group's network. For example, the "Black Network" 
variable is equal to the "Network" variable from the previous exercise if the child is black, and zero 
otherwise. This setup is algebraically equivalent to interacting the Network variable from the previous 
exercise with two of the three race dummies. However, in the chosen setup the coefficients on the Network 
variables are compared to a baseline effect of zero, which allows for easier interpretation of the results. 
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statistical differences between the three network measures, we would expect the Spanish 
language interactions to be similar in both specifications. The results of these two 
versions of the BLM (2000) estimation suggest that the Spanish language results found in 
my earlier models hinge on allowing for cross group effects and including white children 
in the estimation to help soak up unobserved MSA level characteristics. 
Overall, I do not find evidence of network effects as a determinant of Medicaid 
enrollment. The strongest evidence is found when looking for differential network 
effects among individuals who speak Spanish. These results become only slightly 
weaker when models are estimated with a repeated cross section and an alternative 
measure of network quality. Although I observe a positive and significant differential 
effect of networks on Spanish speaking households in the baseline model, I cannot reject 
that the overall effect, given by the sum of the "Hispanic; *Hispanic Network" and 
"Spanish;* Hispanic Network" coefficients is non-zero. Further, these results are not 
robust to different model specifications, such as the simpler models estimated in BLM 
(2000), and this casts doubt on their validity. Therefore, the conclusion that networks are 




In this paper I have explored the role of social networks in determining Medicaid 
enrollment. I do not find any evidence to suggest that network effects are an important 
determinant of Medicaid enrollment when networks are defined along racial or ethnic 
lines, and I find only Weak evidence that network effects are important among individuals 
who speak only Spanish. This may imply that networks operate primarily through 
language, but the evidence is suggestive at best. The results for Spanish speaking 
individuals become weaker in the exercises designed to test the robustness of the results, 
the overall (rather than the differential) effect is not statistically different from zero, and I 
do not find similar language effects when estimating models similar to those estimated in 
BLM (2000). 
The results of this study draw attention to the difficulty in uncovering network 
effects in an econometric analysis. Despite the use of three alternative measures of 
network quantity and two alternative measures of network quality, I do not find evidence 
that network effects explain the cross community variation in Medicaid enrollment. 
Using the housing measures of residential clustering and concentration, which should 
model more accurately the size and strength of an individual's network, does not generate 
results that are qualitatively different from those found when using the simple proportion 
of the population in an individual's reference group. Similarly, estimating simple 
models, such as those in BLM (2000), and more complex models designed to control for 
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unobserved MSA level characteristics that may be correlated with the network variables 
does not help to identify any significant network effects. 
While it is possible that the MSA is too broad of a geographic definition of 
networks to be able to precisely estimate the effect of networks on Medicaid enrollment, 
moving to a smaller geographic area would leave the analysis prone to the types of 
omitted regional factors that drove the baseline results in Aizer and Currie (2004). 
Alternatively, it could be the case that the only network effects strong enough to be 
identified in an econometric analysis are those that operate through language, such as 
those found in BLM (2000) and Deri (2005). Whatever the case may be, despite my 
thorough analysis, I do not find evidence to support the network effects hypothesis with 
respect to child enrollment in Medicaid. Although factors such as residential housing 
patterns and the racial composition of communities are not themselves policy 
instruments, a better understanding of the role that social networks play in spreading 
information about the availability of public programs would be useful information that 
could help to guide policy regarding outreach efforts and the advertising of public 
programs. 
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;T2 sthe sum of all tj in area n2 up to area n 
iCii jthe exponential transform of -djj [= exp(-djj)] 
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Cont. Table 3 







































































































































Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Data are from the 1994 and 2000 Current 
Population Surveys. The sample includes children from the youngest child in each 
family and contains families living in identifiable MS As with incomes below 300 percent 
of the Federal Poverty Line. 
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Biloxi, MS 
Fort Worth, TX 
Tuscon, AZ 

































































Notes: Clustering measures for randomly drawn MS As for each racial group in each 
year. Each Census region is represented. The range is [0,1]. 
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Notes: Concentration measures for randomly drawn MS As for each racial group in each 
year. Each Census region is represented. The range is [0,1]. 
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Table 6: Changes in Segregation Measures 1994 to 2000 
Hispanic Clustering 
Correlation: 0.951 
Min Change: 0 
Max Change: 0.397 
Avg Change: 0.021 
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Min Change: 0 
Max Change: 0.134 
Avg Change: 0.020 


















Min Change: 0 
Max Change: 0.197 
Avg Change: 0.018 


















Min Change: 0 
Max Change: 0.131 
Avg Change: 0.012 
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Min Change: 0 
Max Change: 0.083 
Avg Change: 0.010 


















Min Change: 0 
Max Change: 0.056 
Avg Change: 0.012 








Santa Cruz, CA 







Notes: This table reports the MS As with the largest absolute changes in the segregation 
measures for each group between 1994 and 2000. Descriptive statistics of the absolute 
changes are reported below the name of the measure in the first column. 
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Table 7: Within Group Network Effects for Individuals Below 300% of the FPL in 
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Notes: Results are from linear probability models. *, **, *** Denote significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Dependent variable is Medicaid coverage. Regressions include 
child age dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the MSA level. Results for control variables 
are reported in the appendix. 
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Cont. Table 8 
Asian Network 





















Notes: Results are from linear probability models. *, **, *** Denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Dependent variable is Medicaid coverage. 
Regressions include child age dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the MSA level. 
Results for control variables are reported in the appendix. 
Table 9: Within Group Network and Spanish Language Effects for Individuals 
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Cont. Table 9 
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Notes: Result are from linear probability models. *, **, *** Denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Dependent variable is Medicaid coverage. 
Regressions include age, MSA, and State fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at 
the MSA level. Results for control variables are reported in the appendix. 
Table 10: Spanish Language Effects for Individuals Below 300% of the FPL in the 
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Notes: Results are from linear probability models. *, **, *** Denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Dependent variable is Medicaid coverage. 
Regressions include child age dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the MSA level. 
Results for control variables are reported in the appendix. 
Table 11: Straw Man Test for Spanish Language Effects for Individuals Above 
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Cont. Table 11 
Asian Network 





















Notes: Results are from linear probability models. *, **, *** Denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Dependent variable is Medicaid coverage. 
Regressions include child age dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the MSA level. 
Results for control variables are reported in the appendix. 
Table 12: Replication of Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan (2000) Model for 




Mom works part time 
Mom doesn't work 
Dad works part time 
Dad doesn't work 
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Notes: Results are from linear probability models. *, **, *** Denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Dependent variable is Medicaid coverage. 
Regressions include age, State, and MSA fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at 
the MSA level. 
Table 13: Replication of Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan (2000) Model for 
Individuals Below 300% of the FPL in the Year 2000 with Spanish Language Effects 











































































































Notes: Results are from linear probability models. *, **, *** Denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Dependent variable is Medicaid coverage. 
Regressions include age, State, and MSA fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at 
the MSA level. Results for control variables are reported in the appendix. 
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Figure 1: Racial Map of Boulder, Colorado 
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Figure 2: Racial Map of Reading, Pennsylvania 
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Notes: Results are from linear probability models. *, **, *** Denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Dependent variable is Medicaid coverage. 
Regressions include child age dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the MSA level. 
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Notes: Results are from linear probability models. *, **, *** Denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Dependent variable is Medicaid coverage. 
Regressions include child age dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the MSA level. 
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Notes: Result are from linear probability models. *, **, *** Denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Dependent variable is Medicaid coverage. 
Regressions include age, MSA, and State fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at 
the MSA level. 
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Notes: Results are from linear probability models. *, **, *** Denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Dependent variable is Medicaid coverage. 
Regressions include child age dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the MSA level. 
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Notes: Results are from linear probability models. *, **, *** Denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Dependent variable is Medicaid coverage. 
Regressions include child age dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the MSA level 
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Notes: Results are from linear probability models. *, **, *** Denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Dependent variable is Medicaid coverage. 
Regressions include age, State, and MSA fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at 
the MSA level. 
